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| Georgia 11th Infantry Battalion Organized 25 October 1861 Mustered 12 May 1862 Battles Fought: Battle at James Island, South Carolina on 10 June 1862; Source: The Union Army, vol. 6, p. 521 Detachments of 87th Pennsylvania, 45th Pennsylvania, 47th New York Infantry and Company E, 3rd U. S. Artillery. While six companies of the 47th N. Y. were doing picket duty on the afternoon of the 10th they were attacked by a superior force of the enemy and compelled to retire. A few minutes later a picket guard consisting of the 87th Pa. and two companies of the 47th N. Y. were attacked, but held the enemy in check until the arrival of the artillery and reinforcements. The Federal loss was 3 killed and 13 wounded. The Confederate casualties were not reported, but the Union troops buried 16 of their dead and captured 6 of their wounded. Battle at Chickamauga, Georgia on 19 September 1863; Source: The Union Army, vol. 5 Chickamauga., Sept. 19-20, 1863. Army of the Cumberland. At the battle of Chickamauga the Union forces, commanded by Maj.-Gen. William S. Rosecrans, were organized as follows: the 14th corps, Maj.-Gen. George H. Thomas, was made up of the four divisions of Baird, Negley, Brannan and Reynolds; the 20th corps, Maj. Gen. Alexander D. McCook, consisted of the three divisions of Davis, Johnson and Sheridan ; the 21st corps Maj.Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden, included the divisions of Wood, Palmer and Van Cleve; the reserve corps, Maj.-Gen. Gordon Granger, was made up of the divisions of Steedman and Daniel McCook; the cavalry corps, Brig.-Gen. Robert B. Mitchell, embraced the divisions of Col. Edward M. McCook and Brig.-Gen.George Crook. The effective strength of the entire Army of the Cumberland was slightly less than 60,000 men of all arms. The Confederate army, commanded by Gen. Braxton Bragg, was divided into the right and left wings. The right, commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Leonidas Polk, was composed of Cheatham's division of Polk's corps; Lieut.-Gen. D. H. Hill's corps, consisting of Cleburne's and Breckenridge's divisions; the reserve corps, Maj.-Gen. W. H. T. Walker, including the divisions of Walker and Liddell. The left, commanded by Lieut.-Gen. James Longstreet, embraced Hindman's division of Polk's corps; Longstreet's corps, commanded by Maj.-Gen. John B. Hood, and consisting of the divisions of Hood and McLaws; Buckner's corps, Maj.Gen. Simon B. Buckner, including the divisions of Stewart, Preston and Bushrod Johnson; Wheeler's cavalry, including the divisions of Wharton and Martin; and Forrest's cavalry, consisting of the divisions of Armstrong and Pegram. The total strength of the army was not far from 72,000 men. For several days prior to the engagement both armies had been maneuvering for position. Several attempts had been made by Bragg to cut off and destroy detachments of the Union army, but they had failed, either because of the tardiness of his officers in executing his orders, or because the movements were discovered by the Federal commanders in time to thwart the designs. On the 17th McCook's corps was in McLemore's cove, between Stevens, and Dug gaps, with the remainder of the army in easy supporting distance. For the first time since the crossing of the Tennessee river the Federal forces were in position where they could be quickly concentrated. And it was well that such was the case, for Bragg, having failed to strike the army in detail, was contemplating a movement in force against Rosecrans. The 17th was occupied by him in getting his troops in position along the east bank of the Chickamauga. Wheeler, with his two divisions of cavalry, was to make a feint against the troops at McLemore's cove, while Forrest was to cover the right and front to prevent the Federals from gaining knowledge of Bragg's intentions and preparations. Bushrod Johnson's brigade came up from Ringgold and was assigned to a position at Reed's bridge, on the extreme right of the line. Walker's corps, about 6,000 strong, took position at Alexander's bridge on Johnson's left. Next in order came Buckner's corps, which was stationed near Tedford's ford. Then came Polk's corps, drawn up opposite Lee & Gordon's mills, with Hill on the extreme left. Late in the day two brigades came up from Mississippi and were united with Johnson's, thus forming a division of three brigades at Reed's bridge. That evening Bragg issued his orders for the whole line to move at 6 o'clock the next morning, cross the Chickamauga, and advance on the Federal position. His plan was for Johnson to cross at Reed's bridge, strike the Union left and force it back toward Lee & Gordon's mills, the other portions of the line to cross in succession and continue the assault from right to left, constantly pressing the Federals on the left and rear. The plan was well conceived, but, as frequently happens in war, a series of unforeseen occurrences prevented its successful execution. When Johnson began his forward movement on the morning of the 18th he was so delayed by the stubborn resistance of Minty's and Wilder's cavalry that it was 3 P.M. before he gained possession of the bridge. In the meantime ,Hood had arrived on the field and was assigned to command the division, which was further strengthened by the addition of three brigades belonging to Longstreet's corps. As soon as the bridge was gained Hood rushed his troops across and swept southward to the point where Walker was to cross and resume the assault. The Federal cavalry had been engaged throughout the forenoon in making an extended reconnaissance along the entire front and had developed the enemy's position. Finding Walker about to cross at Alexander's bridge, Wilder massed his brigade of mounted infantry at that point and, after a sharp skirmish, succeeded in destroying the bridge. This compelled Walker to cross at Byram's ford several hours behind schedule time. It was 5 P.M. before Hood had reached a position where he could menace Wilder's flank, and the latter retired toward Gordon's mills. Night fell with only about one-tenth of Bragg's army across the Chickamauga and again his plans had failed. The fighting at the two bridges, in connection with the reconnaissance, had so far indicated the Confederate plan of operations as to cause a radical change in the position of the Union troops. At 4 P.M. Thomas concentrated his corps at Crawfish Spring, where he received orders to move northward to the Chattanooga and Lafayette road and take up a position at or near Kelly's farm. He arrived there about daylight on the 19th and stationed his command to cover the roads leading to Reed's and Alexander's bridges. The morning of the 19th, therefore, found the Union army with its right resting at Crawfish Spring, where the left had been on the preceding day while the left was several miles north, prepared to contest the possession of the road, which Bragg had hoped to occupy without apposition, thus giving him an easy line of march to the Federal rear. The battle was opened on the 19th, by Thomas. Col. Daniel McCook, whose brigade had been stationed during the night on the road leading to Reed's bridge, reported the destruction of the bridge about 4 A.M., and that the only force of the enemy he could discover on the west side of the stream was one brigade, which might be cut off. Thomas ordered Brannan to send forward two brigades for this purpose, and to support Baird with the rest of his division., About 10 A.M. Croxton's brigade became engaged with Forrest's cavalry, gradually forcing him back for about half a mile upon two brigades of infantry - Wilson's and Ector's - who raised the "rebel yell" and in turn forced Croxton to retire until Baird came to his support, when the Confederates were again driven for some distance, a number of prisoners being taken. This action of Croxton's brought on the battle of Chickamauga before the Confederate troops were in the positions assigned them. It also gave Bragg the first knowledge of the fact that his right was overlapped by the Union left, and that his flank was in danger of being turned by Thomas. Hurriedly changing his plans he halted Walker who was marching toward Lee & Gordon's mills, and ordered him to make all possible speed to the relief of the right wing. Croxton's men had almost exhausted their ammunition and were moved to the rear to renew the supply. Baird's. and Brannan's divisions were then united and after some severe fighting drove Walker from their front. Baird had halted to readjust his line, when he was struck on the flank by Liddell's division, and two brigades - Scribner's and King's - were thrown into disorder and their batteries captured by the enemy. Just at this juncture R. W. Johnson's and Reynolds' divisions arrived and were immediately formed on the right of Baird. As soon as they were in position the line advanced, attacking Liddell on the flank and rear, driving him back for a mile and a half, while Brannan's men met him in front and recaptured the guns taken from Baird's brigades, the recapture being effected by the 9th Ohio at the point of the bayonet. Cheatham's division was then rushed to the support of Liddell, but Thomas had also been strongly reinforced and the Confederates were driven back upon their reserves, now posted along the west bank of the Chickamauga between Reed's and Alexander's bridges. This was followed by a lull of about an hour in which Brannan and Baird were posted in a position on the road leading from Reed's bridge to the Lafayette road north of Kelly's and ordered to hold it to the last extremity. About 3 P.M. a furious assault was made on Reynolds' right and Brannan's division was sent to his assistance, Croxton's brigade arriving just in time to check the enemy in an effort to turn Reynolds' flank and gain his rear. Again Thomas reformed his line and about 5 o'clock the enemy assaulted first Johnson and then Baird, but both attacks were repulsed with considerable loss to the assailants. This ended the fighting for the day. On the evening of the 19th, Rosecrans met his corps commanders in council at the house of Mrs. Glenn, and the plans for the next day's battle were arranged. Thomas was to maintain his present position holding the road to Rossville, with Brannan's division in reserve. Davis, division of the 20th corps was to close on Thomas' right, and Sheridan's division was to form the extreme right of the line. Crittenden was to have two divisions in reserve near the junction of Thomas' and McCook's lines, ready to reinforce either as circumstances might require. Davis and Sheridan were to maintain their pickets until they were driven in by the enemy. The reserve corps, under Granger, and the cavalry were to keep open the line of communications to Chattanooga. The Confederate line was also somewhat rearranged. Beginning at the right it was made up of the divisions of Breckenridge, Cleburne, Cheatham and Walker, the last two being in reserve. The left wing began with Stewart's division, which touched Cleburne' left, followed in order by Johnson and Hindman. Hood was in reserve behind Johnson, Preston was in reserve on the extreme left, and Humphrey and Kershaw, who had come up during the night, were also held in reserve. Longstreet arrived about 11 P.M. on the 19th and assumed command of the left wing. Although Bragg had failed to accomplish his ends on the 18th and 19th, he still adhered to his original plan of successive attacks from right to left, in an effort to force the Union army up the valley. Orders were accordingly issued for Breckenridge's division to attack at dawn on the 20th his assault to be followed rapidly by the other divisions throughout the entire length of the line, but constantly forcing back the Federal left until the road to Chattanooga was in possession of the Confederates. Before daylight Bragg was in the saddle near the center of his line anxiously waiting for the sound of Breckenridge's guns. The morning dawned red and sultry, with a dense fog hanging over the battle-field. During the night the Union troops had thrown up temporary breastworks of rails, logs, etc., behind which a line of determined men awaited the onset. Eight o'clock came and still no attack. Bragg then rode to the right and found the troops unprepared for an advance. All the energy possible was exerted to begin the action, but it was 9:30 before Breckenridge moved. Cleburne followed fifteen minutes later and the fight was on. At 2 A.M. Thomas had received word from Baird that his left did not rest on the road to Reed's bridge, as it was intended to do, and that to reach the road he would have to weaken his line. Thomas immediately sent a request to headquarters for Negley's division to be sent to the left to extend the line to the road, and received the assurance that the request would be granted. At 7 A.M. Negley was not in position and Thomas sent one of his staff to hasten him forward and to point out the ground he was to occupy. About the same time Rosecrans rode along the line and personally ordered Negley to lose no time in joining Thomas, at the same time directing McCook to relieve Negley and close up his line more compactly. Upon reaching the left of the line Rosecrans became convinced that the attack would begin on that flank, saw the importance of holding the road, and again rode back to hurry Negley's movements. The division then moved to the left with Beatty's brigade in advance, and Rosecrans directed Crittenden to move Wood's division to the front to fill the gap in the line caused by Negley's removal. The assault of Breckenridge fell mainly on Beatty's brigade soon after it was in position on the left and it was driven back in confusion. Several regiments of Johnson's division, with Vanderveer's and Stanley's brigades, hurled themselves into the breach, checked the advance of the enemy and finally drove trim entirely from Baird's flank and rear. Immediately following the opening attack the Confederate line advanced, striking Johnson, Palmer and Reynolds in quick succession. But, from behind their improvised fortifications, the Federals met the assaults with a bravery and determination seldom equalled on the field of battle. Fresh troops were hurried forward by Bragg, who now made a desperate effort to drive in the center and turn Thomas' right. Again and again the Confederates advanced in the face of that merciless fire and each time they were repulsed with fearful slaughter. Finding all his efforts in this direction futile, Bragg fell back to his old position. About 11 A.M. Wood received an order from headquarters to "close up on Reynolds as fast as possible, and support him."In the execution of this order a gap was left in the line, which Davis undertook to close with his reserve brigade. But Longstreet had observed the break in the line and was quick to take advantage of it. Before Davis could get his reserves into position the divisions of Stewart, Hood, Kershaw, Johnson and Hindman came rushing through the opening, sweeping everything before them, while Preston's division pressed forward to the support of the assailants. McCook vainly endeavored to check the impetuous charge of Longstreet's men with the three brigades of Heg, Carlin and Laiboldt, but they were as chaff before the wind. He then ordered Walworth and Lytle to change front and assist in repelling the assault. For a time these two contended against an overwhelming force, temporarily checking the enemy in their immediate front. But the Confederates, constantly increasing in numbers, succeeded in turning the left of these two brigades and they were forced to retire to avoid being surrounded. In this part of the engagement Gen. Lytle was killed and Hood seriously wounded. Wilder and Harrison joined their commands with that of Sheridan to aid in resisting the fierce attack, but a long line of the enemy was advancing on Sheridan's right and he was compelled to withdraw to the Dry Valley road in order to save his command. Subsequently he moved toward Rossville and effected a junction with Thomas, left on the Lafayette road. In his report Rosecrans says: "Thus Davis' two brigades, one of Van Cleve's, and Sheridan's entire division were swept from the field, and the remainder, consisting of the divisions of Baird, Johnson, Reynolds, Brannan, and Wood, two of Negley's brigades and one of Van Cleve's, were left to sustain the conflict against the whole power of the rebel army, which, desisting from pursuit on the right, concentrated their whole efforts to destroy them." This tells the situation. Not only were the troops on the right driven from the field, but several thousand men were made prisoners 40 pieces of artillery and a large number of wagon trains fell into the hands of the enemy. When McCook's forces were compelled to fall back in confusion they were not pursued. Instead, Longstreet reversed the order of battle, and when Stewart's division reached the Lafayette road it became the pivot upon which the left wing turned to the right instead of to the left, with the intention of crushing the forces under Thomas. At 11 A.M. Granger and his chief of staff were seated on the top of a hay-rick at Rossville. Through his glass Granger could see the clouds of smoke, constantly increasing in volume, while the sounds of the battle grew louder every moment. Scanning the road to the south he saw that no attack was likely to be made on his position, and rightly surmising that the whole Confederate strength was being massed against Thomas, he said to his chief "I am going to Thomas, orders or no orders." Sliding off the hay-rick he hurriedly directed Dan McCook to station his brigade at McAfee Church, to cover the Ringgold and Lafayette roads, then went to Steedman and ordered him to take his command "over there," pointing toward "Horseshoe Ridge" where Thomas was making his last stand. Along the crest of this ridge Thomas had placed Wood's and Brannan's divisions, while on the spurs to the rear was posted his artillery. If Wood had inadvertently brought about the disaster by the withdrawal of his division, causing the gap in the line, he now retrieved himself. From 1 P.M. until nightfall he bravely held his portion of the ridge, repulsing several obstinate and determined attacks of the enemy. One of these attacks was made by Bushrod Johnson, who reformed his line on a ridge running nearly at right angles to the one on which Brannan and Wood were posted. Longstreet reinforced Johnson with the divisions of Hindman and Kershaw, the object being a movement in force against the Federal right and rear. Just at this critical moment Granger and Steedman arrived and reported to Thomas, who ordered them into position on Brannan's right. Granger then ordered a charge on the Confederate lines. Steedman seized the colors of a regiment and led the way. Inspired by the example of their commander the men hurled themselves upon the enemy and after twenty minutes of hot fighting drove him from the ridge which was held by Steedman until 6 P.M., when he fell back under orders. The arrival of Granger's troops was a great advantage to Thomas in another way. By some mistake the latter's ammunition train had been ordered back to Chattanooga at the time the Union right was routed, and the supply was running low, when the arrival of Granger with about l00,000 rounds put new courage into the men as it was distributed among them. To add to the supply the troops went among the dead and gathered all they could from the cartridge boxes of their fallen comrades and foes alike. Toward the close of the day the order was given to husband the ammunition and use the bayonet as much as possible. Some of the late charges of the Confederates were repulsed with the "cold steel" alone. The gallant stand of Thomas, and the generalship he displayed in holding Horseshoe ridge in the face of superior numbers, won for him the significant sobriquet of the "Rock of Chickamauga." When Longstreet broke the Union line at noon Rosecrans himself was caught in the rout. Believing that his army was doomed to certain defeat, he went to Chattanooga to provide for the security of his bridges and, as he says in his report, "to make preliminary dispositions either to forward ammunition and supplies, should we hold our ground, or to withdraw the troops into good position." The first official intelligence that Thomas had of the unfortunate occurrence on the right was about 4 p. m. when Gen. Garfield, Rosecrans, chief of staff, arrived from Rossville. Notwithstanding the disheartening news, Thomas decided to hold his position until nightfall, if possible. The remaining ammunition was distributed and instructions given to his division commanders to be ready to move promptly when orders to that effect were issued. At 5:30 Reynolds received the order to begin the movement. Thomas himself went forward to point out the ground he wanted Reynolds to occupy and form a line to cover the withdrawal of the other troops. While passing through a strip of timber bordering the Lafayette road Thomas met two soldiers, who had been in search of water, and who informed him that a large body of the enemy was drawn up in line in the woods just in front advancing toward the Union lines. Reynolds was ordered to change the head of his column to the left, with his right resting on the road, and charge the enemy. At the same time the artillery opened a converging fire from both right and left, while Turchin made a dashing charge with his brigade, utterly routing the Confederates and driving them clear beyond Baird's position on the left, capturing over 200 prisoners. Robinson's and Willich's brigades were then posted in positions to cover the retirement of the troops, the former on the road leading through the ridge, and the latter on the ridge to the right. Wood, Brannan and Granger fell back without molestation, but Baird, Johnson and Palmer were attacked as they were drawing back to their lines. This attack was made by L. E. Polk's division, but by this time it had become too dark to move with certainty, and in advancing the Confederate line was changed so that it formed an acute angle, the troops firing into each other. The withdrawal from the field was accomplished with such precision and quietness that it was not discovered by Bragg until after sunrise the following morning. Thomas took up a position in the vicinity of Rossville and remained there during the 21st, retiring to Chattanooga that night. Bragg's army had been so severely punished in the two days' fighting that he was disinclined to continue the conflict. Some desultory skirmishing occurred on the 21st, but no general movement was undertaken. The Union losses in the battle of Chickamauga, according to the official reports, were 1,657 killed, 9,756 wounded, and 4,757 missing. The Confederate losses, as given in "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," amounted to 2,389 killed, 13,412 wounded, and 2,003 missing. Battle at Missionary Ridge, Tennessee on 25 November 1863; Battle at Augusta, Georgia on 01 December 1864; Battle at Fort McAllister, Georgia on 13 December 1864; Source: The Union Army, vol. 5 Fort McAllister., Dec 13, 1864. 2nd Division, 15th Corps, Sherman's Army. Incidental to the taking of Savannah by Sherman's army the 2nd division of the 15th corps, under Brig.-Gen. W. B. Hazen, moved down the right bank of the Ogeechee river to take Fort McAllisterrrisoned by a force of 250 men under Maj. G. W. Anderson. Hazen reached the vicinity about 11 a.m. About a mile from the fort a picket was captured, who revealed the whereabouts of a line of torpedoes in the road. Some time was lost in removing them, and leaving eight regiments at that point as a reserve, Hazen pushed on with the other nine to within about 600 yards of the works. Here the troops were deployed, the skirmishers keeping the attention of the Confederate gunners. At 4:45 p.m. a charge was ordered and at precisely 5 o'clock the fort was carried, after 15 minutes of desperate fighting which drove the Confederates to their bomb-proofs. Just outside the works a line of torpedoes had been placed, many of which were exploded by the tread of the men, and worked havoc in some parts of the Union line. The Federal casualties amounted to 24 killed and 110 wounded. The enemy's loss was 48 in killed and wounded, and the rest of the garrison captured, together with 24 cannon, 40 tons of ammunition, all the small arms, horses and equipments of the garrison, a month's supply of provisions and a large amount of private stores which had been sent to the fort for safe-keeping. Battle at Savannah, Georgia on 21 December 1864; Source: The Union Army, vol. 6 Savannah., Dec. 10-21, 1864. 14th, 15th, 17th and 20th Army Corps and Kilpatrick's Cavalry. In the campaign of 1864 it fell to the lot of Maj.-Gen. W. T. Sherman to lead the hosts that were to sever the Confederacy. The plan was to capture or defeat the Confederate army under Gen. J. E. Johnston (later under Gen. J. B. Hood), after which Sherman was to press forward to some available point on the seacoast, establish a base of supplies, then move northward, unite his army with that of Grant and overcome Lee at Richmond. As soon as Hood was compelled to evacuate Atlanta he started his army northward in the hope of carrying the war back into Tennessee, or at least drawing Sherman after him and thus save the Confederacy from being cut in twain. Sherman did follow until after Hood had passed Decatur, Ala., and then turned back to execute his original plan, leaving Gen. Thomas to look after Hood. Early in November Sherman assembled his forces at Atlanta and organized his army into the right and left wings. The former, commanded by Maj.-Gen. O. O. Howard, consisted of the 15th and 17th army corps, and the latter, under command of Maj.-Gen. H. W. Slocum, was composed of the 14th and 20th corps. The 15th corps was commanded by Maj.-Gen. P. J. Osterhaus and was made up of four divisions, commanded by Brig.-Gens. C. R. Woods, W. B. Hazen, J. E. Smith and J. M. Corse. The 17th corps commanded by Maj.-Gen. Frank P. Blair, was composed of three divisions, respectively commanded by Maj.Gen. J. A. Mower, Brig.-Gen. M. D. Leggett and Brig.-Gen. Giles A. Smith. In the left wing the 14th corps was under the command of Bvt. Maj.-Gen. J. C. Davis and was composed of three divisions, commanded by Brig.-Gens. W. P. Carlin, J. D. Morgan and Absalom Baird. The 20th corps, under Brig.-Gen. A. S. Williams, also included three divisions commanded by Brig. Gens. N. J. Jackson, J. W. Geary and W. T. Ward. In addition to these infantry commands there were 16 light batteries and the cavalry division of Brig.-Gen. Judson Kilpatrick, composed of the two brigades commanded by Col. E. H. Murray and Col. S. D. Atkins, and numbering about 5,500 men. Sherman's whole army numbered about 62,000 men of all arms. Howard's wing retained the old name of the Army of the Tennessee, and Slocum's wing took the name of the Army of Georgia. On Nov. 12, Sherman sent a telegram to Thomas at Nashville, cut the wires immediately afterward, and stood isolated in the heart of the enemy's country. Two days later the "March to the Sea" was begun, the different commands moving on parallel roads, but all under orders to reach Savannah without delay. Each division was accompanied by a train of supplies to be used in case of emergency, but the general instructions were to subsist by foraging to the greatest possible extent. Numerous skirmishes occurred on the march, each of which is herein treated under its proper title. On Dec. 10, Sherman drew his lines about Savannah, which was at that time occupied by Gen. Hardee, with a force of some 18,000 men. Slocum struck the Charleston railroad at the Savannah river, the 20th corps extending from the river to the Central railroad, where the 14th corps joined and extended the line some distance beyond the Ogeechee canal. From there the 17th and 15th corps (Howard's wing) completed the line to King's bridge on the Ogeechee river. While the army was on the march from Atlanta Maj.-Gen. J. G. Foster had collected at Port Royal, S.C., 20 miles up the coast, a large store of supplies for Sherman's use when he reached the coast. The first problem was to open communications with Foster and get the supplies, as foraging near Savannah yielded but meager results, and some of the commands were already on short rations. Rear-Adm. Dahlgren's blockading squadron lay off the coast opposite the mouths of the Savannah and Ogeechee rivers but in order to reach the fleet it was necessary to pass Fort McAllister, which commanded the Ogeechee river. The Confederates had destroyed King's bridge, a structure 1,000 feet long, but it was rebuilt under the direction of Howard's chief engineer, Capt. Reese, and on the 13th was ready for use. Hazen's division was sent over and captured the fort. (See Fort McAllister.) This opened the river so that vessels could reach the right of Sherman's army and the question of a base of supplies on the sea-coast was settled. Sherman's object was to capture Hardee's entire army. To this end the railroads running into the city were destroyed, cutting off this means of retreat, as well as Hardee's sources of supplies. One avenue of escape was still open to the Confederates, however, and that was to cross the Savannah river, and by means of the Union causeway reach the Charleston railroad, which was still in operation to Hardeeville, about 15 miles from Savannah. Foster had made an effort to cut this road near Grahamville, S.C., but it had met with failure, though he still held a position near the Coosawhatchie river where his guns commanded the road, compelling all trains to run at night. In the Savannah river, directly in front of the city, is Hutchinson's island and immediately above it is Argyle island. Part of Hutchinson's island was occupied by the enemy, but it was deemed feasible to throw a force across the river and gain the causeway. Sherman had sent to Hilton Head for some heavy ordnance, intending to carry the enemy's works by assault as soon as the causeway was in his possession. On the night of the 11th and the morning of the 12th Williams sent over the 3rd Wis. infantry, under Col. Hawley, to occupy Argyle island, while Winegar's N.Y. battery, supported by the 22nd Wis., were moved up to the bank of the river to cover the channel between the island and the main land. Later in the day these troops drove back two gunboats that were coming down the river, and captured the armed steamer Resolute, which had been acting as tender, and which had been disabled during the action. This affair demonstrated that it was impracticable to move any considerable body of men across the river, as the enemy's gunboats could destroy the pontoons across the main channel and cut off any detachment on the island or the Caroline shore. Sherman now determined to reach the causeway via Port Royal. On the 17th several 30-pounder Parrott guns arrived at King's bridge, and the same day a formal demand was made for the surrender of the place. Upon receiving Hardee's refusal to surrender Sherman directed Slocum to get the siege guns in position and made all the preparations necessary for an assault, while he went in person to Port Royal to make arrangements to reinforce Hatch's division on the Coosawhatchie, carry the railroad and then move toward Savannah until the causeway was occupied. While these movements were under way Hardee forestalled Sherman's plans by evacuating the city on the night of the 20th, moving his army and light artillery over the river and gaining the causeway before the Union troops had time to reach it. At daybreak on the 21st Geary's division of the 20th corps occupied the town. About 250 heavy siege guns, 31,000 bales of cotton, large stores of ammunition cotton, rice, etc., a number of locomotives and cars, 4 steamboats, and other valuable property fall into the hands of the Federal armies, though the escape of Hardee's army was a disappointment to Sherman, who felt confident of its capture or destruction. Notwithstanding skirmishing had been daily carried on during the ten days of investment, the Union losses were slight, the most serious being incurred in the capture of Fort McAllister. Battle at Southwest Creek on 08 March 1865 Battle at Coleman's Creek, Georgia, on 04 April 1865 |
| Georgia 9th Infantry Regiment Organized 11 June 1861 Mustered 09 April 1865 Battles Fought: Battle at Price's Farm, Virginia on 27 June 1861 Battle at Leesburg, Virginia on 21 October 1861 Battle at Centreville, Virginia on 15 November 1861 Battle at Rappahannock Bridge, Virginia on 29 March 1862 Battle at Yorktown, Virginia on 19 April 1862; Source: The Union Army, Vol. 6, p. 961 2nd, 3d and 4th Army Corps, Army of the Potomac. Yorktown is situated on the right bank of the York river, about 20 miles from Fortress Monroe. Opposite the town is Gloucester point, projecting into the river and reducing its width about one-half. A short distance from Yorktown the Warwick river rises and flows a southerly direction into the James river. In the early spring of 1862 the Confederate fortifications at Yorktown, Gloucester point and along the Warwick were manned by some 12,000 to 15,000 troops, all under the command of Gen. J. B. Magruder. The Army of the Potomac, numbering about 145,000 men, was divided into four corps and was under the command of Maj.-Gen. George B. McClellan. The 1st corps, commanded by Gen. Irwin McDowell, was composed of the divisions of Franklin, McCall and King; the 2nd corps, Gen. Edwin V. Sumner, embraced the divisions of Richardson, Blenker and Sedgwick; the 3d corps, Gen. S. P. Heintzelman, consisted of the divisions of Porter, Hooker and Hamilton, and the 4th corps, under command of Gen. E. D. Keyes, included the divisions of Couch, Smith and Casey. The reduction of Yorktown was the initial movement of the Peninsular campaign. McClellan's plan was to land the main body of his army at Fortress Monroe, establish a base there, and then move up the peninsula between the York and James rivers, while McDowell's corps was to land about 4 miles below Yorktown and move directly against that place. Or, if conditions were favorable, McDowell was to land on the left bank of the York river and carry the enemy's works at Gloucester point, after which he was to move to West Point, thereby gaining the rear of the works at Yorktown, which would compel the enemy to evacuate them or be cut off. In the execution of this plan McClellan expected the cooperation of the gunboats under command of Flag-officer Goldsborough, then lying in the vicinity of Fortress Monroe. Two divisions of Heintzelman's corps reached Fortress Monroe on March 23, but owing to limited transportation facilities nearly two weeks elapsed before enough troops had been assembled there to begin the advance. The enemy, well aware of McClellan's movements, took advantage of this delay to strengthen his works all along the line. McClellan arrived at Fortress Monroe on April 2 and reported 58,000 men, with 100 pieces of artillery, as his total force with which to begin the campaign, instead of the 145,000 he had expected. On the 5th he received notice from Washington that McDowell's corps had been withdrawn from his command, and at the same time Goldsborough announced that he did not "feel able to detach to the assistance of the army a suitable force to attack the water batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester." This necessitated a change in the entire plan of campaign. In his report McClellan says: "It was now, of course, out of my power to turn Yorktown by West Point. I had therefore no choice left but to attack it directly in front, as I best could with the force at my command." Reconnaissances had already commenced along the line of the Warwick river, and on the very day that McClellan received the notice of McDowell's withdrawal skirmishes occurred at Lee's mill and the junction of the Warwick and Yorktown roads. In these reconnaissances Gen. W. F. Smith, commanding the 2nd division of Keyes' corps, reported the weakest part of the line to be near Lee's mill, and by McClellan's order a second assault was made at that point on April 16, but the line held fast. (See Lee's Mill and Warwick Road). McClellan then determined to besiege the place. Gen. Fitz John Porter was placed in charge of the construction of batteries, in which he was assisted by Gen. W. F. Barry, chief of artillery, and Gen. J. G. Barnard, chief of engineers. About 100 heavy Parrott guns, mortars and howitzers were placed in position to bear upon the town at a range of from 1,500 to 2,000 yards, and on May 1 fire was opened from the first battery with good effect. Magruder's object in holding his line of defenses at Yorktown and on the Warwick river was "to keep the enemy in check by an intervening line until the authorities might take such steps as should be deemed necessary to meet a serious advance of the enemy on the Peninsula." By the time McClellan's siege guns were in position this object had been attained. May 6 was fixed as the date when all the Union batteries were to be opened on the intrenchments at Yorktown, but on the night of the 3d the entire Confederate line was evacuated. Fifty-six pieces of artillery, all in good condition except three, were abandoned by the Confederates in their retreat as well as large quantities of ammunition, all their camp equipage, etc. Battle at Yorktown, Virginia on 25 April 1862; Source: The Union Army, Vol. 6, p. 961 April 5-May 4, 1862. Same as above. Battle at Yorktown, Virginia on 04 May 1862; Source: The Union Army, Vol. 6, p. 961 April 5-May 4, 1862. Same as above. Battle at Fair Oaks, Virginia on 18 June 1862; Source: The Union Army, Vol. 5, p. 388 Detachment of the 1st Brigade, 2nd Division, 3d Army Corps. Brig.-Gen. C. S. Grover, commanding the brigade, was ordered to make a reconnaissance of the wooded tract lying between the Williamsburg road and the Richmond & York River railroad. Grover sent Col. Wyman, with the 16th Mass. and a section of Bramhall's battery to perform the duty. Wyman threw forward a strong line of skirmishers, which was met by a heavy fire from a line of rifle-pits and from a battery on the right. Lieut. Martin, commanding the section of the battery, moved his guns to a position where he could enfilade the Williamsburg road and soon silenced the enemy's artillery. After developing the Confederate position Wyman retired, the object of the reconnaissance having been accomplished. The Union loss was 16 killed, 28 wounded and 15 missing, several of whom afterward came into camp. The enemy's loss was not definitely learned, but 39 dead were counted in front of the rifle-pits and 4 were captured. Battle at Garnett's Farm, Virginia on 23 June 1862 Battle at Ellison's Mill, Virginia on 26 June 1862 Battle at Cold Harbor, Virginia on 27 June 1862 Battle at Dam 1, Richmond, Virginia on 27 June 1862 Battle at Frazier's Farm, Virginia on 27 June 1862 Battle at Garnett's Farm, Virginia on 27 June 1862 Battle at Savage's Station, Virginia on 29 June 1862; Source: The Union Army, vol. 6 Savage Station, Va., June 29, 1862. The action at Savage Station was an attack by the Confederates under Gen. Magruder on McClellan's rear during the change of base to the James river, and was one of the Seven Days' battles. Battle at Malvern Hill, Virginia on 01 July 1862; Source: The Union Army, vol. 6 Malvern Hill, Va, July 1, 1862. The battle of Malvern Hill was the last of the engagements during the Seven Days, battles (q. v.). Battle on 08 July 1862 Battle at Rappahannock River, Virginia on 11 August 1862 Battle at Rappahannock Bridge, Virginia on 20 August 1862 Battle at Rappahannock River, Virginia on 25 August 1862 Battle at Rappahannock Station, Virginia on 26 August 1862 Battle at 2nd Manassas, Virginia on 28 August 1862 ; Source: The Union Army, vol. 5, p. 187 Bull Run, Va., Aug. 30, 1862. Army of Virginia and Army of the Potomac. In this battle, known as the second Bull Run, is included the action at Gainesville late on the afternoon of the 28th, and the battle of Groveton on the 29th. Gen. Pope's forces at this time consisted of the Army of Virginia and the Army of the Potomac. The former was made up of three corps: the 1st, commanded by Maj.-Gen. Franz Sigel, included the divisions of Schenck, Von Steinwehr and Schurz, the independent brigade of Gen. Robert H. Milroy, and the cavalry brigade of Col. John Beardsley. The 2nd corps, under the command of Maj.-Gen. N. P. Banks, was composed of the divisions of Williams and Greene and the cavalry brigade of Gen. John Buford. The 3rd corps, commanded by Maj.-Gen. Irvin McDowell, consisted of the two divisions of King and Ricketts, the cavalry brigade of Gen. George D. Bayard, and the reserve corps under Brig.-Gen. Samuel D. Sturgis. Reynolds' division was temporarily attached to this corps. In the Army of the Potomac there were also three corps, the 3rd, 5th and 9th. The 3rd was commanded by Maj.-Gen. S. P. Heintzelman and consisted of the divisions of Kearny and Hooker. The 5th was commanded by Maj.-Gen. Fitz John Porter and embraced the divisions of Morell and Sykes. The 9th corps commanded by Maj.-Gen. Jesse L. Reno, included two divisions the 1st commanded by Maj.-Gen. Isaac Stevens, and the 2nd by Reno in person. With this corps was also the 1st provisional brigade of the Kanawha division, commanded by Col. E. P. Scammon. The 1st brigade, 1st division of the 6th corps, Brig.-Gen. George W. Taylor, was engaged at Bull Run bridge toward the close of the battle, and there were some unattached organizations. The Confederate forces-known as the Army of Northern Virginia- were under the command of Gen. Robert E. Lee, and consisted of the right and left wings. The former, commanded by Maj.-Gen. James Longstreet, included the divisions of Anderson, D. R. Jones, Wilcox Hood and Kemper. The left wing, commanded by Maj.-Gen. Thomas J. Jackson, was composed of the divisions of Taliaferro, A. P. Hill, Ewell, and the cavalry division of Stuart. Authorities differ as to the strength of the two armies, but it is probable that Pope had about 63,000 men of all arms and Lee 54,000. By Stuart's dash upon Pope's headquarters at Catlett's station on the night of Aug. 22, the despatch book of the Federal commander fell into the hands of Lee, who learned from it the position and approximate strength of the Union forces in his front, and determined to send part of his army to the right and rear of Pope, with a view to capturing or destroying his command, which was then in the vicinity of Rappahannock Station at the point where the Orange & Alexandria railroad crosses the Rappahannock river. On the 25th, Jackson was sent via Thoroughfare gap to strike Pope in the rear, while Longstreet kept up a show of force in front. The next day the latter took up his march to join Jackson, and Pope got wind of the movement. At sunset on the 26th his forces were somewhat scattered. Reno, Kearny and Hooker were at Warrenton Junction; Sigel was at Warrenton; McDowell was confronting Longstreet at Waterloo bridge; Banks was at Fayetteville; Sykes was south of Bealeton, and Morell was at Kelly's ford, below Rappahannock Station. Orders were sent to the different commands to move toward Gainesville and Manassas Junction, with a view to concentration. Jackson had by this time gained the Federal rear and occupied the road from Gainesville to Bristoe Station. Shortly after midnight Stuart's cavalry assaulted the Union garrison at the junction and captured the place, together with the commissary and quartermaster stores collected there. About 7 a. m. on the 28th Taylor's brigade of the 6th corps came up from Alexandria and made a gallant effort to recapture the stores. In the skirmish Taylor was mortally wounded. Jackson was now in imminent danger of capture or annihilation. In one respect, however, he had the advantage of his opponent. He was aware of the positions of the various detachments of the Union forces, and could at least hazard a shrewd guess at Pope's intentions, while the latter was puzzled as to what Jackson might do. The general opinion of the Federal officers seems to have been that Jackson would move to the southward, fall on the wagon trains under Banks, then near Warrenton Junction, and join Longstreet near Warrenton. To unite with Longstreet was of paramount importance, and in order to do this Jackson resolved to move northward to the old battle-field of 13 months before, where he was well acquainted with the ground, and secure a strong position where he could hold out until Longstreet's arrival. Accordingly on the night of the 27th Taliaferro moved by the Sudley road and at daylight on the 28th was north of the Warrenton pike. At 1 a. m. on the 28th A. P. Hill moved to Centerville, and at 10 o'clock, joined Taliaferro. Ewell crossed Bull Run at Blackburn's ford, proceeded up the east side of the stream to the stone bridge, where he recrossed and by noon the whole command was together. When Jackson began this movement McDowell and Sigel were in the neighborhood of Gainesville, directly between the two wings of the Confederate army. As an evidence that Pope had no intimation of Jackson's purpose, he sent an order to McDowell at 9 p. m. on the 27th to move at daylight the next morning for Manassas. In this report he said: "If you will move promptly and rapidly at the earliest dawn of day upon Manassas Junction we shall bag the whole crowd." This order caused McDowell and Sigel to waste the greater part of the 28th in a useless march to Manassas under the impression that Jackson would wait there to be surrounded. McDowell appears to have had better judgment than Pope, for in his report he says: "I varied from your orders to march with 'my whole force' only so far as concerned Gen. Ricketts' division and the cavalry of Buford and Bayard. Knowing that Longstreet would be coming through Thoroughfare, I sent early in the morning Col. Wyndham's 1st New Jersey regiment of cavalry to the gap, and sent up other cavalry as fast as I could get hold of it, and on receiving word the enemy was coming through I detached Ricketts' division to hold him in check. This departure from your orders to move with 'my whole force' on Manassas I felt called upon to make to carry out the spirit of your plan of crushing the enemy at that place before his reinforcements, of whose position I had just received positive intelligence, could join, as those reinforcements, I thought, could be better held in check at the gap than this side of it." Before his advance reached Manassas McDowell received another despatch from headquarters, stating that the enemy was east of Bull Run, and directing him to march his command toward that place. King's division, which had formed the rear in the march of the forenoon, now became the advance. As this division was marching east on the Warrenton pike about 5 p. m. Jackson, thinking the Union army was in retreat, sent Taliaferro's division and two brigades of Ewell's against King. The latter met the attack bravely by throwing forward a strong skirmish line, supported by the infantry in force, while the batteries were placed where they could enfilade those of the enemy, compelling them to change their position. For over two hours the two lines doggedly held on amidst an incessant fire of artillery and musketry, after which the fight waned somewhat, but was continued until 9 p. m., when the enemy retreated from the field. About the time that this action commenced Jackson sent a body of cavalry down the Sudley road, to harass the rear of a retreating army as he thought, and this detachment ran into Sigel's troops marching northward to strike the pike. Here another sharp skirmish ensued in which the Federals were victorious. These two affairs are known as the battle of Gainesville. Reynolds hearing the firing, from his position near Bethlehem Church, at once put his troops in motion and late in the evening encamped near Sigel, about a mile from Groveton. King took steps to hold his position, but late that night he learned that Ricketts' who had checked Longstreet at Thoroughfare gap, was falling back toward Gainesville to avoid being cut off by a flank movement through Hopewell gap, and after consulting his brigade commanders decided to fall back to Manassas. At 1 a. m. on the 29th Ricketts also fell back toward Manassas, moving via Bristoe Station. At daylight on the 29th Reynolds occupied a position on the south side of the Warrenton pike near Groveton. Sigel's corps lay farther east, near the crossing of the Sudley road. Reno and Heintzelman were farther east, toward Centerville, while McDowell and Porter were near Manassas Junction. Jackson occupied the ridge north of the pike, behind the line of the unfinished railroad, his left resting on Catharpin run near Sudley springs, and his right on the heights not far from Groveton. Pope proceeded on the theory that, because Jackson had left Manassas so suddenly, the enemy was retreating, and prepared to strike with his whole force. McDowell and Porter were ordered to move toward Gainesville early on the 29th in order to gain the Confederate rear; Sigel was to attack the enemy's right, and Reno and Heintzelman were to move forward and engage him in front. Sigel carried out his part of the program and opened the battle of Groveton by a vigorous attack about 6 a. m. The batteries began shelling the woods and under cover of this artillery fire Schurz and Milroy advanced, the enemy falling back to the embankment formed by the railroad cut, where a fierce conflict ensued. The Federals charged the embankment twice, but each time were repulsed. The Confederates then sallied out in pursuit, but were checked by the fire from the Union batteries. Meantime Reynolds had pushed Meade's brigade across the pike in an effort to turn the enemy's right, but the movement failed because Schenck, who was supporting it, was compelled to withdraw Stahel's brigade and send it to the assistance of Milroy. In the advance on the railroad a gap was left between Schurz and Milroy. This was closed by the latter but at the expense of weakening his line. Seeing this the Confederates made a vicious charge against Schurz and succeeded in breaking his line. The men were rallied without difficulty, however, the enemy driven back to the railroad, Schimmelfennig's brigade gaining possession of a part of the embankment and holding it against repeated assaults until relieved by fresh troops in the afternoon. A little while before noon the divisions of Hooker, Kearny Reno and Stevens arrived on the field. Some of the troops belonging to these commands were used to relieve those who had been engaged all morning, but aside from some skirmishing and artillery firing there was no more aggressive action until about 4 p. m. Pope deciding to wait for McDowell and Porter to come up. These two officers, pursuant to Pope's order of the preceding evening, moved at an early hour on the Gainesville road. At 11:30 the advance was at Dawkins' branch, about 2 miles northwest of Bethlehem Church, where the enemy was encountered. This proved to be a portion of Longstreet's corps. Skirmishers were thrown forward across the branch and a few shots exchanged, but a general engagement at this point was not desirable. King's division, then near the church, was ordered to march up the Sudley road and join Reynolds, Ricketts being directed to move in the same direction soon afterward. Later McDowell advised Porter to attack the enemy in front, while with his own command he would move up the Sudley road and join the forces there on the left. Porter assumed that he was to wait until he heard from McDowell before beginning the attack and remained idle all the afternoon. This conduct on his part was made the subject of a court of inquiry. Late in the day Pope ordered Heintzelman to attack simultaneously at two points on the enemy's line. Heintzelman sent in Hooker's and Kearny's divisions, the former against the center of the line and the latter farther to the right against Hill's division. Grover's brigade led the assault made by Hooker and the charge has been described as "one of the most gallant and determined of the war." With loaded pieces and fixed bayonets they advanced slowly until the enemy's fire was drawn, when they fired a volley and rushed forward to carry the position with the bayonet. The railroad embankment was carried in a desperate hand-to-hand conflict in which bayonets and clubbed muskets were the principal weapons. The center of Jackson's line was broken by this terrific onslaught, but Grover was not supported and the advantage thus gained was of short duration as the Confederates came rushing into the breach, forcing Grover to retire. Kearny's attack was delayed until after Grover's repulse and was made with the same bravery and determination. It was successful at first and for a short time it looked as though Jackson's left had been turned. Gregg's brigade of Hill's division held on with the bayonet until the brigades of Lawton and Early could come to his relief, and these reinforcements drove Kearny back. On the march up the Sudley road King was suddenly taken ill and the command of the division fell on Brig.-Gen. John P. Hatch, who arrived on the field, accompanied by McDowell, between 5 and 6 p. m. At that moment the Confederates could be seen readjusting their line and the impression was gained by the Union generals that they were retreating. Hatch was ordered along the pike toward Groveton to convert the retreat into a rout if possible. Hatch made a dashing assault on what he believed to be the retreating army of Jackson, and encountered Hood and Evans of Longstreet's command advancing to meet him. After a sharp action of nearly an hour Hatch was compelled to fall back, leaving one piece of artillery in the hands of the enemy. About the same time Reynolds undertook to renew the attack on the extreme left, but was repulsed by the severe artillery fire of the Confederates and withdrew. The battle of Groveton was over. Not until the repulse of Hatch by Hood and Evans did Pope know that Longstreet had joined Jackson. Even then he was inclined to believe that only a small portion of the Confederate right wing had reached the scene of action. Porter arrived at headquarters early on the morning of the 30th and tried to convince the commanding general that all of Longstreet's forces had been on the field since noon of the preceding day. This statement Pope regarded as an excuse on the part of Porter for not obeying orders, and, although it was corroborated by other officers, he still clung to his cherished opinion that Longstreet had not come up. The battle of the 29th he considered a great victory, and sent a despatch to that effect to Gen. Halleck at 5 a. m. on the 30th. Flushed with this notion of victory, and believing the Confederates to be in full retreat, he resolved to continue on the offensive. Accordingly, at noon on Saturday, the 30th, he issued the following order: "The following forces will be immediately thrown forward in pursuit of the enemy, and press him vigorously during the whole day. Maj.-Gen. McDowell is assigned to the command of the pursuit. Maj.-Gen. Porter's corps will push forward on the Warrenton turnpike, followed by the divisions of Brig.-Gens. King and Reynolds. The division of Brig.-Gen. Ricketts will pursue the Haymarket road, followed by the corps of Maj.-Gen. Heintzelman, the necessary cavalry will be assigned to these columns by Maj.-Gen. McDowell, to whom regular and frequent reports will be made. The General Headquarters will be somewhere on the Warrenton turnpike." Jackson still held his position along the line of the unfinished railroad. To reach the Haymarket road in his rear Ricketts must march some 5 miles via Sudley springs. Had Jackson been inclined to retreat by that route he could have struck the road far in advance of Ricketts before that officer could have reached a point to intercept him, But Jackson had no intention of retreating. He knew that Longstreet, during the night, had moved forward to a position south of the Warrenton pike, from which he could call reinforcements if it became necessary. Hood lay across the pike a short distance west of Groveton, ready to move to the assistance of the right or left, or to hold in check any movement down the pike toward Gainesville. Behind him were Wilcox and Anderson. D. R. Jones and Kemper lay farther south, extending the line almost to the Manassas Gap railroad. This part of the line was effectually concealed by the woods and its existence was unknown to the Union officers. The engagement was opened by a fierce artillery fire and Porter pushed forward Morell's division, supported by Sykes, against Jackson's line, under the impression that the Confederates were in retreat. Farther to the right Hatch made a determined assault on the embankment, receiving a slight wound as he led his command to the charge. Both attacks were gallantly made and Jackson was so sorely pressed that he sent for reinforcements to Lee, who ordered Longstreet to send the required aid. But Longstreet knew that reinforcements were unnecessary. He had planted his batteries in a position to enfilade the Federal lines as they advanced, and now opened fire. In less than ten minutes the Union troops were compelled to retire, suffering heavy losses. A large part of the forces of Reno, Heintzelman and Ricketts were thrown against Jackson, but all failed to accomplish any permanent advantage. To advance against a sheltered foe, while at the same time subjected to an enfilading fire of artillery, was too great an undertaking. Meantime Reynolds, to whom had been assigned the duty of guarding the left against a flank movement, had discovered Jones and Kemper advancing from that direction and reported it to headquarters. He was first ordered to form his division to resist an attack, but was later directed to cross the pike and support Porter. This gave Longstreet the opportunity, of which he was not slow to avail himself, to strike the assailants on the left flank, and he hurriedly massed his unemployed forces south of the pike for that purpose. Sykes sent Warren's brigade to hold the movement in check, but it was swept aside by overwhelming numbers. All thought of "pursuit" was now abandoned by the Union commanders and the struggle became one for the possession of the pike. Longstreet advanced his whole line with a rush, Hood in advance supported by Evans, while Kemper, Jones and Anderson swung farther to the Confederate right until the line extended east of the Sudley road. West of this road was an eminence known as Bald hill, and on the east side of it, near the Henry house, was another elevation. Both had been occupied by the Federal batteries early in the morning, and these guns now did effective service in checking the impetuous advance of the enemy. The possession of these two hills was now the key to the situation. Sigel was hurried to the support of the batteries; two brigades of Ricketts' division under Gen. Tower and two more batteries were also sent forward to Bald hill, and two brigades of Sykes, division to the Henry hill, where they were soon afterward reinforced by heavy detachments from the commands of Reynolds and Meade. The battle was thus transferred to the south side of the pike, and the Federal army suddenly thrown on the defensive. Jackson, as soon as he saw that Longstreet's advance was likely to be a success, sallied out of his works and advanced toward the pike, but was met and turned back by Reno and Heintzelman. The fight now centered around Bald hill. McLean's brigade of Schenck's division was sent to the support of the troops there engaged in a stubborn defense, and held the hill against several attacks from different directions. Schenck was severely wounded while bringing up reinforcements. Schurz, division was then sent in and for a time held the Confederates back. In the fight here Gen. Tower was wounded and Col. Fletcher Webster, a son of Daniel Webster, was killed while leading his regiment, the 12th Mass., into action. Longstreet massed his forces for a final assault and by main force of superior numbers carried the hill, but not without paying a severe penalty in killed and wounded. At the Henry hill a similar scene was being enacted. Here Sykes' regulars stood in readiness to receive the onset. The two brigades were commanded by Buchanan and Chapman, veterans of the Mexican war, who had stood together at Molino del Rey. Behind them were all the troops it was possible to bring to their support, as this was the last stand that could be made west of Bull Run. If it were lost the Union army was doomed to utter defeat. Already most of the troops were falling back toward the stone bridge, and the possession of Henry hill was absolutely necessary to cover the retreat. The Confederates had exhausted most of their energies in the capture of Bald hill but they charged Sykes with a show of courage and enthusiasm only to be repulsed with severe loss. Again they advanced and again the invincible line of regulars stood the shock. Before the third attack could be made darkness fell with the hill still in the hands of the Unionists. During the night the remnant of the army fell back to Centerville. The losses of the Union army from the 25th to the 30th, including the engagements at Bristoe Stationinesville Groveton and Bull Run, amounted to 1,747 killed, 8,452 wounded and 4,263 captured or missing. Lee claims to have captured 7,000 prisoners and 30 pieces of artillery, but the facts do not bear out the statement. The reports regarding the Confederate loss are somewhat conflicting. Taking the figures of the different division and brigade commanders they had in the battles of the 28th to 30th, inclusive, 1,553 killed, 7,812 wounded and 109 missing. The probabilities are that the losses on both sides have been understated. Battle at Thoroughfare Gap, Virginia on 28 August 1862 Battle at 2nd Manassas, Virginia on 29 August 1862; Source: The Union Army, vol. 5, p. 187 Battle at 2nd Manassas, Virginia on 30 August 1862; Source: The Union Army, vol. 5, p. 187 Battle at Crampton's Gap, Maryland on 14 September 1862; Source: The Union Army, vol. 5 SOUTH MOUNTAIN, MD. SEPT. 14TH, 1862 (Also known as Crampton's Gap) South Mountain, Md., Sept. 14, 1862. 1st, 6th and 9th Army Corps. The battle of South mountain was a preliminary engagement to the greater battle of Antietam. About noon on the 13th the Union army reached Frederick City. The 12th corps stacked arms on the same ground occupied by Confederate Gen. D. H. Hill the preceding evening. Soon after halting, some of the soldiers found a paper which proved to be an order from Gen. Lee to Hill, directing the movements of his division. The lost despatch-"Special Order, No. 191"-was taken to Gen. McClellan, who learned from it the intentions of the Confederate commander and the position of his forces. At that time Lee's army was west of South mountain and was stretched out over a distance of 25 miles. The greater part of Jackson's corps was in the vicinity of Harper's Ferry; McLaws was at Maryland heights; Walker was on the Virginia side of the Potomac; D. H. Hill's division was at Boonsboro, and the remainder of Longstreet's command was at Hagertown. The order directed Longstreet to proceed to Boonsboro, where he and Hill were to be joined by Jackson, as soon as the capture of Harper's Ferry was effected. Soon after the lost despatch fell into McClellan's hands orders were issued for a movement having for its object the piercing of the Confederate center, before Lee's orders could be carried out, and the destruction of the army in detail. South mountain lies along the western side of the Catoctin valley and from Middletown, in the valley, it is easily crossed at four different places. Crampton's gap, the southernmost pass, is on the road leading from Jefferson to Keedysville, six miles north is Turner's gap, on the Middletown and Boonsboro road; a little way south of Turner's is Fox's gap, on the road that runs to Sharpsburg, while north of Turner's gap is the Braddock pass, on the road leading to Hagerstown. The 6th corps, commanded by Maj.-Gen. W. B. Franklin, was directed to seize and hold Crampton's gap, while the remainder of the army was to direct its attention to Turner's and Fox's gaps, but especially the former. Franklin moved at an early hour on the 14th and upon arriving at the pass found the enemy strongly posted on each side of the road, at a point where it ran through a narrow defile, giving them superior advantages in position. The advance was near the base of the mountain, drawn up behind a stone wall, with open fields in front, and 8 guns were stationed on an elevation to the left of the road. Slocum's division was pushed forward through the little village of Burkittsville to attack the right of the enemy; the 1st Md. battery was placed in position in the rear and to the left of the village; Smith's division was drawn up in reserve east of the village, from where he could support Slocum or protect the batteries as the occasion might require. Slocum advanced steadily with Bartlett's brigade in front, closely supported by Newton's and Torbert's. As soon as the enemy's position was determined the skirmishers were withdrawn and Bartlett's whole line became engaged. Two regiments of Newton's command were then thrown to Bartlett's right and the rest of the supporting force to his left, and a charge was ordered. Meantime Ayres' battery had been planted to the left of the reserves, and the two batteries kept up an uninterrupted fire until the enemy was driven from his position. As soon as Slocum ordered the charge Franklin directed Brooks' brigade of Smith's division to advance upon the left of the road, and dislodge the Confederates in the woods on Slocum's flank. The movement was admirably executed, after which Brooks moved forward in line with Slocum to the very crest of the mountain. Crampton's gap was in possession of the Union forces. The enemy was completely routed, abandoning 1 piece of artillery and throwing away haversacks, blankets and arms in the flight. Prisoners to the number of 400 were taken and 3 stands of colors were captured. At Turner's gap the fighting was more severe. On the afternoon of the 13th Lee learned that the Federals were moving by that route and D H. Hill was instructed to hold the gap. In obedience to this order Hill first sent the brigades of Garland and Colquitt to guard the pass, but after an examination of the ground he concluded that a larger force would be necessary and ordered up the rest of his division from Boonsboro. At the same time Longstreet was directed to march from Hagerstown to Hill's support. The action on the morning of the 14th was commenced by a reconnaissance of Pleasonton's cavalry, supported by Cox's and Willcox's divisions of the 9th corps and Benjamin's and Gibson's batteries. Turner's gap is so narrow that a small force with artillery could hold it against an army. Fortunately for the Union forces a road ran along the crest on either side of the pass, and it was to these roads the Federal commanders turned their attention as a means of gaining the enemy's flanks. Cox's division took the old Sharpsburg road to the left, with Scammon's brigade in advance, the 2nd brigade keeping in close supporting distance. About half a mile from the summit, at Fox's gap, the enemy opened on Scammon with artillery, forcing him to leave the road and turn further to the left. The 23rd Ohio, commanded by Col. R. B. Hayes, was sent through the woods to the left of the road to gain the crest and attack the enemy on the flank. The movement was successful and Hayes gained a strong position, to drive him from which all efforts of the Confederates were futile. At the same time the 30th Ohio, Col. Hugh Ewing, moved up to a position on the right of Hayes in the face of a galling fire from a Confederate battery. The 12th Ohio, Col. C. D. White's regiment, drove in the enemy's skirmishers and charged up the slope in the center, driving the enemy from behind a stone fence at the point of the bayonet. Willcox's division was first ordered by Gen. Pleasonton to move to the right of the main pike, with a view of turning the Confederate left, but before the movement could be executed the order was recalled by Gen. Burnside, and Willcox took up a position near Cox. Toward noon there was a lull in the fighting, and during this temporary cessation of hostilities, which lasted about two hours, Meade's division of the 1st corps was steadily working its way up the road to the right of the gap, where a solitary peak completely commanded the Confederate position. Hill discovered this movement and brought all his available artillery to bear on Meade, but with little effect. Meade brought forward Cooper's battery and placed it on a ridge where it could reply to the Confederate guns, while the main body of the division pressed on toward the summit, Seymour's brigade leading the advance. Seeing that his efforts to check Meade with artillery were vain, Hill sent three brigades of infantry to seize and hold the peak. The lines met near the crest and a fierce combat ensued, each side taking all possible advantage of such natural defenses as the slope of the mountain afforded Seymour finally drove in the Confederate left and gained the crest, while the other two brigades of the division, under Magilton and Gallagher, made a courageous advance and the enemy was driven from the mountain. When darkness fell the Union troops held the gap and every position commanding it. Longstreet arrived upon the field about 4 p.m., but too late to turn the tide of battle. Nothing was left for the Confederates but to retreat, which was done during the night. At Crampton's pass the Federal loss was 113 killed, 418 wounded and 2 missing. The Confederate loss was reported as being 62 killed, 208 wounded and 479 missing, but Gen. Franklin, who was in command of the Union forces, reported that his men buried 15O of the enemy's dead and took charge of over 300 wounded who had been left on the field. The Union loss at Turner's gap was 325 killed, 1,403 wounded and 85 missing. The estimated loss of the enemy was about 2,000 killed and wounded and 1,500 prisoners. Many of the prisoners, however, were among the wounded. Gen. Jesse L. Reno was killed and Col. Thomas F. Gallagher, who commanded a brigade in Meade's attack on the right, was severely wounded. The Confederates lost Gen. Samuel Garland. Battle at Sharpsburg, Maryland on 17 September 1862; Source: The Union Army, vol. 5 ANTIETAM, MD. SETP. 16-17TH, 1862 Antietam, Md., Sept. 16-17, 1862. Army of the Potomac. In his report of the battle of South Mountain, which was fought on the 14th, Gen. Meade says: "The command rested on their arms during the night. The ammunition train was brought up and the men's cartridge-boxes were filled, and every preparation made to renew the contest at daylight the next morning should the enemy be in force. Unfortunately, the morning opened with a heavy mist, which prevented any view being obtained, so that it was not until 7 a. m. that it was ascertained that the enemy had retired from the mountain." As soon as this discovery was made the whole Union army began pouring through the passes of South Mountain in pursuit. At Boonsboro Pleasonton's cavalry came up with the Confederate rear guard. The 8th Ill., which was in the advance, immediately charged and then pursued the retreating enemy for a distance of 2 miles. There the Illinois regiment was joined by a section of Tidball's battery, which threw a few shells into the Confederate lines, completely routing the enemy from the field. The Union loss in this skirmish was 1 killed and 15 wounded, while the Confederates left 30 killed and 50 wounded on the field, and a number of prisoners were taken. About the time this engagement commenced another was taking place on the Sharpsburg road, between the Confederate rear and the 5th N. H. infantry. This skirmish lasted until 9 p. m., when the New Hampshire troops were relieved, after losing 4 men in killed and wounded. The enemy's loss here was 12 killed and wounded and 60 prisoners. The 2nd Del. and 52nd N. Y. also skirmished with the rear guard at other points, and in the afternoon the Confederates opened a heavy artillery fire on the Federal advance near Antietam creek, keeping it up until after dark. This was replied to by Tidball's horse artillery and Battery B, 1st N. Y. light artillery, from the heights east of the creek. McClellan's hope was to bring on an engagement before the Confederate forces could be united. Lee, on the other hand, was bending every effort to concentrate his army in time to resist the general attack which he now realized was imminent. Stonewall Jackson, with his own division and those of Ewell and A. P. Hill, was at Harper's Ferry. McLaws, after his defeat at Crampton's pass on the 14th, formed his forces across the lower end of Pleasant Valley, while the Union forces under Gen. Franklin confronted him at the upper end of the valley, about 2 miles distant. Here the two lay all day on the 15th, each supposing the other to be superior in strength and neither daring to attack. The morning of the 16th found Longstreet and D. H. Hill occupying a position on the west side of the Antietam, between that stream and the little town of Sharpsburg. Here Lee personally directed the movements of his army, selecting the strongest possible ground to withstand an attack until the detachments under Jackson and McLaws could be united with the main body. Soon after crossing the Antietam Lee learned that the Federal garrison at Harper's Ferry had surrendered, and sent orders for the whole force near the ferry to move at once to Sharpsburg. The Army of the Potomac at this time was organized as follows: The 1st army corps, commanded by Maj.-Gen. Joseph Hooker, consisted of the divisions of Doubleday, Ricketts and Meade; the 2nd corps, Maj.Gen. Edwin V. Sumner, included Richardson's, Sedgwick's and French's divisions; Couch's division of the 4th corps, the 5th corps, Maj.-Gen. Fitz John Porter, was composed of the divisions of Morell Sykes and Humphreys; the 6th corps, Maj.-Gen. William B. Franklin, embraced the divisions of Slocum and W. F. Smith , the 9th corps, Maj.-Gen Ambrose E. Burnside consisted of the divisions of Willcox, Sturgis and Rodman, and the Kanawha division, commanded by Brig.-Gen. Jacob D. Cox , the 12th corps, Maj.-Gen. Joseph K. F. Mansfield, included the divisions of Williams and Greene; the cavalry division numbering five brigades and commanded by Brig.-Gen. Alfred Pleasonton, and over 50 batteries of artillery. In his report of the campaign McClellan gives the number of his forces at 87,164. Lee, in his official report on the battle of Antietam, says: "This great battle was fought by less than 40,000 men on our side " The Confederate line of battle on the 16th extended from the Potomac, at a point a little below Mercersville, to the Antietam about a mile below Sharpsburg. It was nearly four miles long and occupied a broken country, the low hills being separated by narrow valleys, while almost everywhere the limestone cropped out above the surface, affording a natural shelter for the troops. In front the line was protected by the Antietam, which was crossed by three bridges and several fords, though the latter were all too difficult to attempt a crossing with artillery. Near the south end of Lee's line was the bridge afterward known as the "Burnside bridge;" on the Sharpsburg and Boonsboro road, near the center of the line, was the second bridge, while the third was the stone bridge on the Williamsport road still further north. Near the mouth of the stream was a fourth bridge, but it was not used during the operations, except by A. P. Hill in bringing up his division from Harper's Ferry. On the Hagerstown pike, about a mile from Sharpsburg, stood the Dunker church in the edge of a patch of timber, since known as the "West woods." At the church the Smoketown road leaves the pike, and about half a mile north on this road were some more timber patches called the "East woods." In forming his line Lee posted Longstreet on the right, so as to cover the Burnside bridge, and D. H. Hill on the left, covering the bridge on the Boonsboro road. On the opposite side of the Antietam lay the Union army with the 1st corps on the extreme right and the 9th on the left. McClellan established his headquarters at the Pry house, a short distance northwest of the Boonsboro road and near the center of his line. Lee's headquarters were at the west side of Sharpsburg on the road leading to Shepherdstown. Shortly after 1 p. m. on the 16th Hooker received orders to cross the Antietam and attack the Confederate left. Meade's and Ricketts, divisions crossed at the stone bridge and Doubleday's at the ford just below. Once across the stream he turned to the right in order to gain the watershed between the Antietam and Potomac, intending to follow the ridge until he gained the enemy's left flank. Some skirmishing occurred along the line of march, and information of Hooker's movements was at once carried to Lee. At the time the messenger arrived Lee was in council with Longstreet and Jackson, who had arrived from Harper's Ferry that morning. Lee immediately ordered Jackson to the command of the left wing and Hood's command was moved from the center to a position near the Dunker church. A little while before sunset Hooker pushed forward a battery and opened fire on Jackson's left. The fire was promptly returned and the artillery duel was continued until after dark, when the corps went into bivouac a short distance north of the East woods, where the men rested on their arms during the night, ready to begin the attack the next morning. All that night there was desultory firing between the pickets, who were so close to each other that at times their footsteps could be heard. During the night Mansfield's corps was sent over to the assistance of Hooker and about 2 a. m. on the 17th took up a position on the Poffenberger farm, about a mile in Hooker's rear. As soon as it was light enough to distinguish objects on the morning of the 17th the Federal skirmishers began their work in the East woods. Soon afterward the entire corps was thrown into line with Doubleday on the right, Ricketts on the left, and Meade in reserve in the center, with instructions to reinforce either of the other divisions as circumstances might require. Thus formed the whole line moved forward and the real battle of Antietam was begun. In the triangular space between the Hagerstown and Smoketown roads, and directly in front of Hooker, was a 30-acre field of corn in which the enemy had stationed a large force of infantry during the night. Before this force fired a shot its presence was discovered by the sun's rays on the bayonets, and in his report Hooker says: "Instructions were immediately given for the assemblage of all my spare batteries, near at hand, of which I think there were five or six, to spring into battery, on the right of this field, and to open with canister at once. In the time 1 am writing every stalk of corn in the northern and greater part of the field was cut as closely as could have been done with a knife, and the slain lay in rows precisely as they had stood in their ranks a few moments before. It was never my fortune to witness a more bloody, dismal battle-field." The survivors beat a rapid retreat toward the church and there sought shelter behind rocks, trees and stone fences. The Union men pressed forward in close pursuit for some distance, but the Confederates were rallied and reinforced, when the Federals were in turn forced to fall back. At this juncture Mansfield arrived, but while deploying his men he fell mortally wounded and the command of the corpsfell on Gen. Williams, who had barely time to receive a few general instructions from Hooker before he was forced to go into the fight. Not knowing the exact position of the 1st corps there was some lack of unity in the movements of the various division commanders, but after nearly two hours of hard fighting the enemy was driven back to the West woods. Greene's division succeeded in turning Jackson's right and in gaining a position in the edge of the woods near the Dunker church, where he hung on tenaciously, repulsing several attempts to dislodge him. In this part of the engagement the Confederates suffered severely. J. .R Jones, who was in command of Jackson's division, was wounded. Starke, who succeeded him, was soon afterward killed. Lawton then took command of the division and was wounded and borne from the field. Nearly one-half the entire force on the Confederate left were killed or wounded, and it is probable that if Sumner had arrived at this time the entire Confederate army could have been crushed. It was nearly 10 o'clock, however, before Sumner's corps, some 18,000 strong, reached the field, coming on in three columns. Sedgwick on the right occupied the position from which Hooker had been driven earlier in the action. Next came the divisions of French and Richardson, the Union line now being extended well down toward the Boonsboro road. Sedgwick's division went into battle in three lines. The first had hardly become engaged when the Confederates made a desperate rush, broke through the Union line and turned Sedgwick's left. The third line was quickly faced about to repel an attack from the rear, but the Confederate fire on the left was so effective that the entire division was forced to retire. Here Sedgwick was wounded, but he remained in the saddle until his command was rallied and placed in a strong position, where, under the command of Gen. Howard, it remained throughout the rest of the battle. The battle was gradually moving southward and after ten o'clock there was no more serious fighting north of the church. About half a mile south of the church a road leaves the pike and, following a zigzag course, strikes the Boonsboro road about half-way between Sharpsburg and the Antietam. For some distance after leaving the pike this road was lower than the ground on either side, forming a natural breastwork, and was known as the sunken road. It was toward this road that French and Richardson directed their movements. When Lee saw that his left was defeated and his center in danger of being broken, he brought up every available man from his right. In quick succession the divisions of Walker, Anderson and McLaws were hurled against Sumner's veterans. Sumner was reinforced by part of Mansfield's corps and the Confederates were slowly forced back every foot of the ground being stubbornly contested, until their final stand was made at the sunken road. In this part of the engagement the heavy guns of the Union batteries east of the Antietam rendered important service by preventing the enemy from using his artillery. D. H. Hill, who commanded this part of the Confederate line, says: "Our artillery could not cope with the superior weight, caliber, range and number of the Yankee guns. They were smashed up or withdrawn before they could be turned against the massive columns of attack." At last Col. Barlow, commanding the 1st brigade of Richardson's division, made a successful flank movement on the road and captured about 300 men who still clung to it, more as a place of shelter than in the hope of checking the Federal advance. The road was filled with Confederate dead and is referred to in all descriptions of the battle as the "Bloody Lane." In his report of the battle of Antietam McClellan says: "My plan for the impending general engagement was to attack the enemy's left with the corps of Hooker and Mansfield, supported by Sumner's, and if necessary by Franklin's and as soon as matters looked favorably there to move the corps of Burnside against the enemy's extreme right upon the ridge running to the south and rear of Sharpsburg, and having carried their position, to press along the crest toward our right, and whenever either of these flank movements should be successful, to advance our center with all the forces then disposable." In pursuance of this plan the 9th corps was stationed on the Federal left, with instructions to assault and carry the Burnside bridge whenever an order to that effect should be issued from headquarters. McClellan says that this order was sent to Burnside at 8 a. m. on the 17th, while the latter says he received it "about ten o'clock." The bridge was guarded by Toombs, brigade, which occupied a strong position among the rocks and trees on the bluff commanding the west end of the bridge, while the bridge, the ford below, and in fact, the entire valley, were all effectually covered by the Confederate batteries. The first attempt to carry the bridge was made by Crook's brigade of the Kanawha division, with the 11th Conn. deployed as skirmishers to cover the advance. The plan was to move the brigade across the bridge in two columns of fours, which were to turn to the right and left as soon as they reached the opposite bank, Rodman's division meanwhile to try to cross at a ford about a third of a mile farther down the creek. This plan failed because Crook missed his way and reached the stream some distance above the bridge, where he became engaged with the enemy on the west bank. A second effort, made by the 2nd Md. and 6th N. H. infantry, likewise proved a failure. The two regiments charged across the bridge with fixed bayonets, but were met by a withering fire of artillery and musketry and forced to fall back. Gen. Cox, to whom Burnside had entrusted the work of carrying the bridge, then directed Gen. Sturgis to select two regiments from Ferrero,s brigade and push them across the bridge in accordance with the first plan. Sturgis selected the 51st N. Y. and the 51st Penn. A howitzer from Simmonds, battery was brought forward and placed where it covered the west end of the bridge. When everything was in readiness the strong skirmish line opened fire, the howitzer was operated rapidly, throwing double charges of canister into the ranks of Toombs' men, and under this protection the two regiments advanced at the double-quick with fixed bayonets and dashed across the bridge, the Confederates hastily retreating before the impetuous charge. The remainder of Sturgis, division and Crook's brigade were hurried over to the support of the two gallant regiments, and these were soon further strengthened by Rodman's division and Scammon's brigade, which had succeeded in crossing at the ford. Here another delay ensued. Sturgis' and Crook's men had almost exhausted their ammunition and a halt was made necessary until their cartridge-boxes were replenished. During the pause Willcox's division and several light batteries were brought over, the remaining batteries being planted on the hills east of the creek, and at 3 p.m. the left wing began its advance on Sharpsburg. The Confederates under D. R. Jones were soon encountered, drawn up diagonally across the ridge, screened by stone fences, etc., and well supported by artillery. Welsh's and Christ's brigades, which were in advance, drove them back after some sharp fighting, until near the edge of the village, where Jones made his final stand in an old orchard. From this position he was routed by the batteries with Willcox's division and the orchard was occupied by the infantry. In the advance Rodman's division formed the extreme left, and as the movement was made in the form of a right wheel he became separated from Willcox, causing a break in the line and throwing Rodman's brigades en echelon. To the south was a field of tall corn, through which A. P. Hill's division, just up from Harper's Ferry, was advancing in line of battle to strike the left flank. They wore the blue uniforms captured at the ferry and it was thought they were part of the Union forces until they opened fire. Scammon quickly faced his brigade to the left and held Hill in check until the line could be reformed. In order to do this it was necessary for Willcox and Crook to retire somewhat from their advanced position, while Sturgis came up with his command to fill the break in the line. This gave Jones an opportunity to retire beyond Sharpsburg and take a position on the high ground where the national cemetery is now located, but it no doubt saved Rodman's division from being cut to pieces. This virtually ended the battle of Antietam, and at the close the two armies held the same relative positions they occupied at the commencement of the fight. The Union loss was 2,108 killed, 9,549 wounded and 753 captured or missing. According to Confederate reports Lee's army lost 1,512 killed, 7,816 wounded and 1,844 captured or missing, a much greater loss in proportion to the number of troops engaged than that inflicted on the Federal forces. Both sides claimed a victory and the engagement might well be designated as a drawn battle. The 18th was spent by both armies in resting the tired troops and in caring for the dead and wounded. McClellan's intention was to renew the fight on the 19th, but when the sun rose that morning it was discovered that the enemy had evacuated his position during the night, crossed the Potomac at a ford some distance below the Shepherdstown road, and retired into Virginia. Lee's invasion of Maryland was ended. Battle at Keedysville, Maryland on 20 September 1862 Battle at New Haven, Kentucky on 29 September 1862 Battle at Warrenton, Virginia on 29 September 1862 Battle at Rappahannock Bridge, Virginia on 08 November 1862 Battle on 15 November 1862 Battle at Suffolk, Virginia on 04 April 1863 Battle on 28 April 1863 Battle at Mayre's Heights, Virginia on 03 May 1863 Battle at Suffolk, Virginia on 15 May 1863 Battle at Upperville, Virginia on 21 June 1863; Source: The Union Army, vol. 6 Upperville, Va., June 2l, 1863. 1st and 2nd Cavalry Divisions, Army of the Potomac. The enemy was driven from his position on Goose creek by Vincent's infantry brigade, and retreated rapidly toward Upperville, followed by the Federal cavalry, Gregg's (2nd) division in advance. At Upperville the Confederate cavalry was massed and their artillery was placed in position at Ashby's gap. Kilpatrick's brigade charged, but was repulsed. The 3d brigade, under Col. J. I. Gregg, now came up and formed on Kilpatrick's left, the artillery was placed in position, and with these supports Kilpatrick again charged and drove the enemy from the town, capturing 1 piece of artillery. A short distance west of the town the Confederates again made a stand at the base of the mountain, where for a time they successfully met and repulsed Gregg's attacks counter-charging in turn, only to be forced back. Gen. Buford, with the 1st division, was moving to Gregg's assistance, when he became engaged with a heavy force of the enemy that threatened to come between him and Gregg. Col. Gamble, commanding the advance brigade, deployed the 3d Ind. and 8th Ill. to protect the flanks, and these two regiments poured in such a murderous carbine fire that the enemy broke and fled toward the gap, closely pressed by the entire division. About the same time the force in front of Gregg gave way and the retreat became almost a rout. The Union loss at Upperville was 12 killed, 130 wounded and 67 missing. The Confederate casualties were not officially reported, but Gen. Pleasonton, commanding the Union cavalry corps, says in his report: "We took 2 pieces of artillery and 3 caissons, besides blowing up 1; also upward of 60 prisoners, * * * a lieutenant-colonel, major and 5 other officers, besides a wounded colonel and a large number of wounded rebels, left in the town of Upperville. They left their dead and wounded upon the field. Of the former I saw upward of 20." Battle at Upperville, Virginia on 22 June 1863; Source: The Union Army, vol. 6 (Same As above.) Battle at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania on 02 July 1863; Source: The Union Army, vol. 5 Gettysburg, Pa., July 1-3, 1863. Army of the Potomac. After the battles of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville the opinion became prevalent through the South that Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was more than a match for the Federal Army of the Potomac, and a clamor arose for an aggressive movement. There were at this time potent reasons why Lee should assume the offensive. An invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania would have a tendency to draw troops from Grant at Vicksburg and Rosecrans in Tennessee to repel the invaders, thus relieving the pressure on the Confederate forces under Pemberton, Johnston and Bragg. If the invasion should prove to be successful European nations might be persuaded to recognize the Confederacy, loans could be obtained and probably aid secured to open the Southern ports, then in a state of blockade. All these reasons and possibilities were carefully weighed and toward the last of May Lee decided to make the invasion. Since the battle of Chancellorsville he had been lying at Fredericksburg, recruiting and reorganizing his army, which on June 1, numbered, according to Confederate reports, 88,754 men. It was divided into three corps, as follows: The 1st, commanded by Lieut.-Gen. James Longstreet, was composed of the divisions of McLaws, Pickett and Hood, and the reserve artillery under Col. J. B. Walton. The 2nd, under the command of Lieut.-Gen. Richard S. Ewell, included the divisions of Early, Johnson and Rodes, the reserve artillery being in charge of Col. J. T. Brown. The 3rd, commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Ambrose P. Hill consisted of the divisions of Anderson, Heth and Pender, and the reserve artillery under Col. R. L. Walker. In addition to these three corps was the cavalry under the command of Maj.- Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, and consisting of the brigades of Fitzhugh Lee, W. H. F. Lee, Hampton, Jenkins, W. E. Jones and Imboden, and six batteries of horse artillery under the command of Maj. R. F. Beckham. Having decided to undertake an offensive movement, Lee chose a route along the eastern base of the Blue Ridge, from which he could at any time threaten Washington or Baltimore, hoping by this means to detain the Union army in a position to defend the national capital, or failing in that to draw it after him and into a general engagement on a field of his own selection. He accordingly began the concentration of his army at Culpeper leaving Hill at Fredericksburg to keep up a show of force there in order to keep Hooker from ascertaining what was going on until it was too late for him to interfere. Through the medium of despatches captured in the affair at Brandy Station on June 9, Hooker learned that the major part of Lee's army was at Culpeper. He proposed to cross over the river and attack Hill, but the movement was forbidden by Gen. Halleck. He then suggested a movement against Richmond to force Lee to recall his army in that direction, but this, too, was forbidden, though either might have been successful. Hooker then sent the 3rd and 5th corps to guard the fords on the Rappahannock, to prevent the Confederates from crossing, and on the night of the 13th, moved his forces northward to Manassas Junction and Thoroughfare gap. This compelled Lee to change his plans and select the longer route through the Shenandoah Valley. The Federal force at Winchester, commanded by Gen. Milroy, was driven out on the 15th, Ewell pursuing across the Potomac and occupying Hagerstown and Sharpsburg. About the same time the Union troops at Harper's Ferry and Martinsburg were withdrawn to Maryland heights, thus leaving the valley open to Lee, who crossed the Potomac at Williamsport and Shepherdstown on the 24th and 25th, united his columns at Hagerstown, and pushed on toward Chambersburg, Pa. On the 25th and 26th, Hooker crossed the Potomac at Edwards' ferry and the next day Reynolds, with three corps, occupied the passes of South mountain, thus forestalling any attempt of Lee to pass to the eastward. To cut the enemy's communications with Virginia, Hooker ordered the 12th corps, then near Harper's Ferry, to march to that place, where it would be joined by the forces under Gen. Kelley on Maryland heights, and then, in connection with Reynolds, operate on Lee's rear. Again Halleck interposed an objection, deeming it inadvisable to abandon Harper's Ferry, and Hooker asked to be relieved from command of the army. He was succeeded by Maj.-Gen. George G. Meade on June 28. The Army of the Potomac was then organized as follows: Maj.-Gen. John F. Reynolds, formerly commanding the 1st corps, was placed in command of the left wing, Maj.-Gen. Abner Doubleday taking command of the corps, which consisted of three divisions under Brig.-Gens. James S. Wadsworth, John C. Robinson and Thomas A. Rowley, and the artillery brigade commanded by Col. Charles S. Wainright. The 2nd corps, commanded by Maj.-Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, embraced the three divisions under Brig.-Gens. John C. Caldwell, John Gibbon and Alexander Hays, and the artillery brigade of Capt. John G. Hazard. The 3rd corps, Maj.-Gen. Daniel E. Sickles, was made up of the divisions of Maj.-Gen. David B. Birney and Brig.-Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys, and the artillery brigade commanded by Capt. George E. Randolph. The 5th corps, Maj.-Gen. George Sykes, was composed of the three divisions of Brig.-Gens. James Barnes, Romeyn B. Ayres and Samuel W. Crawford, and the artillery brigade of Capt. A. P. Martin. The 6th corps, Maj.-Gen. John Sedgwick, embraced the divisions of Brig.-Gen. Horatio G. Wright, Brig.-Gen. Albion P. Howe and Maj.-Gen. John Newton, and the artillery brigade of Col. Charles H. Tompkins. The 11th corps, Maj.-Gen. Oliver O. Howard, included the divisions of Brig.-Gens. Francis C. Barlow and Adolph von Steinwehr, Maj.-Gen. Carl Schurz, and the artillery brigade commanded by Maj. Thomas W. Osborn. The 12th corps, Maj.-Gen. Henry W. Slocum was composed of the two divisions of Brig.-Gens. Alpheus S. Williams and John W. Geary, and the artillery brigade under command of Lieut. E. D. Muhlenberg. The cavalry corps, Maj.-Gen. Alfred Pleasonton, included the three divisions commanded by Brig.-Gens. John Buford, David McM. Gregg and Judson Kilpatrick, and the horse artillery under Capt. James M. Robertson. Altogether the army had 65 batteries numbering 370 guns. Of these 212 were with the infantry, 50 with the cavalry, and an artillery reserve of 108 under the command of Brig-Gen. Robert O. Tyler, Brig.-Gen. Henry J. Hunt being the chief of artillery. Meade took command in the midst of a campaign, and when the army was preparing to move through a region with which he was but little acquainted. For the time he decided to follow Hooker's plans, the only departure there from being to recall Slocum's corps from the Confederate rear, with orders to join the main column. Without consulting Halleck he ordered the troops at Maryland heights, now under the command of Gen. French, to move up to Frederick, where they were to act as a reserve when the army moved forward. Such information as he could obtain regarding the enemy's movements located Longstreet at Chambersburg, Ewell at Carlisle and York, where he was preparing to attack Harrisburg, and Hill in the vicinity of Cashtown. Conjecturing that Harrisburg was Lee's objective point, Meade determined to move directly toward that place and if possible strike the enemy before he could cross the Susquehanna. Orders to that effect were issued to the various corps commanders on the evening of the 28th and early the next morning the army was in motion. Stuart's cavalry had been sent on a raid around the Union army, in the hope that by threatening its rear he could delay the crossing of the Potomac until Lee could capture Harrisburg. But he encountered Federal troops in so many unexpected places that his raid was prolonged to such an extent he did not arrive at Gettysburg until the battle was almost over. Being thus deprived of his cavalry, Lee had no way of obtaining information of the movements of the Federals, and up to the 28th, supposed them to be still on the south side of the Potomac. On the afternoon of that day he ordered Hill and Longstreet to join Ewell for an advance on Harrisburg. Late that night a scout came to Lee's headquarters with the information that Hooker had been superseded by Meade, that the Union army was north of the Potomac and in a position to seriously menace the Confederate line of communications. These tidings changed the whole situation. In his report Lee says: "In the absence of the cavalry, it was impossible to ascertain his intentions, but to deter him from advancing farther west, and intercepting our communication with Virginia, it was determined to concentrate the army east of the mountains." Instructions were hurried to Hill and Longstreet to move to Cashtown, 8 miles northwest of Gettysburg, Ewell was recalled from Carlisle, and Pickett was left at Chambersburg to guard the rear until relieved by Imboden. Owing to rainy weather these movements were performed somewhat leisurely, but Heth's division reached Cashtown on the afternoon of the 29th. That evening the Union army was in position just south of the state line, with the right at New Windsor and the left at Emmitsburg. Buford's cavalry division was on the extreme left, with his advance well toward Gettysburg. Buford sent Merritt's brigade to Mechanicstown to guard the trains and issued orders for Gamble's and Devin's brigades to move early on the following morning to Gettysburg, where he expected to find some of Kilpatrick's cavalry. The two brigades entered the town about noon, and found a detachment of the enemy within half a mile of the place. This was Pettigrew's brigade of Heth's division, which had been sent from Cashtown to procure supplies, but finding the town in possession of the Union forces hurriedly fell back on the main body of the division. Scouting parties were sent out in all directions, bringing in information showing that the Confederates were unquestionably aiming to concentrate in the vicinity of Gettysburg, and Buford so notified Meade that evening. Pickets were thrown out toward Cashtown and Hunterstown, and the ridges west of the town occupied in anticipation of an attack the next day. Meade's chief objects had been to force Lee to forego his intention of crossing the Susquehanna, and to bring on an engagement at the first opportunity. The field selected for such an engagement was along the banks of Pipe creek, a little stream 15 miles south of Gettysburg. With a view to meeting Lee at this point the different commands were so placed as to be easily concentrated along Pipe creek, while at the same time they were held in readiness to move elsewhere as the occasion might demand. On the evening of June 30, the 1st corps was at Marsh creek, about halfway between Emmitsburg and Gettysburg; the 2nd and 3rd were in the vicinity of Taneytown, the 5th was at Union Mills, southeast of Taneytown, the 6th was at Manchester, still farther east; the 11th was near Emmitsburg, Kilpatrick's cavalry was at Hanover, and Gregg's at Westminster. The information received from Buford caused a change in Meade's plans. Reynolds was ordered to move the 1st, 3rd and 11th corps to the support of Buford, Sickles relieving the last at Emmitsburg, and the other corps commanders instructed to move toward Gettysburg. The town of Gettysburg is located about 7 miles from the Maryland line, and some 10 miles east of South mountain. It is in a valley, surrounded by broken granite ridges. On one of these, about half a mile west of the town, stood the Lutheran seminary, the elevation being known as Seminary ridge. It was covered with an open woods and at the north end is a knoll called Oak hill. South is a chain of hills beginning about 3 miles from town and running almost due north for a distance of 2 miles when it makes a curve to the east. At the south end of this chain is Round Top, just east of this is a smaller hill called Little Round Top; at the curve is Cemetery hill, while at the eastern extremity of the range is Culp's hill. About 500 yards west of Little Round Top, in the forks of Plum creek is a hill known as the Devil's Den. It is steep and rocky on the eastern side sloping away gradually to the west and is about 100 lower than Little Round Top. The summits of nearly all the ridges were covered with huge boulders, forming a natural protection to sharpshooters, etc. Near the western base of Cemetery hill was Ziegler's grove, and along the base of the ridge farther south were the Weikert and Trostle houses. Roads enter the town from almost every direction. Through the valley between the Round Tops and Seminary ridge ran the Emmitsburg road; along the eastern side of the ridge was the road to Taneytown, running southeast, between Cemetery and Culp's hills, was the Baltimore pike. These three roads came together near the cemetery and entered the town from the south. The Fairfield and Chambersburg roads diverged at the west side of town, the former running southwest and the latter northwest over Seminary ridge. From the north came the Harrisburg, Carlisle and Middletown roads, and Black's turnpike, while the Oxford and Bonaughton roads entered the town from the east. On the east side of town is Rock creek and west of Seminary ridge is Willoughby run, both flowing southward. At daybreak on July 1, Buford held the roads and ridges to the west of Gettysburg with Devin's and Gamble's brigades, his vedettes being thrown out far enough to give timely warning of the enemy's approach. About 8 a.m. the scouts reported the enemy advancing in force from the direction of Cashtown. This was Heth's entire division, which had been sent forward to occupy Gettysburg. Gamble's brigade was formed on the left from the Fairfield road to the railroad cut, with one section of Calef's battery near the left and the rest of it on the Chambersburg pike. Devin formed on the right, extending the line to Oak hill, a portion of the men being dismounted and thrown forward as skirmishers. Heth advanced on the Chambersburg road, with Archer's brigade to the right and Davis, to the left of the pike, and the brigades of Pettigrew and Brockenbrough in support. About 9 o'clock Buford had three cannon shots fired as a signal for his skirmishers to open fire on the advancing Confederates, and the battle of Gettysburg was begun. Buford had been notified that Reynolds was coming to his support and determined to hold his ground until the reinforcements arrived. When the sound of the firing reached Reynolds his advance, Wadsworth's division, was within a mile of the town. This command was hurried forward across the fields, Reynolds riding ahead to Seminary ridge, where he met Buford and learned the positions of the contending forces. As soon as Wadsworth arrived three regiments of Cutler's brigade were formed north of the railroad cut and the other two south of the pike, Hall's battery relieving Calef's, which had almost exhausted its supply of ammunition. Meredith's "Iron Brigade" was sent against Archer on the left, and Devin's brigade of cavalry was faced north to meet Ewell, who was known to be coming up from Heidlersburg. Cutler's line had barely been formed when it was struck on the front and right by Davis. Col. Fowler who was in command of the two regiments south of the road, changed front, drove Davis from the field, and took possession of the railroad cut, capturing the two regiments which occupied it. Reynolds sent word to Howard to hurry forward the 11th corps, and then rode over to where Meredith and Archer were contending for a piece of timber, known as McPherson's woods, on the east side of Willoughby run. While directing the movements of this brigade Reynolds was killed by a shot from a Confederate sharpshooter, and Meredith was wounded by the explosion of a shell in front of his horse. Col. Morrow, of the 24th Mich., then took command, charged into the woods, captured Archer and about 800 of his men, and forced the rest to retire across the creek. By this time all of the 1st corps was on the field. Stone's brigade of Rowley's division was sent to the left of the pike, where it drove out the enemy's skirmishers and took position behind a ridge, being partly sheltered by a stone fence. Biddle's brigade was posted on the left of McPherson's wood, with Cooper's battery on the right, while Robinson's division was stationed in reserve on Seminary ridge. Reynolds' battery relieved Hall's and Calef's again joined Gamble's cavalry, which was also in reserve. The enemy had also received heavy reinforcements, Pender's division coming up from Cashtown and Ewell's corps from Carlisle. Heth reformed his division south of the Chambersburg road, with Pender in support, and nine batteries stationed on commanding points west of Willoughby run. Lee had notified Ewell not to bring on a general engagement until the entire army was brought up, but on arriving on the field and finding Hill's corps already engaged he ordered Rodes' division to take position on Seminary ridge and Carter's battalion of artillery to occupy Oak hill. It was now nearly 2 p.m., when the batteries on Oak hill opened upon the Union lines an enfilading fire that forced Wadsworth to retire Cutler to Seminary ridge, where he was joined by Robinson's whole division to resist the advance of Rodes, who was following along the ridge with O'Neal's and Doles' brigades on the eastern slope and Iverson's, Daniel's and Ramseur's on the western. At 2:30 Rodes gave the order to attack. Iverson was confronted by Paul's brigade and O'Neal by Baxter's. O'Neal was soon repulsed and Baxter went to the assistance of Paul. At the same time Cutler swung his line around so as to attack Iverson on the right flank. Baxter's men from the shelter of a stone fence fired a volley at short range into the Confederate ranks, leaving 500 of Iverson's command dead and wounded on the field, and the rest surrendered. About 1,000 prisoners and 3 regimental colors were taken in this part of the engagement. Howard had arrived with the 11th corps about noon and assumed command. Shurz took command of the corps and Brig.-Gen. Alexander Schimmelfennig of the 3rd division. This division and Barlow's were thrown forward on the right to check Ewell's advance, leaving Steinwehr's, with two batteries, as a reserve and rallying point on Cemetery hill. Upon hearing of the death of Reynolds Meade ordered Hancock to proceed from Taneytown to Gettysburg and assume command of the left wing. Hancock arrived about 3 p.m. and found the Union troops retiring before the vastly superior numbers of the enemy. Early's division had secured a position on the flank and rear of the 11th corps, the artillery on the hills east of Rock creek enfilading its entire line. Up to this time the assaults of the enemy had been made without concert at various points along the line, giving the Federals an opportunity to repulse one before the next was commenced. But about 4 o'clock the whole Confederate line advanced-50,000 against probably 15,000. The odds were too great and orders were issued to fall back to Cemetery hill. The men retired in good order, fighting as they went, the only confusion being that which resulted by crowding the narrow streets of the town. Wadsworth's division was sent to occupy Culp's hill and skirmishers were thrown forward to the west side of the town to hold the Confederates in check until the new line of battle could be formed. About 5 o'clock Williams' division of the 12th corps came up and was stationed on the right and rear of Wadsworth. Geary's division arrived soon afterward and was sent to occupy Little Round Top and the ridge running toward Cemetery hill, in a position commandmg the Emmitsburg and Taneytown roads. Stannard's brigade of Rowley's division also came up and joined the command, but too late to participate in the fight. These reinforcements greatly encouraged those who had borne the brunt of the battle all day, and the trains were sent to the rear out of the way to prepare for the action which was to come on the morrow. As the day drew to a close and it became evident that the enemy did not intend to renew the attack, Hancock turned over the command to Slocum and set out for Meade's headquarters at Taneytown. Orders were given for all the different commands to march at once to Gettysburg, Meade set out for the scene of action, and about 1 a.m. on the 2nd reached the field. Notwithstanding Lee's order on the evening of the 1st to "attack the enemy in the morning as early as practicable," the greater part of the day was spent in maneuvering for position. Longstreet did not want to attack until the arrival of Pickett's division. As a matter of fact Pickett did not come up in time to take any part in the second days, battle, and Law's brigade of Hood's division did not arrive on the field until noon on the 2nd. Considerable delay was incurred in moving the artillery so as to keep out of sight of the Union signal station on Little Round Top, so that it was the middle of the afternoon before the Confederates were in position to begin the general assault on Meade's flanks according to Lee's plans. This delay cost them dear in the end, as Meade's different commands were hurrying to the front and when the attack did come there was an opposition too strong to be overcome. As soon as possible after his arrival Meade looked over the ground and at dawn he commenced the formation of his lines for an attack on the Confederate left. The 12th corps was sent to the right of Wadsworth on Culp's hill, but Slocum and Gen. G. K. Warren, who had served as chief engineer under Hooker, and now held that position on Meade's staff, advised against such a movement. Meade, however, was determined to fight aggressively and began to arrange his troops for an assault on the enemy's left. Some time was necessarily spent in the preparations and before they were completed Lee attacked both ends of the Union line, thus forcing Meade to assume the defensive, which finally proved to be to his advantage. The Union line was formed as follows: Slocum on the extreme right; Wadsworth's division on Cemetery hill, with the other two divisions of the 1st corps at the base; Hancock's corps, which had come up during the night, next on the left; then Sickles; Sykes on the extreme left, while Sedgwick, who had made a march of 35 miles, arriving just before the attack commenced, was stationed in reserve on the Taneytown road behind the Round Tops, where he could rest his men until called on to strengthen some part of the line. The Confederate line was in the form of a concave. Longstreet on the left was opposite the Round Tops; Hill in the center occupied Seminary ridge; Ewell on the right held the town and the ridges east of Rock creek. Along the north side of Little Round Top ran a road which crossed the Emmitsburg road almost at right angles near the center of the open country lying between the two lines. On the south side of this road and east of the Emmitsburg road was a large peach orchard, to the east of which was a wheatfield. Sickles moved his corps to the cross roads, forming Humphrey's division along the Emmitsburg road and Birney's in the peach orchard and on a ridge south of the cross-road, Ward's brigade being thrown forward to the Devil's Den. As this position was some distance in advance of the main line, and subsequently proved to be untenable, there has been some controversy as to whether Sickles occupied it by order of the commanding general or selected it himself. It is not the province of this work, however, to settle responsibilities, but to tell what happened. Birney's skirmishers were engaged almost from the time his line was formed until the main attack of the Confederates about 4 p.m. When that attack was opened Longstreet directed a severe artillery fire against the two sides of the angle formed by Sickles' line, and this was followed by a fierce assault on Ward, who was overlapped by the enemy's line and compelled retire. The attack was then extended toward the peach orchard and some of the enemy's batteries secured positions from which an enfilading fire was poured into the two lines forming the angle. Humphreys sent a brigade and later a regiment to the assistance of Birney, but soon afterward his own line was vigorously assailed by Barksdale's brigade on the north and Kershaw's on the west, making it impossible to render any further aid to Birney, who was now hard pressed. Graham's brigade was driven from the orchard, Sickles had lost a leg and Graham was wounded and a prisoner in the hands of the enemy. The Federal batteries, commanded by Maj. McGilvery, and which was stationed on the cross-road below the orchard, met the Confederate advance by an effective fire, but in vain. One of the batteries was captured by Kershaw's men, but the 141st Pa. made a gallant charge and recaptured the guns, bringing them off by hand. Still the Confederates pressed on, and as a last resort McGilvery ordered Biglow to sacrifice his battery to save the rest. With the courage born of desperation he obeyed the order, fighting until the enemy approached within a few feet, when he managed to withdraw, but with severe loss. This left the orchard in the hands of the enemy, which brought them on Humphreys' flank and Birney's right. Reinforcements were called for and Hancock sent in Caldwell's division, but it was compelled to fall back after losing heavily in killed and wounded, two brigade commanders, Cross and Zook, being among the killed. Ayres' division next went in, and, although he struck the enemy on the flank, doubled up their line and forced them back, he was in the end compelled to make a hurried retreat to save his command from annihilation. This fight on the left was a struggle for the possession of Little Round Top. About the time that Ward was outflanked Warren rode over to the signal station there to obtain a better view of what was going on. Seeing the importance of the position which was then undefended, he assumed the responsibility of ordering Vincent's brigade of Barnes' division to occupy the crest, at the same time notifying Meade of what he had done and asking for a force sufficient to hold it. As Ward retired the Confederates, made a rush for the hill, but were met on the top by Vincent's men who repulsed the first assault with the bayonet. The 140th N. Y., belonging to Weed's brigade of Barnes' division, and Hazlett's battery were then sent to the aid of Vincent. Having failed in the first attempt to carry the position, the enemy next made an effort to turn the left, but were met by the 2Oth Me., under Col. Chamberlain. At first the Unionists were forced back by the main strength of superior numbers, but Svkes hurried a brigade to the relief of Chamberlain, and a brigade of the Pennsylvania reserves arriving about the same time, the Confederates were driven from the hill with a loss of 500 captured and 1,000 stands of arms taken, besides a large number in killed and wounded. After the 3rd corps had been driven from the peach orchard the enemy began to form in front of the wheatfield for another assault on Little Round Top. McCandless' brigade of Crawford's division, led by Crawford himself, charged and drove them to the farther side of the wheatfield, where they found shelter behind a stone fence. In the meantime two brigades-Eustis' and Nevin's-of Sedgwick's corps had come forward and during the time of Crawford's charge took a position in front of the ridge. The sight of these fresh troops had a discouraging effect on the Confederates and they withdrew from the contest. Through some miscalculation Ewell did not begin his attack on the Federal right until after Longstreet's repulse. The plan of attack here was for Johnson to move against Culp's hill, and as soon as he was fairly engaged Early and Rodes were to assault the works on Cemetery hill. When the fight commenced on the left Ewell opened with his artillery and kept up the fire for about an hour before making any further movement against the Union lines. In this time Meade, under the impression that the demonstration on his right was merely a feint, withdrew from that portion of his line all of the 12th corps except Greene's brigade, and sent it to the support of Sykes. About 5 p.m. Johnson crossed Rock creek and advanced against Greene and Wadsworth. Greene held out until he was reinforced, when the enemy was driven from his front, though Johnson occupied the intrenchments that had been abandoned by the 12th corps, giving him a strong position on the right flank of the Union army. While this was taking place Early sent the brigades of Hays and Hoke, the latter commanded by Col. Avery, up the valley between Culp's and Cemetery hills to assault the Federal position on the latter. The advance was somewhat impetuous driving back Von Gilsa's and Ames' brigades, which were stationed at the foot of the hill. In the rear of this infantry line were Wiedrich's and Ricketts' batteries, which were next attacked, the former being captured and 2 guns of the latter spiked. Farther up the hill were the batteries of Stevens, Reynolds and Stewart, the officers of which had orders from Col. Wainright to "fight the guns to the last." As the enemy advanced in the face of these guns they were met by a storm of canister Stevens' battery especially doing effective work. Hancock voluntarily sent Carroll's brigade to the support of the batteries, which were also reinforced by the 106th Pa. and a detachment from Schurz' command. The arrival of these troops carried dismay into the enemy's lines, which had not been properly supported, although Gordon's brigade had been assigned to that duty, and a retreat was ordered. As they fell back they were followed by a shower of canister from the batteries, which killed and wounded a large number and threw the line into some confusion. It is said that the Confederate organization known as the "Louisiana Tigers," went into this fight with 1,750 men, of whom only 150 returned unscathed. Rodes was delayed in making his attack, having to move out of Gettysburg by the flank, then change front and march some distance. By the time he was in position to cooperate with Early the latter had met defeat. The day closed with the Union forces still in possession of the ridge, though the enemy had gained some advantage on the right, as Johnson still held the intrenchments of the 12th corps, which threatened the safety of Meade's army by cutting off the line of retreat if such a movement became necessary. This victory, meager as it was, offered Lee sufficient incentive to continue the contest the next morning. That night a council of war was held, at which it was unanimously decided to "stay and fight it out." It is said that Meade was somewhat displeased at the decision, because he wanted to retire to the ground previously selected at Pipe creek. However this may have been he acquiesced in the judgment of his corps commanders, and preparations were immediately commenced looking to the coming engagement. Lee's general plan of battle for the 3rd was similar to that of the preceding day. Ewell was to open the fight by pressing the advantage already gained on the extreme right, and after his attack was well under way the main assault was to be made on the center. Johnson was reinforced by three brigades and instructed to begin his attack at daybreak. But a disagreeable surprise was in store for him. Geary returned to Culp's hill about midnight and learned that his intrenchments were in the hands of the enemy. He took a position with Greene and began making arrangements to recover his works at the earliest opportunity the next morning. Batteries were brought up during the remaining hours of darkness and stationed at all the points bearing on Johnson, and as soon as it was light enough to distinguish objects the guns opened fire. Johnson was without artillery, so he determined to risk all on a charge. The charge was gallantly made, but it was bravely met by Kane's brigade of Geary's division, and a severe contest was waged for several hours. Williams' division, now commanded by Col. Thomas H. Ruger, came up and gained a position where it could strike Johnson on the flank, and about the same time Shaler's brigade of Newton's division joined Kane, when Johnson, finding the conflict an unequal one, withdrew to Rock creek, leaving Geary and Ruger in possession of their old line. This part of the third day's battle was ended long before Lee's troops were in position to assault Cemetery hill, and again that concert of action, so essential to Confederate success, was lost. Pickett's division, which had not yet been engaged, was selected to lead the charge against the Union center. Longstreet, in his report, thus describes the arrangement of troops and plan of the assault: "Orders were given to Maj.-Gen. Pickett to form his line under the best cover that he could get from the enemy's batteries, and so that the center of the assaulting column would arrive at the salient of the enemy's position, Gen. Pickett's line to be the guide and to attack the enemy's defenses, and Gen. Pettigrew, in command of Heth's division, moving on the same line as Gen. Pickett, was to assault the salient at the same moment. Pickett's division was arranged, two brigades in the front line, supported by his third brigade, and Wilcox's brigade was ordered to move in rear of his right flank, to protect it from any force that the enemy might attempt to move against it. Heth's division, under command of Brig.-Gen. Pettigrew was arranged in two lines, and these supported by part of Maj.-Gen. Pender's division, under Maj.-Gen. Trimble. All of the batteries of the 1st and 3rd corps, and some of those of the 2nd, were put into the best positions for effective fire upon the point of attack and the hill occupied by the enemy's left. Col. Walton, chief of artillery of the 1st corps, and Col. Alexander had posted our batteries and agreed with the artillery officers of the other corps upon a signal for the batteries to open." At 1 p.m. two cannon shots were heard in quick succession. This was the signal for the Confederate batteries to open fire, and immediately 150 guns commenced their deadly work. The object was to silence the Union guns, and when this was accomplished Pickett was to move forward to the grand assault which was to decide the fate of the battle. Owing to the convex form of the Federal position only 80 guns could find room on the ridge to respond to the enemy's fire. That number was already in position and for two hours was waged an artillery duel seldom if ever equaled in the annals of wars. The enemy's fire was very effective, although many of the shells went high and exploded in the open ground to the rear of the ridge, forcing the artillery reserve to move to a better protected position Meade was compelled to change the location of his headquarters, a number of guns were disabled, though they were quickly replaced by others brought up from the reserve, about a dozen caissons were blown up and after each of these explosions the exultant yells of the Confederates could be heard along their entire line. During this time Pickett's men were in the wood on Seminary ridge, waiting for the command to move forward across the 1,400 yards of open ground in their endeavor to pierce the Union center. The Union generals knew that this fierce artillery fire was but the prelude to a charge and placed their commands in position to receive the shock. About 3 o'clock Hunt ordered the guns to cease firing, partly to replenish his supply of ammunition, and partly to see what the enemy would do. Thinking that the batteries were silenced Pickett emerged from the woods and began his advance, his men marching with such even step that for a little while the whole Union line stood in silent admiration of this display of heroism on the part of men who were marching to certain death. But when about half of the open space had been crossed the Federal batteries again opened with telling effect. Great gaps were torn in Pickett's line by the shot and shell, but they were quickly closed up as the line pressed forward. When the Confederates crossed the Emmitsburg road canister came into use, and at the same time McGilvery's guns on Little Round Top opened a destructive, enfilading fire on the advancing lines. Still on they came. Hancock's skirmishers near the Emmitsburg road were driven back like chaff before the wind. The enemy had now come within musket range and Hays' division poured volley after volley into the left, causing it to waver so that it fell behind the main column. Before Pickett's first line reached the stone wall, behind which the main line of Meade's army was posted, Stannard found an opportunity to make a flank attack with his Vermont brigade. Quickly changing front with two of his three regiments, he brought them perpendicular to the enemy's line and sent in a volley that forced Kemper's brigade staggering back on the center. This was closely followed up by Col. Gates, of the 20th N. Y. militia, throwing Pickett's left into confusion and causing many to surrender, while others threw away their arms and took to their heels. Although the two ends of the line were badly disorganized by these flank attacks, the center kept bravely on to the stone wall. Gen. Armistead, whose brigade was in this portion of the line, was one of the first to gain the wall. Placing his hat on the point of his sword he waved it above his head and shouted: "Give,em the cold steel, boys!" His example was speedily followed and with fixed bayonets the Confederates came pouring over the wall. One of the batteries was captured, the enemy's flag floated for a few brief moments over the Federal works, while the "rebel yell" resounded on all sides. But their triumph was of short duration. The place where the Union line was broken was directly in front of Webb's brigade of Gibbon's division. Webb rallied the 72nd Pa. and led it against the enemy; part of the 71st Pa. gained a position behind a stone wall on the right, from which they poured a murderous fire into Armistead's flank. The remainder of this regiment and the 68th Pa. found shelter in a clump of trees and sent a storm of leaden hail into the ranks of the assailants. Col. Hall, commanding Gibbon's 3rd brigade, made a dashing charge with two regiments of his own command, the 15th Mass., the 1st Minn., and the 19th Me. of the 1st brigade, that drove the enemy from the works and turned defeat into vitory. Back across the open space, over which they had marched with heroic determination but a short time before, the Confederates now fled in the wildest disorder. Of Pickett's three brigade commanders Armistead and Garnett were killed and Kemper severely wounded. Nearly three-fourths of his command were either killed, wounded or captured. As the enemy retreated, Stannard, who had held his position during the action, repeated his flank movement and captured a large part of Wilcox's brigade, which was coming up to Pickett's support. Lee's grand coup de main had failed. While the main battle was in progress in the center there were sharp cavalry engagements on both flanks. On the left part of Kilpatrick's division made a charge through the woods near Devil's Den, against the infantry and artillery stationed there. In this action Kilpatrick lost a number in killed and wounded, among the former being Gen. Farnsworth. The affair on the right was of greater magnitude. Four of Stuart's brigades were ordered to cover Ewell's left, and to make a demonstration to divert attention from the main attack. Then, if Pickett's charge proved successful, he was to fall on the rear of the Federals or harass their retreat. Stuart planted several batteries on the hills commanding the Baltimore pike and made other preparations to attack the minute he heard that Pickett had carried the works on Cemetery hill. Custer's brigade of Kilpatrick's division became engaged, although he was under orders to join his command on the left, and continued the fight until he was relieved by McIntosh's brigade of Gregg's division. One of Stuart's batteries was posted near the buildings of the Rummel farm and Mclntosh undertook to drive it away. He soon encountered a strong body of skirmishers and sent back for reinforcements. Randol's and Bulloch's batteries were moved to the front and soon silenced the enemy's batteries, when McIntosh moved up and occupied the position. W. H. Lee's brigade now came up to the support of the skirmish line and succeeded in repulsing the 1st N. J., whose ammunition was exhausted. The 7th Mich. was also driven back and it began to look dark for McIntosh, when the 5th Mich. made a charge on Lee and soon had him on the retreat. Just then Hampton's brigade, which had been kept in reserve by Stuart, came up and again turned the tide in favor of the Confederates. Although Custer had been relieved he had not yet left the field. Seeing the Union troops about to be overpowered he placed himself at the head of the 1st Michigan and shouting "Come on, you Wolverines!" charged with such impetuosity that Hampton's line was temporarily thrown into confusion. Custer's timely action put new courage into those already engaged, and for a few minutes every saber was busy officers and privates fighting side by side. Capt. Hart next brought up a squadron of the 1st N. J. and the Confederates gave way. Beaten at every point the Confederates fell back to a strong position on Seminary ridge, where the army lay all day on the 4th anxiously expecting and dreading an attack from Meade, who was content to hold his position on Cemetery ridge. Some skirmishing occurred during the day and that night Lee's army, broken and dispirited, began its retreat into Virginia. The decisive battle of the Civil war had been fought and won by the Federals and the days of the Confederacy were numbered. The Union losses at Gettysburg were 3,155 killed, 14,529 wounded and 5,365 missing. The Confederate reports give Lee's losses as being 2,592 killed, 12,709 wounded and 5,150 missing, but the records of prisoners of war in the office of the adjutant-general of the United States army bear the names of 12,277 Confederates who were captured at the battle of Gettysburg. Battle at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania on 03 July 1863; Source: The Union Army Vol. 5 (Same as above) Battle at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania on 04 July 1863; Source: The Union Army Vol. 5 (Same as Above) Battle at Chambersburg, Pennsylvania on 05 July 1863; Source: The Union Army Vol. 5 (Same as Above) Battle at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania on 05 July 1863; Source: The Union Army Vol. 5 (Same as Above) Battle on 06 July 1863 Battle at Greencastle, Pennsylvania on 09 July 1863 Battle at Funkstown, Maryland on 12 July 1863 Battle at Falling Waters, Maryland on 14 July 1863; source: the Union Army, Vol. 5 Falling Waters, Md., July 14, 1863. 1st and 3rd Cavalry Divisions Army of the Potomac. While in pursuit of the Confederates after the battle of Gettysburg Brig.-Gen. Judson Kilpatrick, commanding the 3rd cavalry division, learned that the enemy was moving toward Falling Waters and immediately started in that direction. At 7:30 a.m. on the 14th his advance came up with the Confederate rearguard about 2 miles from Falling Waters and the skirmishing commenced. Half a mile farther on Heth's division was discovered drawn up in line of battle on a hill commanding the road on which Kilpatrick was advancing. Heth's left was protected by earthworks and his right extended into a piece of woods. The 6th Mich., seeing only that portion of the enemy behind the works, made a gallant charge under the leadership of Maj. P. Weber, and although met by a heavy fire passed up to and over the works, then turned to right and returned to the main column, bringing in a piece of artillery, which was captured while the enemy was trying to get it in position in advance of his works. In this charge the regiment lost 30 in killed, wounded and missing, Weber being one of the killed. Gen. Custer next threw forward a regiment as skirmishers, but it was driven back, followed by the enemy until checked by the 1st Mich and part of the 8th N.Y. Kilpatrick now formed the entire division and pressed the enemy at all points gradually forcing him back toward the river. While the 3rd division was thus engaged with the Confederates in front, the 1st division, Brig.-Gen. John Buford commanding, made a detour and attacked them on the flank and rear, throwing them into confusion and scattering them through the woods and hills. In this flank attack Buford captured a 10-pounder Parrott gun, a caisson, 300 muskets and over 500 prisoners. As soon as the enemy's line broke under Buford's assault, Kilpatrick pressed his advantage and the Confederates were completely routed. This was the last stand made by Lee's army on the north side of the Potomac. The Union loss was 29 killed, 36 wounded and 40 missing. The Confederate loss was 15O killed, a large number wounded and 1,500 captured. Brig.-Gen. Pettigrew, commanding part of the Confederate forces, was mortally wounded early in the action. In addition to the prisoners captured the Federals brought off 2 pieces of artillery, 2 caissons, several hundred stands of small-arms and 3 battleflags. Battle at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania on 21 July 1863 Battle at Chickamauga, Georgia on 18 September 1863 Battle at Knoxville, Tennessee on 16 October 1863 Battle on 01 November 1863 Battle at Loudon, Tennessee on 15 November 1863 Battle at Campbell Station, Tennessee on 16 November 1863 Battle at Knoxville, Tennessee on 20 November 1863 Battle at Knoxville, Tennessee on 29 November 1863 Battle at Knoxville, Tennessee on 02 December 1863 Battle at Knoxville, Tennessee on 03 December 1863 Battle at Knoxville, Tennessee on 05 December 1863 Battle at Middlebrook, Tennessee on 05 December 1863 Battle at Clinch Mountain, Tennessee on 06 December 1863 Battle at Knoxville, Tennessee on 06 December 1863 Battle at Cumberland Gap, Tennessee on 09 December 1863 Battle at Bean Station, Tennessee on 10 December 1863 Battle at Rogersville, Alabama on 12 December 1863 Battle at Rossville, Georgia on 14 December 1863 Battle at Knoxville, Tennessee on 18 December 1863 Battle at LaFayette, Georgia on 22 December 1863 Battle on 30 December 1863 Battle at Lawrence Mills, Tennessee on 05 January 1864 Battle at Bull's Gap, Tennessee on 16 March 1864 Battle at Bull's Gap, Tennessee on 17 March 1864 Battle at Spotsylvania Court House, Virginia on 06 May 1864 Battle at Wilderness, Virginia on 06 May 1864; Source: The Union Army, vol. 6 Wilderness, Va., May 5-7, 1864. Army of the Potomac. On March 9, 1864, Maj.-Gen. U. S. Grant was raised to the rank of lieutenant-general and placed in command of all the United States armies in the field. The interval from that time until the 1st of May was spent in planning campaigns, and in strengthening, organizing and equipping the several armies in the different military districts. Grant remained with the Army of the Potomac, which was under the immediate command of Maj.-Gen. George G. Meade, and which had for its objective the destruction of the Confederate army under command of Gen. Robert E. Lee. On May 1, the Army of the Potomac lay along the north side of the Rapidan river and was organized as follows: The 2nd corps Maj.Gen. W. S. Hancock commanding, was composed of four divisions; the 1st commanded by Brig.-Gen. F. C. Barlow, the 2nd by Brig.-Gen. John Gibbon, the 3rd by Maj.- Gen. D. B. Birney, and the 4th by Brig-Gen. Gershom Mott. The 5th corps, commanded by Maj.-Gen. G. K Warren, consisted of four divisions, respectively commanded by Brig Gens. Charles Griffin, J. C. Robinson, S. W. Crawford and J. S. Wadsworth. The 6th corps under command of Maj.-Gen. John Sedgwick included the three divisions commanded by Brig.-Gens. H. G. Wright, G. W. Getty and James B. Ricketts. The 9th corps, Maj.-Gen. A. E. Burnside commanding, was composed of four divisions, each of which was commanded by a brigadier-general-the 1st by T. G. Stevenson, the 2nd by R B. Potter, the 3rd by O. B. Willcox and the 4th by Edward Ferrero. The cavalry corps, under command of Maj.-Gen. P. H. Sheridan, consisted of three divisions, the 1st commanded by Brig.-Gen. T. A. Torbert, the 2nd by Brig.-Gen. G. A. Custer and the 3rd by Brig-Gen. J. H. Wilson. With the 2nd corps was the artillery brigade under Col John C. Tidball; the artillery of the 5th corps was in charge of Col. C. S. Wainwright; that of the 6th corps under Col. C. H. Tompkins, and the artillery reserve, composed of Kitching's, J. A. Tompkins' and Burton's brigades, was commanded by Brig.-Gen. Henry J. Hunt. Burnside had 14 light and 2 heavy batteries. During the campaign the 18th corps, commanded by Maj.-Gen. W. F. Smith, was transferred from the Army of the James to the Army of the Potomac. This corps was composed of three divisions, commanded by Brig.-Gens. W. T. H. Brooks, Godfrey Weitzel and E. W. Hinks, and the cavalry division under Brig-Gen. August V. Kautz. Lee's army-the Army of Northern Virginia-consisted of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd corps, respectively commanded by Lieut.-Gens. James Longstreet, R. S. Ewell and A. P. Hill, and the cavalry corps of Maj.-Gen. J. E. B. Stuart. Longstreet's corps included the divisions of Kershaw and Field, and the artillery brigade under Brig.-Gen. E. P. Alexander. Ewell's corps was made up of the divisions of Early, Edward Johnson and Rodes, and the artillery brigade of Brig.-Gen. A. L. Long Hill's corps was composed of the divisions of R. H. Anderson, Heth and Wilcox, and his artillery was commanded by Col. R. L. Walker. Stuart's cavalry embraced three divisions, commanded by Wade Hampton, Fitzhugh Lee and W. H. F. Lee, and the horse artillery under Maj. R. P. Chew. The Union army numbered about 120,000 men of all arms, exclusive of Smith's corps. Lee's army numbered about 61,000 not including the forces under Beauregard on the Petersburg lines and the troops left in the defenses of Richmond, about 30,000 in all. Ewell's corps was intrenched along the south side of the Rapidan, his right resting near Morton's ford a short distance above the mouth of Mine run. The upper half of the intrenched line was held by Hill's corps, the left extending to Barnett's ford, about 5 miles west of the Orange & Alexandria railroad. Longstreet's command was at Gordonsville, the junction of the Orange & Alexandria and the Virginia Central railroads. Lee's headquarters were at Orange Court House, about half way between Longstreet and the line along the Rapidan, from which point he could easily communicate with his corps commanders, and detachments of cavalry watched the various fords and bridges along the river. Grant's plan was to cross the Rapidan at the fords below the Confederate line of intrenchments move rapidly around Lee's right flank and force him either to give battle or retire to Richmond. As soon as this movement was well under way, Gen. Butler, with the Army of the James, was to advance up the James river from Fortress Monroe and attack Richmond from the south. The region known as the Wilderness, through which the Army of the Potomac was to move, lies between the Rapidan the north and the Mattapony on the south. It is about 12 miles wide from north to south and some 16 miles in extent from east to west. Near the center stood the Wilderness tavern, 8 miles west of Chancellorsville and 6 miles south of Culpeper Mine ford on the Rapidan. A short distance west of the tavern the plank road from ermanna ford crossed the Orange & Fredericksburg turnpike, and then running southeast for about 2 miles intersected the Orange plank road near the Hickman farmhouse. The Brock road left the Orange & Fredericksburg pike about a mile east of the tavern and ran southward to Spottsylvania Court House, via Todd's tavern. The first iron furnaces in the United States were established in the Wilderness, the original growth of timber had been cut off to furnish fuel for the furnaces, and the surface, much broken by ravines, ridges and old ore beds, was covered by a second growth of pines, scrub-oaks, etc., so dense in places that it was impossible to see a man at a distance of 50 yards. Between the Orange plank road and the Fredericksburg pike ran a little stream called Wilderness run, and north of the latter road was Flat run the general direction of both streams being northeast toward the Rapidan into which they emptied. On the Orange plank road, about 4 miles southwest from the Wilderness tavern, was Parker's store. From the Confederate signal station on Clark's mountain, near the right of Ewell's position, the Federal camps could be plainly seen. On May 2nd Lee, accompanied by several of his generals, made a personal observation, saw the commotion in the Union lines, and rightly conjectured that an early movement of some kind was in contemplation. He accordingly directed his officers to hold their commands in readiness to move against the flank of the Federal army whenever the orders were given from the signal station. It was on this same day that Meade, by Grant's instructions, issued his orders for the advance. Knowing that his every movement was observed by the enemy, he determined to cross the Rapidan during the night. At midnight on the 3rd the 5th and 6th corps, preceded by Wilson cavalry division, began crossing at Germanna ford. The 2nd corps, preceded by Gregg's cavalry, crossed at Ely's ford farther down the river. On the evening of the 4th Warren's corps went into bivouac near the Wilderness tavern, Sedgwick was between Warren and the Rapidan; Hancock was near the cross-roads at Chancellorsville and Burnside, with the 9th corps, was moving by a forced march from the Rappahannock river toward Germanna ford in response to a telegram from Grant. Wilson's cavalry covered both the plank road and the turnpike west of Warren's camp, the main body of the division being at Parker's store and a small force at Robertson's tavern on the pike. The orders issued that evening for the movements of the army on the 5th would indicate that both Grant and Meade believed that Lee would fall back toward Richmond upon finding his flank turned by a superior force. In this they were mistaken. Lee had outgeneraled Hooker on the same ground a year before, and he now decided to make an effort at least to drive the Federals back across the Rapidan. Therefore, as soon as he learned on the morning of the 4th that Meade's advance had crossed the river, Ewell was directed to move by the Orange turnpike, Hill by the plank road, and Longstreet was ordered to bring up his corps with all possible despatch. That night Ewell was bivouacked about 5 miles from Warren's camp, Hill was at Verdiersville, about 3 miles in the rear of Ewell, and Longstreet was at Brock's bridge, 10 miles east of Gordonsville. During the night Lee sent word to Ewell to "bring on the battle now as soon as possible," and ordered Hill to move forward at the same time as Ewell. Warren's orders were to move at 5 a.m on the 5th to Parker's store and extend his right toward the Wilderness tavern to connect with the 6th corps. He moved on time, Crawford's division in advance, Wadsworth's in the center and Griffin's in the rear. About 7 o'clock Meade received a despatch from Warren, announcing that the Confederates were in some force on the pike about 2 miles west of the tavern. Meade hurried to the front and directed Warren to attack with his entire corps to develop what part of Lee's army was there. Hancock, who was moving to take a position on Warren's left, was ordered to halt at Todd's tavern and await further orders. Sedgwick was ordered to move by a cross-road that left the Germanna road at Spottswood, attack any Confederate force he might find in his way, and connect with Warren's right on the pike. Grant joined Meade soon after these orders were issued and the two generals established their headquarters on the knoll around the Lacy house, a little west of the Wilderness tavern. At 8 o'clock Crawford was in a strong position on the Chewning farm, where he was directed to halt until Griffin and Wadsworth were ready to move against the enemy on the turnpike, when he was to send one of his brigades to join in the attack. About noon Griffin attacked vigorously striking Jones brigade of Johnson's division and driving it back in some confusion through the supporting line, after which he advanced against Battle's and Doles' brigades of Rodes' division. Wright of the 6th corps, was to have moved forward on Warren's right, but owing to the dense thickets and the uneven surface of the ground, he was unable to connect with Griffin's line in time to carry out the original plan of attack. As Griffin advanced, his right therefore became exposed and Ewell hurled the brigades of Gordon and Daniel against his flank forcing Ayres' brigade back across the pike. Seeing that his line was in danger of being broken, Griffin then gave the order to fall back. In executing this order his line was so closely pressed by the Confederates that he was compelled to abandon 2 pieces of artillery. Wadsworth, in moving forward through the thickets, lost his direction and exposed his left flank to Gordon and Daniel, just after they had forced Griffin to retire. These two brigades now attacked Wadsworth and drove back his left in disorder. The Confederates then poured through the gap thus formed and struck Dennison's brigade of Robinson's division in the flank as it was moving to Wadsworth's support. Pursuant to orders Crawford had sent McCandless' brigade to join Wadsworth's left, but the latter had begun his advance before McCandless could reach the position assigned him. The brigade was moved forward, however, in the direction that McCandless supposed would bring him into the desired place, and came up just in time to be engaged by Gordon's victorious forces after Dennison's defeat. A sharp fight ensued, but McCandless was greatly outnumbered and was finally forced to withdraw with a severe loss in killed and wounded and the capture of several hundred of his men. Ewell then reformed his line on the ground where he was first attacked and intrenched his position. Warren fell back about 300 yards and formed a new line with his right resting on the pike. Early in the morning Wilson left Col. Hammond, with the 5th N. Y. at Parker's store and pushed on with the rest of his command toward the Craig meeting-house. Soon after Wilson's departure Hammond became engaged with Hill's advance and Crawford threw forward a skirmish line of his infantry to support the cavalry. This line soon encountered Kirkland's brigade of Heth's division and with Hammond's regiment was slowly forced back along the plank road toward the Wilderness tavern. Getty's division was hurried forward to the intersection of the Brock and Orange plank roads, and a despatch was sent to Hancock directing him to move up on the Brock road to Getty's support. Getty reached the cross-roads just in time to secure that important position, and formed his division in two lines of battle at right angles to the plank road, Wheaton's brigade in the center, Grant's on the left and Eustis' on the right. Hill advanced against this line, but received such a galling fire that he speedily retired and for the next two hours everything was quiet, except for the almost constant firing of the skirmishers. When Hancock received the order at 9 a.m. to halt at Todd's tavern his advance was already some 2 miles beyond that point, and this caused some delay when, two hours later, he was ordered to move to the support of Getty. At 2 p.m. Birney's division came up on the Brock road and formed on Getty's left in two lines of battle along that road. The divisions of Mott and Gibbon followed in order, as fast as the narrow road and dense undergrowth would permit, and also formed in two lines on the left of Birney. Barlow's division, on the extreme left, was thrown forward to some high, clear ground, which was the only place along the line where artillery could be used to advantage. Here Hancock massed all his batteries except Dow's and one section of Ricketts', the former of which was placed near Mott's left and the latter on the plank road. As fast as the different commands fell into position breastworks of logs and earth were thrown up. The second line also threw up works in the rear of the first, and later a third line was constructed behind the divisions of Mott and Birney. Before his troops were in position Hancock received orders to attack, and a little after 3 p.m. Getty was directed to attack at once, without waiting for Hancock. During the lull of two hours Hill had been industriously pushing his men into position and forming a junction with Ewell's right. He was anxiously awaiting and expecting the arrival of Longstreet, but that officer had delayed his advance, because he was unwilling to take the road assigned him by Lee, and waited for permission to select his own route. The result was that when darkness fell on the 5th he was still miles away from Hill's right. Although Getty received orders about 3 o'clock to attack at once, his advance was delayed an hour, as he was engaged in shifting Wheaton's brigade to the right of the plank road to make more room for the 2nd corps. At 4:15 he moved forward down the plank roads, but had not proceeded more than 300 yards when he encountered Heth's division. Ricketts' guns had advanced with the line of infantry and did good service in forcing back the enemy's center, but Hill's line overlapped Getty's flanks and the slight advantage gained in the center was more than offset by the severe losses on both the right and left, where the Federal attacks were repulsed, Grant losing nearly 1,000 men, about one-half of his brigade. Seeing that Getty had met the enemy in force, Hancock ordered Birney's and Mott's divisions to his support, and a little later sent Carroll's brigade of Gibbon's division to the right of the plank road to support Eustis. About 5:30 the enemy charged and forced back the Union line for 50 yards. One of Ricketts' guns had to be abandoned on account of the horses being killed. Some of the Confederates reached this gun and planted their colors on it, but they were driven away before they could withdraw it. About the time that this charge was made Hancock had completed the formation of his line and attacked Hill's right with great vigor, Smyth's "Irish" brigade driving back the enemy's line for some distance. In his report Hancock says: "The battle raged with great severity and obstinacy until 8 p.m. without decided advantage to either party." While this was apparently true at the time an hour more of daylight would have witnssed Hill's defeat. He had extended his lines to the southward to cover the ground that had been assigned to Longstreet. This thin line was now shattered and disjointed, and had it been severely pressed for an hour longer it must inevitably have been broken at some point and the whole corps driven from the field. During the action Gen. Hays' commanding one of Hancock's brigades, was killed; Col. Carroll and Gen. Getty were both severely wounded, but neither left the field until the fighting was over for the day. In the afternoon some heavy skirmishing took place on the Federal right. About 5 p.m. Ricketts' 2nd brigade, under the command of Brig.-Gen. Truman Seymour, who had relieved Col. B. F. Smith that morning, Neill's brigade of Getty's division, and part of Wrights's 1st brigade, under Col. W. H. Penrose, attacked the Confederate brigades of Hays and Pegram in a strongly intrenched position on the ridge south of net run. Pegram placed some artillery on his left, the fire from which enfiladed Neill's line, forcing him and Penrose to retire from the field with considerable loss. Seymour continued the contest until dark, but was unable to dislodge the enemy from his position. The Federal loss in killed and wounded was heavy on this part of the field, Col. Keifer, commanding Seymour's first line, being severely wounded. On the other side Gen. Pegram was wounded and compelled to leave the field. While these different infantry engagements were going on the cavalry was not idle. At the Craig meeting-house Chapman's brigade of Wilson's division encountered Rosser's brigade of Hampton's cavalry and drove it back about 2 miles. Rosser was then strongly reinforced and Chapman fell back on the 1st brigade at the junction of the Parker's store and Catharpin roads. Soon after this Wilson ordered his whole command to Todd's tavern, where he had been directed by Sheridan to meet Gregg's division. On the way to Todd's he was closely pressed by the Confederate cavalry. Gregg arrived at the tavern about the same time as Wilson, when the two divisions immediately assumed the offensive and drove the enemy beyond Corbin's bridge across the Po river. Immediately after the fighting ceased on the 5th, Hancock, Warren and Sedgwick received orders to attack at 5 o'clock the next morning. Burnside, then in the vicinity of Germanna ford, was instructed to march at 2 a.m., with Stevenson's, Potter's and Willcox's divisions, and be in position to join in the general advance at the hour designated. From prisoners captured during the day it was learned that Longstreet was hourly expected and Hancock was notified to keep a close watch on his left. Barlow's division, with all the artillery of the 2nd corps, was therefore placed in position to protect the left flank and a strong skirmish line was thrown out on the Brock road. The Federal attack was anticipated by the enemy, who began firing on both the left and right a few minutes before 5 o'clock. Soon after the firing commenced, Hancock attacked in two lines, extending across the plank road, Getty's division, with Eustis on the right, Wheaton in the center and Grant on the left, supporting the divisions of Mott and Birney, the latter being in command of Hancock's right wing. The Confederates were pushed back about a mile and a half from the cross-roads when Wadsworth's division came sweeping in from the right, which threw the enemy into confusion and resulted in the capture of several hundred prisoners. The whole line then pressed on after the almost routed enemy for nearly a mile farther; Lee's trains and headquarters were in full view and the battle was nearly won, when a heavy artillery fire was opened on the Union lines from Poague's batteries masked in the shrubbery on the south side of the road, and it was learned that one of Longstreet's divisions had finally connected with Hill's right. In the impetuous advance Hancock's line had become somewhat disordered and he ordered a halt to readjust his lines before engaging the fresh troops. Getty had been wounded during the action and turned over the command of the division to Wheaton. He was now relieved by Webb's brigade of Gibbon's division and formed his command along the original line of battle on the Brock road. At 7 a.m. Gibbon, commanding the left wing, was directed to attack the Confederate right with Barlow's division, but owing to the expected attack by Longstreet the order was but partially carried out. Frank's brigade only was thrown forward to feel the enemy's position and after some sharp fighting it connected with Mott's left. About 8 o'clock Stevenson's division of Burnside's corps reported to Hancock. Burnside, with his 2nd and 3rd divisions, had been expected to move by a cross-toad toward Parker's store, on Birney's right, and attack simultaneously with the rest of the line. About the time of Stevenson's arrival at the Brock road, Hancock received word from Meade that Burnside had then pushed forward nearly to the store and was ready to attack. This information proved to be erroneous and was in a measure contributory to the disaster that overtook Hancock later in the day. Burnside was delayed by a lack of definite information regarding the ground over which he was to move and the dense thickets he encountered, so that it was 2 p.m. before his attack was commenced. A few minutes before 9 o'clock Birney, Mott and Wadsworth, with part of Stevenson's division and three brigades of Gibbon's, resumed the attack along the plank road and were soon furiously engaged with the enemy. Just previous to this, rapid firing was heard in the direction of Todd's tavern, which Hancock supposed to be the threatened flank attack by Longstreet, and this caused him to send Brooke's brigade of Barlow's division out on the Brock road to occupy a line of breastworks there to hold Longstreet in check. Leasure's brigade of the 9th corps and Eustis' of the 6th were held in readiness to support Barlow. As a matter of fact Longstreet was at that moment in Hancock's front, the firing at Todd's being an engagement between Sheridan and the Confederate cavalry. In his report Hancock says: "The arrangements made on my extreme left to receive Longstreet prevented me from pushing my success at the time when Gen. Birney was driving Hill on the plank road." South of the plank road and nearly parallel to it was the unfinished Gordonsville & Fredericksburg railroad. About 10 o'clock Longstreet sent Gen. Mahone with four brigades to move along the line of this railroad and gain Hancock's flank and rear, while the brigades of Law, Gregg and Benning engaged the Federals in front. Mahone first encountered Frank's brigade, which had nearly exhausted its ammunition and was therefore compelled to retire before the vehement flank attack. He then struck the left of Mott's division, which in turn was forced back in some confusion. Heroic efforts were made to rally the men and reform the line along the plank road by throwing back the left, but the troops had been engaged all morning under a heavy fire in the dense forest and their formation was too irregular for such a movement. At Birney's suggestion the whole line was then withdrawn and reestablished in the breastworks along the Brock road. When Longstreet saw that Mahone's attack was successful he ordered a general advance along the plank road, hoping to crush Hancock's line. Mahone's men, upon seeing the head of the Confederate column, mistook it for a fresh body of Union troops and fired a volley, killing Gen. Jenkins and wounding Longstreet. Lee then assumed command of his right wing in person and ordered the attack to be postponed, although the Confederate line was then within a short distance of the Union works. About half an hour before Mahone struck the left of Hancock's line Cutler's brigade of Wadsworth's division was driven back to the open ground near the Lacy house, but Birney sent two brigades and recovered the lost ground, though at considerable loss. During this part of the battle Gen. Wadsworth was mortally and Gen. Baxter severely wounded. From 11 a.m. to 4 p.m. all was comparatively quiet along Hancock's front. About 2 o'clock Robinson's 1st brigade, under Col. Lyle, and two regiments of heavy artillery reported to Hancock and were massed near the cross-roads in reserve. At this time Burnside made an assault on the enemy's line near the Tapp house, north of the plank road, and drove it back in disorder, but part of Heth's division and Wofford's brigade of Kershaw's came up as reinforcements and regained all the lost ground. At 3 p.m. Hancock and Burnside both received orders to attack at 6 o'clock. They were not permitted to wait until that hour, however, for at 4:15 the enemy advanced against Hancock in force, pressing up to the edge of the abatis, less than 100 yards from the first line of works, where they halted and opened a fierce fire of musketry. This was continued for half an hour, during which time the Union line held firm. Then a portion of Mott's division and Ward's brigade of Birney's gave way. Concerning this break, Hancock says in his report: "The confusion and disorganization among a portion of the troops of Mott's and Birney's divisions on this occasion was greatly increased, if not originated, by the front line of breastworks having taken fire a short time before the enemy made his attack, the flames having been communicated to it from the forest in front (the battle-ground of the morning), which had been burning for some hours. The breastworks on this portion of my line were constructed entirely of logs, and at the critical moment of the enemy's advance were a mass of flames which it was impossible at that time to subdue, the fire extending for many hundred paces to the right and left. The intense heat and smoke, which was driven by the wind directly into the faces of the men, prevented them on portions of the line from firing over the parapet, and at some points compelled them to abandon the line." As soon as Mott's men gave way the Confederates advanced And, some of them reached the breastworks and planted their colors thereon. But their victory was of short duration, for Carroll's brigade moved by the left flank, advancing at the double-quick with fixed bayonets, and drove the enemy back with heavy loss in killed and wounded, some of the dead being afterward found inside the works. Dow's battery, one section of which was near the plank road and the others in the second line near Mott's left, did good service in firing on the enemy, both during his advance and retreat. After the repulse of the Confederates by Carroll, Lee withdrew his troops from the contest, and there was no more fighting along the Brock road that day, the order for the attack being countermanded because Hancock's men were almost out of ammunition and it was too late to replenish the supply. When Burnside heard the firing in Hancock's front he advanced against the enemy before him, but his attacks were isolated and unsupported and the only important result attained was to prevent Heth and Wilcox from moving to Lee's support When the attack began in the morning Wright's division vigorously assaulted Early's intrenchments in his front, but was repulsed with heavy loss. A second attack met with no better success, and as the withdrawal of Burnside's corps had left Sedgwick's right exposed he was ordered to intrench his position and act on the defensive. Warren's attacks on Ewell were also unsuccessful, as the enemy's lines here had been strengthened during the night and several pieces of artillery added. During the day Sedgwick was reinforced by Shaler's brigade, which had been guarding the trains, and Johnston's brigade was sent to Early. Both sides were thus reinforced and some sharp fighting occurred during the afternoon, the attacks of Warren and Sedgwick serving to keep Lee from concentrating his entire force against Hancock. Just before sunset Gordon's brigade, supported by Johnston's, made an attack on Sedgwick's right flank, while Pegram engaged the Federals in front. Shaler's brigade was engaged in building breastworks and the sudden descent of the enemy threw it into confusion, rolling it back on Seymour's brigade, which also fell into some disorder. Seymour and Shaler, with several hundred of their men, were captured. Johnston passed to the left of Gordon and gained Wright's rear, where he captured a few prisoners. Wright promptly restored order among the troops and repulsed the attack of Johnston. Gordon's men were thrown into confusion and Early ordered both brigades to withdraw. In his Memoir Early says of this flank attack: "It was fortunate, however, that darkness came to close this affair, as the enemy, if he had been able to discover the disorder on our side, might have brought up fresh troops and availed himself of our condition." This flank attack of Early's was the last important event in the day's contest, and, in fact, closed the battle of the Wilderness, for when Federal pickets and skirmishing parties were sent out the next morning no trace of the enemy could be discovered on the field of the day before. The Army of Northern Virginia had retired to its line of intrenchments and the redoubtable Lee had evidently abandoned his offensive campaign. The Union loss in the battle of the Wilderness was 2,246 killed 12,037 wounded and 3,383 captured or missing. No doubt many of the wounded were burned to death or suffocated in the fire that raged through the woods on Hancock's front. Concerning the enemy's casualties Badeau, in his Military History of U. S. Grant, says: "The losses of Lee no human being can tell. No official report of them exists, if any was ever made, and no statement that has been put forth in regard to them has any foundation but a guess. It seems however, fair to presume that as Lee fought outside of his works as often as Grant, and was as often repelled, the slaughter of the rebels equalled that in the national army. The grey coats lay as thick as the blue next day, when the national scouts pushed out over the entire battle-field and could discover no living enemy " Battle at Spotsylvania Court House, Virginia on 09 May 1864; Source: The Union Army, vol. 6 Spottsylvania Court House, Va., May 8-18, 1864. Army of the Potomac. At 3 p.m. on May 7, while the Army of the Potomac was still on the battle-field of the Wilderness, a messenger arrived at Grant's headquarters with the information that Gen. Butler, with the Army of the James, had landed at City Point, completely surprising the Confederates there, and was ready to advance on Richmond. Lee had retired behind his works, leaving open the road to Richmond round his right flank, and as soon as the intelligence of Butler's successful beginning was received Grant issued orders for a night march of the whole army toward Spottsylvania Court House. (For the organization of the Army of the Potomac at this time see Wilderness.) From the Wilderness a road ran east to Chancellorsville, where it was intersected by another that ran southeast to Piney Branch Church. The Brock road ran in a southeasterly direction to Spottsylvania and about 3 miles south of it, and nearly parallel to it, ran the Shady Grove road. The former was in possession of the Federals as far as Todd's tavern and the latter was in the hands of the enemy. Beyond Todd's tavern the Brock road was held by the Confederate cavalry under Stuart. From the tavern the Catharpin road ran southwest and intersected the southern road at Shady Grove Church. Gen. Warren, commanding the 5th corps was to move by the Brock road and was to be followed by Gen. Hancock with the 2nd corps, while the 6th and 9th corps, respectively commanded by Gen. Sedgwick and Gen. Burnside, were directed to move by way of Chancellorsville and Piney Branch Church. Gen. Sheridan, commanding the cavalry, was ordered to "have a sufficient force on the approaches from the right to keep the corps commanders advised in time of the approach of the enemy." The trains and reserve artillery were moved to Chancellorsville in the afternoon from which point they were to follow the army. Nearly parallel to the course of the army ran the Po river on the south. The Catharpin road crossed this river at Corbin's bridge, the Shady Grove road at what was known as the Block House bridge, and the road running from Spottsylvania to Richmond crossed it at Snell's bridge about 2 miles south of the Court House. Some controversy and criticism have been indulged in as to why these bridges were not taken possession of by the Federal forces. Badeau, in his Military History of Grant, says: "These bridges were of first importance for they commanded Lee's only approaches to Spottsylvania, and Sheridan, who had been ordered to keep a good look-out toward the enemy disposed his force so as to secure all three positions. * * * Had these orders (Sheridan's) been carried out, every avenue to Spottsylvania would have been closed to the rebel army." Sheridan's corps consisted of the three divisions commanded by Gregg, Merritt and Wilson. His instructions to Gregg, issued at 1 a.m on the 8th, show the disposition of his forces with regard to the bridges. They were as follows: "Move with your command at 5 a.m., on the Catharpin road crossing at Corbin's bridge, and taking position at Shady Grove Church. Gen. Merritt will follow you, and at Shady Grove Church will take the left hand, or Block House road, moving forward and taking up position at that point (viz., Block House). Immediately after he has passed, you will move forward with your division, on the same road to the crossing of the Po river, where you will take up position supporting Gen. Merritt. Gen. Wilson with his division will march from Alsop's by way of Spottsylvania Court House and the Gate to Snell's bridge, where he will take up position." Before the hour fixed for the cavalry to move, Corbin's bridge and the Block House bridge were both in the hands of the enemy. Snell's bridge was not used by the Confederates, nor was any attempt made to use it, because it was too far out of the way. When Lee learned, on the afternoon of the 7th, of the movement of the Federal trains, his first impression was that Grant was falling back to Fredericksburg and determined to interpose a force between him and Richmond. He therefore ordered Longstreets corps, now commanded by Gen. R. H. Anderson, Longstreet having been wounded in the battle of the Wilderness, to move to Spottsylvania that night, to be followed by Ewell's corps at daylight the next morning. Anderson moved at 11 p.m. and at daylight his advance had reached the Block House bridge. Had Gregg and Merritt undertaken to carry out Sheridan's order, they would have encountered this entire corps as it was marching along the Shady Grove road. In fact they would have met the enemy before reaching that road, as Hampton was on the Catharpin road between Corbin's bridge and Todd's tavern, Wilson did move forward to Spottsylvania, where he found Wickham's brigade of Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, which he drove from the town and held the place for two hours, when he was recalled by Sheridan just as Wofford's and Bryan's brigades of Anderson's command were moving to attack him: It was not the failure to carry out Sheridan's order regarding the bridges, but the presence of Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry on the Brock road, that prevented the Federals from gaining possession of Spottsylvania Court House. Warren moved at 8:30 p.m. and was expected to reach the Court House by daylight on the 8th. At Todd's tavern he was delayed for more than an hour by the headquarters escort and 2 miles farther on he encountered the enemy's cavalry. Merritt was directed to move forward and clear the road for the infantry. The Confederates were forced back slowly, leaving the road obstructed by fallen trees, so that Warren's progress was necessarily slow. At 6 o'clock in the morning Merritt was relieved by Robinson's division, which succeeded after a sharp contest in driving the enemy from the road, but at this hour Warren's advance was still several miles from the Court House. At 8:30 a.m. Robinson came out of the woods into the open fields. Of the Alsop farm, about half way between Todd's tavern and Spottsylvania. Here the Brock road forked, the two branches coming together again about a mile farther on. Robinson took the left hand road, Denison's brigade on the right, Lyle's on the left and Coulter's (formerly Baxter's) on the left rear. Griffin's division moved on the right fork with Bartlett's brigade in line of battle in advance, the brigades of Ayres and Sweitzer following the road. Robinson reached the junction of the roads before Griffin, formed his command in column of regiments and threw out a strong skirmish line in front. Near the intersection of the Brock road and the old Court House road the former entered a piece of timber. When Robinson's advance was about 300 yards from this timber the enemy opened a heavy fire of artillery and musketry upon the front and right from a line of intrenchments just inside the wood. Robinson was seriously wounded at the first fire and, the national troops were forced back, closely pressed by the enemy, who tried to turn Lyle's left, but was prevented from doing so by the prompt action of Denison, who placed his brigade in the edge of the wood where he checked the further advance of the Confederates and finally compelled them to retire to their works. Soon after Robinson's division became engaged, Bartlett's line of battle came under the enemy's fire when about half-way across the open fields of the Alsop farm. At first Bartlett's men gave way, but fortunately just at that time Ayres' brigade occupied a sunken part of the road and under cover of this position the line was reformed. Griffin then advanced his whole division, Crawford came up with his division and drove the enemy from the woods on Griffin's left. The Confederate force with which Robinson and Griffin had been engaged up to this time was Henagan's and Humphreys' brigades of Kershaw's division, which had formed Anderson's advance on the Shady Grove road. When Kershaw reached the Block House bridge about daylight he heard the sound of the firing over on the Brock road where Fitzhugh Lee was engaged with Merritt and Robinson. Turning sharply to the left with the two brigades he reached the woods just as Lee was falling back, threw up temporary breastworks and awaited the Federal advance. He was followed a little later by Field's division, which came up on Griffin's right about the time that Crawford was driving the enemy from the woods. Cutler's division, the last of Warren's corps to arrive, came up in time to prevent Field from turning Griffin's flank and drove him from the woods after which the entire corps was pushed forward as far as possible and intrenched, the 6th corps coming up and intrenching on Warren's left. Hancock, who was expected to move with the 2nd corps at 10 p.m on the 7th, was so delayed by other troops blocking the road that he did not begin his march until daylight the next morning. At 9 a.m. the head of his column arrived at Todd's tavern, where Gregg's cavalry was found skirmishing with that of the enemy. Hancock threw forward a skirmish line to relieve Gregg and then posted his division with Mott covering the Brock road to the right, Barlow on Mott's left, Gibbon covering the Catharpin road and Birney in reserve. About 11 a.m Miles' brigade of Barlow's division, one brigade of Gregg's and a battery was sent on a reconnaissance toward Corbin's bridge. When about half a mile from the bridge this force was opened upon by the Confederate batteries on the hills south of the river. Miles ordered his artillery to reply and formed his infantry in line of battle along a ridge in the wood, which position he held until about 5 p.m., when he was ordered to return to the tavern. On the way back he was attacked by Mahone's brigade of Hill's corps, which was then on the way to Spottsylvania. Miles repulsed two spirited attacks, holding his ground until after dark, when he rejoined the division. Gibbon's division was sent to the support of Warren and Sedgwick in the afternoon, but the remainder of the 2nd corps did not move toward Spottsylvania until about noon on the 9th. Then Birney and Barlow moved down the road about a mile, where they took a road leading to the right and joined Gibbon's division on the high ground overlooking the Po, the three divisions going into line of battle facing the river. Mott's division was moved from Todd's tavern to the left of the 6th corps at Alsop's. During the day Burnside moved with the 9th corps from his position near Chancellorsville down the Fredericksburg pike toward Spottsylvania. On the march Willcox's division encountered and repulsed a small force at the bridge over the Ny river, after which the command, Christ's brigade in advance, pushed on and went into position about a mile east of the Court House, where several assaults were repulsed during the afternoon, and where the division finally intrenched. The presence of the enemy on the Fredericksburg road led Burnside to report to Grant that Lee was moving toward Fredericksburg and Hancock was directed to force a passage of the Po for the purpose of making a reconnaissance on Lee's left. Although the stream was difficult to ford and the opposite bank was held by the enemy, each of his three divisions succeeded in crossing and occupied the Shady Grove road from Waite's shop, at the cross-roads between the Po and Glady run, toward the Block House bridge, which Hancock endeavored to seize, but darkness came on before the movement could be executed. That night Hancock threw over three pontoon bridges for the passage of his artillery early the next morning. Lee became alarmed by Hancock's presence on his left and on the evening of the 9th sent Mahone's division to hold the Shady Grove road. Later Mahone was reinforced by Heth's division. As soon as it was light enough to see on the morning of the 1Oth, Hancock made a reconnaissance toward the Block House bridge with the intention of forcing a passage across it, but found the enemy strongly intrenched on the east bank. Concerning his movements in trying to gain possession of the bridge he says in his report: "After a careful survey had been made, I concluded not to attempt to carry the bridge, but sent Brooke's brigade, of Barlow's division down the river to ascertain what could be effected there. Gen. Birney was directed to send three or four regiments out on the Andrews'tavern road to cover Brooke's movement. Col. Brooke succeeded in crossing the river about half way between the bridge and the mouth of Glady run. * * * About this time I was informed by the major-general commanding, that an assault was to be made on the enemy's works on Laurel Hill, in front of Gen. Warren's position near Alsop's house. I was directed to move two of my divisions to the left to participate in it, and to assume command of the forces to be engaged in the attack." Pursuant to this order Gibbon was at once sent to the north bank of the Po and formed his command on Warren's right. Birney followed, leaving Barlow to hold the ground on the south side of the river. As soon as the enemy discovered that the Federals were recrossing the Po, he advanced in force against Barlow, who was instructed to fall back across the pontoons. The brigades of Brooke and Brown took up a position along a wooded crest about 100 yards in the rear of the works Barlow had constructed, while Miles and Smyth were ordered to fall back with their brigades to the bank of the river. Mistaking the movement of Miles and Smyth for a forced retreat, the Confederates advanced in line of battle supported by heavy columns and attacked Brooke and Brown, but the assault was repulsed. A second attack was made soon after and the combat became close and bloody, but again the enemy was forced back. In the meantime the woods on the right and rear of the Union line had caught fire and the flames now came so near that it was impossible for Brooke and Brown longer to maintain their position. Taking advantage of the lull that followed the second repulse of the enemy the two brigades were withdrawn. This affair is known as the battle of Waite's Shop. Miles' brigade was the last to cross and as he was near the river Heth attempted to cross the open ground toward the pontoons, but was driven back by the fire of Miles men and the batteries on the north bank. All through the forenoon of the 1Oth there were sharp skirmishing and artillery firing preparatory to the general attack which had been ordered for the afternoon. Gen. Sedgwick had been killed on the 9th and the 6th corps was now under command of Brig.-Gen. H. G. Wright. At 3:45 p.m. he was ordered to attack the works in his front with his whole command and Mott's division of the 2nd corps. Warren was also ordered to assault the works near the Alsop house with the divisions of Crawford and Cutler and the brigades of Webb and Carroll of Gibbon's division. Carroll charged through a belt of burning woods, the right of his line gaining the enemy's works and the whole brigade pressing up to the abatis, only to be forced back by "such a concentrated and murderous fire from two lines as to make the position untenable." Warren was also repulsed with heavy loss, Gen. Rice commanding one of Cutler's brigades being among the killed. Col. Emory Upton, with twelve regiments of the 6th corpsined the parapet and engaged in some desperate hand-to-hand fighting, capturing several pieces of artillery and about 1,000 prisoners. His assault was to have been supported by Mott's division, but when Mott reached the open field he was met by an enfilading fire from the enemy's batteries, which threw his line into confusion and forced him to retire. The advantage gained by Upton was therefore of little moment, for the Confederates fairly swarmed against him, compelling him to abandon the captured cannon and fall back, though he succeeded in bringing in the most of his prisoners. Altogether the attack was a failure. Lee's line extended from the Block House bridge northeast across the Brock road to the watershed between the Po and Ny rivers, nearly north of the Court House, where it turned sharply to the south, the right being near Snell's bridge. From his right center the works were thrown forward in a horseshoe salient around the crest of a spur between two small tributaries of the Ny river. Ewell's corps occupied the salient, Anderson's extended the line to the right and Hill's to the left. Directly. north of the salient, and about three-fourths of a mile distant, was the Brown house, while inside the enemy's works on the spur within the angle stood the McCool house. Very little fighting was done on the 11th, the day being spent in preparations for an assault on the salient at daylight the next morning. Mott made an attempt to drive in the enemy's skirmishers in order to develop the weak place in the Confederate works, but the effort was only partially successful. Wright was instructed to extend his left and concentrate on that wing. Hancock moved his entire corps after dark to the vicinity of the Brown house, and was to lead the assault. Warren was to hold the position vacated by the 2nd corps, and when Hancock began his attack Warren on the right and Burnside on the left were to engage the enemy in their fronts to prevent reinforcements from being sent to the salient. Hancock was to advance on a line drawn from the Brown House to the McCool house. The night of the 11th was dark and stormy, but the troops of the 2nd corps took their positions quietly and promptly, fully aware of the desperate character of the work awaiting them. Barlow's division in two massed lines was placed on the cleared ground which extended up to the enemy's line; Birney's was formed in two deployed lines on Barlow's right; Mott's division was in the rear of Birney, and Gibbon's was in reserve. The assault was to have been made at 4 o'clock but owing to a dense fog it was 35 minutes later before Hancock gave the order to advance. With even pace the troops moved forward in column and when about half way up the slope broke into a cheer, dashed forward on the double-quick through the abatis and over the works. Hancock describes the action here as follows: "Barlow's and Birney's divisions entered almost at the same moment, striking the enemy's line at a sharp salient immediately in front of the Landrum house. A fierce and bloody fight ensued in the works with bayonets and clubbed muskets. It was short, however, and resulted in the capture of nearly 4,000 prisoners of Johnson's division, of Ewell's corps, 20 pieces of artillery, with horses, caissons and material complete, several thousand stand of small arms, and upward of 30 colors. Among the prisoners were Maj.-Gen. Edward Johnson and Brig.-Gen. George H. Steuart, of the Confederate service. The enemy fled in great disorder." So far the assault had been a success. Elated by their victory, the Union troops pursued the flying Confederates toward Spottsylvania until they encountered a second line, the presence of which was unknown to Hancock or any of his officers. This line was held by Gordon, who checked the rush of the Federals and gave Lee an opportunity to push reinforcements into the angle. Lee was further aided at this critical moment by the necessity of reforming the Union lines, as in the impetuous charge and pursuit practically all semblance of a regular formation had been lost. The divisions of Mahone and Wilcox came up from the right and advanced against the 2nd corps before the disorder of its success could be overcome, driving Hancock's men back to the first line of works, where they were reinforced by Wright, with Russell's and Wheaton's divisions of the 6th corps( which came up on the right and vigorously assaulted the west angle of the salient. Again there was some stubborn hand-to-hand fighting in which Wright was wounded, though he remained with his men, cheering them on, and through the heroic efforts of Upton's brigade the line was held against the repeated and determined attempts of the Confederates to regain it. Hancock ordered his artillery to the high ground near the Landrum house and throughout the day charges of canister were fired over the heads of the Union troops into the enemy's line of battle. On Hancock's left Burnside assaulted the Confederate works at 4:30 a.m. and in half an hour had carried two lines of rifle-pits. Stevenson's and Potter's divisions then moved against the main line of works, a portion of which was carried by Potter, who captured a number of prisoners and a battery of 2 guns, but was unable to hold his advantage and was finally forced to retire with heavy loss. Several subsequent attacks were made by the two divisions, and also by Willcox's on the extreme left, but none succeeded in driving the enemy from his position. The persistent hammering of Burnside, however, prevented the enemy from withdrawing troops in his front to hurl against Hancock and Wright. About 9 o'clock Warren was directed to attack the enemy on his front, but upon attempting to advance his line was subjected to a heavy enfilading fire and he was forced back. Cutler's division was then sent to Wright and later the whole corps was withdrawn from its position and thrown to the left, where it became engaged against the west angle, but failed to carry the works. The firing was so heavy and constant that several oak trees inside the salient, some of them nearly 2 feet in diameter, were literally gnawed off by the bullets. Late in the day Lee gave up the idea of trying to recapture the outer line of works and retired to Gordon's line, half a mile to the rear, where he strengthened his position during the night. The losses on both sides were so heavy during the action that the salient has passed into history as the "Bloody Angle." The attack on the 12th was the last of the hard fighting about Spottsylvania. Hancock was ordered to hold his corps in readiness to renew the assault at 4 o'clock the next morning, but owing to a dark and rainy night the other commands were not in position at the appointed hour to support him and the attack was abandoned. Artillery firing was kept up from the 13th to the 18th, chiefly to cover the movement of the army to a position covering the Fredericksburg road on Lee's right, and there was a slight skirmish near Piney Branch Church on the 15th. In his report Grant says: "Deeming it impracticable to make any further attack upon the enemy at Spottsylvania Court House, orders were issued on the 18th with a view to a movement to the North Anna, to commence at 12 o'clock on the night of the 19th." This movement was interfered with by Ewell coming out of his works late on the afternoon of the 19th and attacking the Federal right near the Harris farm on the Fredericksburg road north of the Ny river. The attack was promptly repulsed, but it delayed the movement to the North Anna until the night of the 21st. The Union loss at Spottsylvania, during the ten days fighting, was 2,725 killed, 13,416 wounded and 2,258 missing. The Confederate losses were not officially reported and various estimates have been made, some of which place the total in killed, wounded and missing as high as 15,000. Maj. Jed Hotchkiss, who was topographer for Lee's army and author of the Virginia volume of the Confederate Military History, places the total loss at 8,000 and significantly adds: "but these were 18 per cent of the army." Battle at Spotsylvania Court House, Virginia on 10 May 1864; Source: The Union Army, vol. 6 (Same as above) Battle at Spotsylvania Court House, Virginia on 11 May 1864; Source: The Union Army, vol. 6 (Same as above) Battle at Spotsylvania Court House, Virginia on 12 May 1864; Source: The Union Army, vol. 6 (Same as above) Battle at Virginia on 12 May 1864 Battle at Hanover Junction, Virginia on 16 May 1864 Battle at Mine Run, Virginia on 17 May 1864 Battle at Spotsylvania Court House, Virginia on 22 May 1864 Battle at Hanover Junction, Virginia on 24 May 1864 Battle at Spotsylvania Court House, Virginia on 25 May 1864 Battle at Hanover Junction, Virginia on 29 May 1864 Battle at Cold Harbor, Virginia on 31 May 1864; Source: The Union Army, vol. 5 (Same as Above) Cold Harbor, Va., June 1-3, 1864. Army of the Potomac. This was the last engagement of any consequence in the campaign from the Rapidan to the James, which began with the battle of the Wilderness on May 5-7. The severe losses in the Wilderness, at Spottsylvania Court House and along the North Anna river had made necessary several changes, and the Army of the Potomac on the last day of May was organized as follows: The 2nd corps, Maj.Gen. Winfield S. Hancock commanding, was composed of the three divisions commanded by Brig.-Gen. Francis C. Barlow, Brig.Gen. John Gibbon and Brig.-Gen. David B. Birney, and the artillery brigade under Col. John C. Tidball. The 5th corps, commanded by Maj.-Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren, included four divisions, respectively commanded by Brig.-Gens. Charles Griffin, Henry H. Lockwood, Samuel W. Crawford and Lysander Cutler, and the artillery brigade of Col. Charles S. Wainwright. (On June 2 Crawford's division was consolidated with Lockwood's.) The 6th corps, Maj.-Gen. Horatio G. Wright commanding, consisted of three divisions commanded by Brig.-Gens. David A. Russell, Thomas H. Neill and James B. Ricketts, and the artillery brigade of Col. Charles H. Tompkins. The 9th corps, under command of Maj.-Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside, was made up of the four divisions commanded by Maj.-Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden, Brig.-Gen. Robert B. Potter, Brig.-Gen. Orlando B. Willcox and Brig. Gen. Edward Ferrero, and the reserve artillery under Capt. John Edwards. (Ferrero's division was composed of colored troops.) The cavalry corps under Maj.-Gen. P. Sheridan, consisted of three divisions commanded by Brig.-Gens.Alfred T. A. Torbert, David McM. Gregg and James H. Wilson, and a brigade of horse artillery under Capt. James M. Robertson. The 18th corps, formerly with the Army of the James, commanded by Maj. Gen. William F. Smith, embraced three divisions, respectively commanded by Brig.-Gens. William H. T. Brooks, James H. Martindale and Charles Devens, and the artillery brigade under command of Capt. Samuel S. Elder. This corps was added to the Army of the Potomac just in time to take part in the battle of Cold Harbor. The artillery reserve was under command of Brig.-Gen. Henry J. Hunt. On June 1 Grant's forces numbered "present for duty" 113,875 men of all arms. The Confederate army under command of Gen. Robert E. Lee, was organized practically as it was at the beginning of the campaign, (See Wilderness) with the exception of some slight changes in commanders and the accession of the divisions of Breckenridge, Pickett and Hoke. Various estimates have been made of the strength of the Confederate forces at Cold Harbor. Maj. Jed Hotchkiss, topographer for Lee's army states it as being 58,000 men, which is probably not far from the truth. Cold Harbor is about 3 miles north of the Chickahominy river and 11 miles from Richmond. Grant considered it an important point as several roads centered there, notably among them those leading to Bethesda Church, White House landing on the Pamunkey, and the several crossings of the Chickahominy, offering facilities for the movement of troops in almost any direction. On the last day of May Sheridan sent Torbert's division to drive away from Cold Harbor the Confederate cavalry under Fitzhugh Lee, which was done with slight loss. Gregg's division reinforced Torbert, but the Confederates were also reinforced and Sheridan sent word to Grant that the enemy was moving a heavy force against the place and that he did not think it prudent to hold on. In response to this message Sheridan was instructed to hold on at all hazards, as a force of infantry was on the way to relieve him. This infantry force was the 6th corps, which arrived at Cold Harbor at 9 a. m. on the 1st, just as Sheridan had repulsed the second assault by Kershaw's division, the rapid fire of the retreating carbines and the heavy charges of canister proving too much for the enemy. Wright relieved the cavalry and about 2 p. m. Smith's corps came up from Newcastle and took position on the right of the 6th. Both were under instructions to assault as soon as they were ready but the troops were not properly disposed until 6 o'clock that afternoon. When Lee discovered that Grant was moving some of his force to the left of the Federal line, he decided to meet the maneuver by transferring Anderson's corps from the Confederate left to the right in order to confront Wright. Anderson took position on the left of Hoke, whose division formed the extreme right of Lee's line. At 6 p. m. Wright and Smith moved forward to the attack. In their front was an open space, varying in width from 300 to 1,2OO yards, and the moment the first line debauched from the wood the enemy opened fire. The troops pressed forward, however, with an unwavering line until they reached the timber on the farther side of the clearing. Ricketts' division struck the main line of entrenchments at the point where Anderson's and Hoke's commands joined, with such force that the flank of each was rolled back and about 500 prisoners were captured. Smith drove the enemy about 250 prisoners, but when he attempted to advance on the main line he was met by such a galling fire that he was compelled to retire to the woods, holding the first line captured. After trying in vain to dislodge Ricketts the enemy retired from that part of the works and formed a new line some distance in the rear. Wright and Smith then intrenched the positions they had gained and held them during the night, though repeated attacks were made by the enemy in an endeavor to regain the lost ground. Badeau says: "The ground won, on the 1st of June, was of the highest consequence to the national army; it cost 2,000 men in killed and wounded. but it secured the roads to the James, and almost outflanked Lee." In the meantime Lee had assumed the offensive on his left. Hancock and Burnside along Swift run and near Bethesda Church were attacked, probably with a view to force Grant to draw troops from Cold Harbor to reinforce his right. Three attacks were also made on Warren, whose corps was extended to cover over 4 miles of the line, but each attack was repulsed by artillery alone. Late in the afternoon Hancock was ordered to withdraw his corps early that night and move to the left of Wright at Cold Harbor, using every effort to reach there by daylight the next morning. Grant's object was to make a general assault as early as possible on the 2nd, Hancock, Wright and Smith to lead the attack, supported by Warren and Burnside, but the night march of the 2nd corps in the heat and dust had almost completely exhausted the men, so that the assault was first postponed until 5 p. m. and then to 4:30 on the morning of the 3d. The 2nd was therefore spent in forming the lines, in skirmishing and entrenching. In the afternoon it was discovered that a considerable Confederate force under Early was in front of the Federal right and at midnight the orders to Warren and Burnside were modified by directing them, in case Early was still in their front, to attack at 4:30 "in such man- ner and by such combinations of the two corps as may in both your judgments be deemed best. If the enemy should appear to be in strongest force on our left, and your attack should in consequence prove successful, you will follow it up, closing in upon them toward our left; if, on the contrary, the attack on the left should be successful, it will be followed up, moving toward our right." The battle of June 3 was fought on the same ground as the battle of Gaines' mill in the Peninsular campaign of 1862 except the positions were exactly reversed. Lee now held the trenches, extended and strengthened, that had been occupied by Porter, who, with a single corps, had held the entire Confederate army at bay and even repulsed its most determined attacks, inflicting severe loss upon its charging columns, while the Un- ion troops were now to assault a position which Lee two years before had found to be impregnable. The Confederate right was extended along a ridge, the crest of which formed a natural parapet, while just in front was a sunken road that could be used as an entrenchment. Promptly at the designated hour the columns of the 2nd, 6th and 18th corps moved to the attack. Hancock sent forward the divisions of Barlow and Gibbon, supported by Birney. Barlow advanced in two lines under a heavy fire of infantry and artillery, until the first line encountered the enemy's line in the sunken road. This was quickly dislodged and as the Confederates retired over the crest Barlow's men followed, capturing several hundred prisoners and 3 pieces of artillery. These guns were turned on the enemy, who broke in confusion, leaving the national forces in possession of a considerable portion of the main line of works. The broken ranks were soon rallied and reinforced, a heavy enfilading artillery fire was brought to bear on the assailants, and as Barlow's second line had not come up in time to secure the advantage gained he gave the order to fall back to a slight crest about 50 yards in the rear, where rifle-pits were dug under a heavy fire, and this position was held the remainder of the day. Gibbon's division, on the right of Barlow, was also formed in two lines, Tyler's brigade on the right and Smyth's on the left in the first line, McKeen's and Owen's on the right and left respectively in the second. As the division advanced the line was cut in two by an impassable swamp, but the men pushed bravely on, in spite of this obstacle and the galling fire of cannon and musketry that was poured upon them, until close up to the enemy's works. A portion of Smyth's brigade gained the intrenchments, and Col. McMahon, with part of his regiment, the 164th N. Y., of Tyler's brigadeined the parapet, where McMahon was killed and those who were with him were either killed or captured, the regimental colors falling into the hands of the Confederates. Owen had been directed to push forward in column through Smyth's line, but instead of doing so he deployed on the left as soon as Smyth became engaged, thus losing the opportunity of supporting the lodgment made by that officer and McMahon. The result was the assault of Gibbon was repulsed, and the division fell back, taking advantage of the inequalities of the ground to avoid the murderous fire that followed them on their retreat. Some idea of the intensity of the fighting on this part of the line may be gained from the fact that Gibbon's command lost 65 officers and 1,032 men in killed and wounded during the assault. Wright's advance with the 6th corps was made with Russell's division on the left, Ricketts' in the center and Neill's on the right. Neill car-ried the advanced rifle-pits, after which the whole corps assaulted the main line with great vigor, but the attack was repulsed with heavy loss. The only advantage gained - and this a rather dubious one - by the corps was that of being able to occupy a position closer to the Confederate entrenchments than before the attack. A description of the attack by the 18th corps is perhaps best given by quoting Smith's report. He says: "In front of my right was an open plain, swept by the fire of the enemy, both direct and from our right; on my left the open space was narrower, but equally covered by the artillery of the enemy. Near the center was a ravine, in which the troops would be sheltered from the cross-fire, and through this ravine I determined the main assault should be made. Gen. Devens' division had been placed on the right to protect our flank and hold as much as possible of the lines vacated by the troops moving forward. Gen. Martindale with his division was ordered to move down the ravine, while Gen. Brooks with his division was to advance on the left, taking care to keep up the connection between Martindale and the Sixth Corps, and if, in the advance, those two commanders should join, he (Gen. Brooks) was ordered to throw his command behind Gen. Martindale ready to operate on the right flank, if necessary. The troops moved promptly at the time ordered, and, driving in the skirmishers of the enemy, carried his first line of works or rifle- pits. Here the command was halted under a severe fire to readjust the lines. After a personal inspection of Gen. Martindale's front, I found that I had to form a line of battle faced to the right to protect the right flank of the moving column, and also that no farther advance could be made until the Sixth Corps advanced to cover my left from a cross-fire. Martindale was ordered to keep his column covered as much as possible, and to move only when Gen. Brooks moved. I then went to the front of Gen. Brooks, line to reconnoiter there. Gen. Brooks was forming his column when a heavy fire on the right began, which brought so severe a cross-fire on Brooks that I at once ordered him not to move his men farther, but to keep them sheltered until the cross-fire was over. Going back to the right, I found that Martindale had been suffering severely. and having mistaken the firing in front of the Sixth Corps for that of Brooks had determined to make the assault, and that Stannard's brigade had been repulsed in three gallant assaults." On the right the attacks of Burnside and Warren were attended by no decisive results. The former sent forward the divisions of Potter and Willcox; Crittenden's being held in reserve. Potter sent in Curtin's brigade, which forced back the enemy's skirmishers carried some detached rifle-pits and buildings, and gained a position close up to the main line, from which the Federal artillery silenced the principal battery inside the Confederate works and blew up two of their caissons. Willcox recaptured a line of rifle-pits from which he had been driven the day before, Hartranft's brigade driving the enemy to his main entrenchments and establishing itself close in their front. In this attack Griffin's division of the 5th corps cooperated with Willcox. Owing to the necessity of placing artillery in position to silence the enemy's guns, active operations were suspended until 1 p. m. An order was therefore issued to the various division commanders in the two corps to attack at that hour, and Wilson was directed to move with part of his cavalry division across the Totopotomy, with a view of attacking the Confederate position on the flank and rear. The arrangements were all completed by the appointed time and the skirmish line was about to advance for the beginning of the assault, when an order was received from headquarters to cease all offensive movements, on account of the general repulse on the left. Meade reported his loss in the battle of Cold Harbor as 1,705 killed, 9,042 wounded and 2,042 missing. As in the other engagements of the campaign from the Rapidan to the James, no detailed report of the Confederate casualties was made, but Lee's loss at Cold Harbor was comparatively slight. Hotchkiss gives it as "about 1,700." Some of the Federal wounded were brought in at night by volunteers from the entrenching parties, but most of them lay on the field, under the hot sun of a Virginia summer, for three days before Grant would consent to ask permission under a flag of truce to bury the dead and care for the injured. By that time the wounded were nearly all beyond the need of medical aid, and the dead had to be interred almost where they fell. The assault on the 3d has been severely critcised by military men. Gen. Martin T. McMahon, in "Battles and Leaders," begins his article on the battle of Cold Harbor with the following statement: "In the opinion of a majority of its survivors, the battle of Cold Harbor never should have been fought. There was no military reason to justify it. It was the dreary, dismal, bloody, ineffective close of the Lieutenant-General's first campaign with the Army of the Potomac, and corresponded in all its essential features with what had preceded it." Grant, in his "Personal Memoirs" (Vol. II, page 276), says: "I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was ever made. * * * No advantage whatever was gained to compensate for the heavy loss we sustained. Indeed the advantages other than those of relative losses, were on the Confederate side." After the battle Grant turned his attention to the plan of effecting a junction with Butler and approaching Richmond from the south side of the James, along the lines suggested by McClellan two years before. The "hammering" process had proved to be too costly and the army settled down to a regular siege of the Confederate capital. The campaign from the Rapidan to the James began with the battle of the Wilderness on May 5, and from that time until June 10, when the movement to the James was commenced from Cold Harbor, the Army of the Potomac lost 54,550 men. Battle at Cold Harbor, Virginia on 01 June 1864; Source: The Union Army, vol. 5 (Same as Above) Battle at Cold Harbor, Virginia on 02 June 1864; Source: The Union Army, vol. 5 (Same as Above) Battle at Cold Harbor, Virginia on 03 June 1864; Source: The Union Army, vol. 5 (Same as Above) Battle at Petersburg, Virginia on 09 June 1864 Battle at Petersburg, Virginia on 10 June 1864 Battle at Petersburg, Virginia on 17 June 1864 Battle at Petersburg, Virginia on 22 June 1864 Battle at Cold Harbor, Virginia on 27 June 1864 Battle at Richmond, Virginia on 05 July 1864 Battle at Petersburg, Virginia on 09 July 1864 Battle at Petersburg, Virginia on 11 July 1864 Battle at Charles City Road, Virginia on 15 July 1864 Battle at Petersburg, Virginia on 22 July 1864; Source: The Union Army, vol. 6 Petersburg, Va., June 9, 1864. Detachment, Army of the James. Brig.-Gen. August V. Kautz with the cavalry division, in what was to be a joint movement on Petersburg, assailed and carried the first line of the Confederate intrenchments by dismounting his men and slowly advancing until the enemy was obliged to retreat. The men were then remounted and started for the city, but before reaching it a large ravine had to be crossed. While Kautz was moving down this he was fired on by the Confederate artillery and musketry and after waiting for some time for the infantry under Maj.-Gen. Q. A. Gillmore to come up, he withdrew, having lost 4 killed, 26 wounded and 6 captured or missing. Gillmore's command, through some misunderstanding did not advance to support Kautz, but during the day skirmished with the enemy in his works on another side of town. In the fighting there Gillmore lost 25 in killed and wounded. Battle at Reams' Station, Virginia on 22 July 1864 Battle at Petersburg, Virginia on 30 July 1864; Source: The Union Army, vol. 6 Petersburg, Va., June 15, 1864, to April 2, 1865. Army of the Potomac and Army of the James. When the Army of the Potomac began the campaign from the Rapidan to the James on May 4, 1864, Gen. Butler, with the Army of the James, was directed to move against Richmond by the south bank of the James river, and Gen. Hunter was to move up the Shenandoah Valley, "destroying, as far as practicable, railroads that could be used as lines of supplies to the enemy, and also the James river and the Kanawha canal." After the battle of Cold Harbor on June 3, Grant resolved to transfer the field of operations to the south side of the James, and on the 5th he sent a despatch to Gen. Halleck, chief of staff, in which he stated: "My idea from the start has been to beat Lee's army if possible north of Richmond; then after destroying his lines of communication on the north side of the James river to transfer the army to the south side and besiege Lee in Richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat. * * * Once on the south side of the James river, I can cut off all sources of supply to the enemy except what is furnished by the canal. If Hunter succeeds in reaching Lynchburg, that will be lost to him also. Should Hunter not succeed, I will still make the effort to destroy the canal by sending cavalry up the south side of the river with a pontoon train to cross wherever they can." Grant had now adopted practically the same plan that had been proposed by McClellan two years before. In June, 1862, McClellan said: "The superiority of the James river route as a line of attack and supply is too obvious to need exposition," and again in August, when the authorities in Washington were needlessly alarmed for the safety of the national capital, he telegraphed Gen. Halleck: "Here is the true defense of Washington. It is here on the banks of the James, that the fate of the Union should be decided." In view of the final success of the army under Grant these words are prophetic. The siege of Petersburg was also the siege of Richmond, for with the fall of the former the latter was doomed. From Richmond the James river flows south in almost a straight line for 10 miles, when it turns toward the southeast and after a sinuous course receives the Appomattox at City Point. Petersburg is located on the Appomattox, 10 miles above its mouth and 22 miles south of Richmond. The two cities were connected by the Richmond & Petersburg railway. From Petersburg the South Side railroad ran west along the bank of the Appomattox to Lynchburg; the Weldon railroad ran south and the Norfolk southeast. A short line also connected Petersburg with City Point. Directly across the James from Richmond was the village of Manchester, from which the Richmond & Danville railroad ran west along the south bank of the James river, while along the north bank of that stream was the Kanawha canal, mentioned by Grant in his despatch to Halleck. To cut these lines of communication was the first object of the Federal commander. About half way between Petersburg and City Point are the Point of Rocks and Broadway landing on the Appomattox. From this point to the Dutch Gap bend on the James the distance in a straight line is about 3 miles. The peninsula enclosed by the two rivers below this line is known as Bermuda Hundred, which had been occupied by Butler early in May and a line of works constructed across the neck of the peninsula. This position was a strong one for defense, but Gen. Beauregard, commanding the defenses of Petersburg, threw up a line of works immediately in Butler's front, thus preventing his further advance and bottling him up on the peninsula, where he remained until the Army of the Potomac moved to the south side of the James. On June 9, Kautz charged and carried a portion of the Petersburg works, but not being supported by the infantry was unable to hold them, though he brought out 40 prisoners and 1 piece of artillery when he withdrew. The withdrawal of troops from Cold Harbor began on the 1Oth. Shortly after dark on the 12th the 18th corps, the last to leave the trenches, took up the march to White House landing on the Pamunkey river, where the men were embarked on transports, and by sunset on the 14th the corps joined Butler at Bermuda Hundred, near the junction of the James and Appomattox rivers. The other corps crossed the Chickahominy and marched across the country, striking the James river in the vicinity of Malvern hill. By the 20th of June Grant had about 110,000 men in front of the Petersburg and Richmond intrenchments. His forces were organized as follows: The Army of the Potomac, Maj.-Gen. George G. Meade, commanding, consisted of the 2nd 5th, 6th and 9th corps of infantry and the cavalry corps. The 2nd corps was commanded by Maj.-Gen. Winfield S. Hancock and was composed of three divisions, the first under command of Brig.-Gen. Francis C. Barlow, the 2nd under Maj.-Gen. John Gibbon, and the 3rd under Maj.-Gen. David B. Birney. The 5th corps, commanded by Maj.-Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren, embraced four divisions, respectively commanded by Brig.-Gens. Charles Griffin, Romeyn B. Ayres, Samuel W. Crawford and Lysander Cutler. The 6th corps, Maj.-Gen. Horatio G. Wright commanding, included three divisions, the 1st commanded by Brig.-Gen. David A. Russell, the 2nd by Brig.-Gen. George W. Getty, and the 3rd by Brig.-Gen. James B. Ricketts. Maj.-Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside was in command of the 9th corps. which was composed of four divisions respectively commanded by Brig.-Gens. James H. Ledlie, Robert H. Potter, Orlando B. Willcox and Edward Ferrero, the last named being composed of colored troops. The cavalry corps was under command of Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan, and was made up of three divisions, the 1st commanded by Brig.-Gen. Alfred T. A. Torbert, the 2nd by Brig.-Gen. David McM. Gregg, and the 3rd by Brig.-Gen. James H. Wilson. With the 2nd corps was the artillery brigade of Col. John C. Tidball, Col. Charles S. Wainwright commanded the artillery brigade of the 5th corps, and Col. Charles H. Tompkins of the 6th, while the artillery of the 9th was distributed among the several divisions. Capt. James M. Robertson's brigade of horse artillery was attached to Sheridan's command. The Army of the James, Maj.-Gen. Benjamin F. Butler commanding, was made up of the 1Oth. and 18th infantry corps, the cavalry division under Brig. Gen. August V. Kautz, the siege artillery under Col. Henry L Abbot, and the naval brigade under Brig.-Gen. Charles K. Graham. The 1Oth. corps, commanded by Brig.-Gen. William H. T. Brooks, included the three divisions commanded by Brig.-Gens. Alfred H. Terry, John W. Turner and Orris K. Ferry. The 18th corps, commanded by Maj.-Gen. William F. Smith, embraced the three divisions under Brig.-Gens. George J. Stannard, John H. Martindale and Edward W. Hinks. In addition to the regular organizations named there were some unattached troops. Early on the morning of June 13, Lee discovered that the Federal troops in his front had been withdrawn, and immediately put his own army in motion for the Richmond and Petersburg intrenchmeets. The Confederate works about the two cities are thus described by Hotchkiss in the Virginia volume of the Confederate Military History: "At this time, Beauregard's left rested on the navigable Appomattox, about one mile north of east from Petersburg. * * * On his right, Anderson, with the First corps, extended the Confederate line for some 3 miles to the southward, in front of Petersburg, crossing the Norfolk & Petersburg railroad in the vicinity of the Jerusalem plank road, thence westward for some 2 miles; the Third corps, under A. P. Hill, extended the Confederate right, on the south of Petersburg, to the Weldon & Petersburg railroad. Pickett's division took up the line on the west side of the Appomattox and extended it north to the James, at the big bend opposite Dutch gap. The fortifications on the north of the James from Chaffin's bluff northward, along the front of Richmond, were held by batteries and by local troops in command of Lieut.-Gen. R. S. Ewell. Subsequently the Confederate works were extended to the southwest of Petersburg for more than 10 miles to beyond Hatcher's run, until Lee's line of defensive works, consisting of forts and redoubts connected by breastworks and strengthened by all means known to the art of war, extended for nearly 40 miles." According to the same authority, "Lee had, in his 40-mile line, for the defense of Richmond and Petersburg, some 54,000 men, the remaining veterans of the Army of Northern Virginia, and of the department of North Carolina and Southern Virginia, Beauregard's army." From official sources it is learned that on June 30, Lee's forces numbered 54,751 men, which was gradually increased until on December 20, he had 66,533. During the same period the Union army had lost in killed, wounded and missing 47,554 men, but recruits had been brought in until on Dec. 20, Grant had 110,364 men of all arms in front of the Confederate works. About 4 a.m. on June 15, Smith's corps and Kautz's cavalry left Broadway landing for an assault on Beauregard's works. Kautz soon met the Confederate skirmishers and at Baylor's farm about 4 miles from Petersburg, a force of infantry and artillery was found occupying a line of rifle-pits. Hinks' division of colored troops made a vigorous attack, dislodged the enemy and captured 1 piece of artillery. Smith then advanced about a mile and a half to the Jordan farm, where his entire front was subjected to an artillery fire that drove the Union batteries from their position. Some delay was incurred in reconnoitering, but at 7 p. m. the divisions of Brooks and Hinks pushed forward and carried the works, capturing over 200 prisoners, 4 guns, with horses, caissons and ammunition, several stands of colors and the intrenching tools. About the same time Martindale's division carried the works between Jordan's house and the Appomattox, capturing 2 pieces of artillery and equipments complete. Hancock was directed on the evening of the 18th to hold his corps in readiness to move, but he was delayed in waiting or rations from City Point until 10:30 a.m. on the 15th when the command moved without the rations. Owing to an incorrect map he was unable to join Smith until after the action at Jordan's was over. At 8 o'clock that evening Burnside started the 9th corps to reinforce Smith and Hancock, and at 10 o'clock the next morning his command went into position on Hancock's left. Hancock was placed in command of all the troops and ordered to make a general assault at 6 p.m. Before that hour Egan's brigade of Birney's division assaulted and carried a redoubt, known as redan No. 12, on Birney's left. In the attack at 6 o'clock redans Nos. 4, 13 and 14, with their connecting lines of breastworks, were carried, but with considerable loss to the assailants. At dawn on the 17th Potter's division surprised the enemy in the works on the ridge near the Shand house, captured 4 guns, 5 stands of colors, 600 prisoners and 1,50O stands of small arms. This was accomplished without a shot being fired, the bayonet alone being used. The Confederates were asleep with their arms in their hands, but Potter's men moved so quietly, and at the same time so swiftly, that they were over the works before the alarm could be given. Those captured surrendered without resistance and the others fled precipitately to an intrenched position along the west side of Harrison's creek. Later in the day this line was attacked by Willcox, but owing to a heavy enfilading fire of artillery from the left, and the lack of proper support, the assault was repulsed. Hartranft's brigade went into this action with 1,890 men, of whom but 1,050 came back. In the meantime Warren's corps had come up and taken position on the left of Burnside. From prisoners Meade learned the character of Beauregard's intrenchments and the strength of his force, and ordered an assault by the whole line to be made at daylight on the morning of the 18th, hoping to carry the works before Lee could send reinforcements. When the line advanced on the morning of the 18th it was found that the enemy had evacuated the trenches held the day before and now occupied a new line some distance farther back toward the city of Petersburg. It was also discovered that Field's and Kershaw's divisions had arrived during the night and were already in position to meet the assault. On account of the change in the enemy's position and the nature of the ground over which the Federal troops had to advance, the attack was postponed until 12 o'clock. The 2nd corps then made two attacks on the right of the Prince George Court House road, but both were repulsed. Burnside encountered some difficulty in driving the Confederates from the railroad cut, but finally succeeded and established his corps within a hundred yards of the enemy's main line. Warren's assault was also unsuccessful, though some of Griffin's men fell within 20 feet of the enemy's works. Martindale's division carried a line of rifle-pits, but made no attack on the main line. The positions gained by the several commands were then intrenched "and the siege of Petersburg was begun in earnest. From that time until the fall of the city on April 2, 1865, there was almost daily skirmishing at some point along the lines in front of Petersburg, with more serious engagements on the Jerusalem plank road, at Deep Bottom, long the Weldon, South Side and Danville railroads, Reams' Station, Yellow Tavern, Globe Tavern, Dinwiddie Court. House, Fort Harrison, Chaffin's farm, Fair Oaks, Hatcher's run, Five Forks, Sailor's creek, and a number of minor skirmishes, each of which is herein treated under the proper head. In Potter's division of the 9th corps was the 48th Pa., a Regiment made up chiefly of miners from Schuylkill county and commanded by Lieut.-Col. Henry Pleasants, who was a practical mining engineer. After the assault of the 18th the men of this regiment began discussing the feasibility of running a mine under the enemy's works, and the plan was finally proposed by Pleasants to Burnside, who gave the project his unqualified approval and gained Meade's consent to it. The portion of the works to be mined was known as Elliott's salient, being occupied by Elliott's brigade of Bushrod Johnson's division and was near the center of the line on the east side of the city. With no tools but the pick and shovel the Pennsylvanians excavated a main gallery 522 feet in length with lateral galleries 37 and 38 feet long running under and nearly parallel to the enemy's works, the earth taken from the tunnel being carried out in cracker boxes. The work was commenced on June 25, and on July 27 the mine was charged with 8,000 pounds of powder which was placed in eight magazines of 1,000 pounds each. On the 26th Burnside reported his plan for an assault to follow immediately upon the explosion of the mine. This plan contemplated the placing of Ferrero's division in the advance, because his other divisions had been under a heavy fire, day and night, for more than a month, while the colored troops had been held as a reserve. This selection was not approved by Meade and Grant, partly for the reason that it might be charged they were willing to sacrifice the negro soldiers by pushing them forward and partly because Ferrero's division had never been in close contact with the enemy and it was not known how they would conduct themselves in such an emergency, though the men had been drilling for several weeks for the work, and were not only willing but anxious for the undertaking. A division was then selected by lot, and it fell to Gen. Ledlie to lead the assault. This was Burnside's weakest division and was commanded by a man whom Gen. Humphreys, Meade's chief of staff, characterizes as "an officer whose total unfitness for such a duty ought to have been known to Gen. Burnside, though it is not possible that it could have been. It was not known to Gen. Meade." On the 29th an order was issued from headquarters providing that "At half past three in the morning of the 30th, Maj.-Gen. Burnside will spring his mine, and his assaulting columns will immediately move rapidly upon the breach, seize the crest in the rear and effect a lodgment there. He will be followed by Maj.-Gen. Ord (now in command of the 18th corps), who will support him on the right, directing his movement to the crest indicated, and by Maj.-Gen. Warren who will support him on the left. Upon the explosion of the mine the artillery of all kinds in battery will open upon those points of the enemy's works whose fire covers the ground over which our columns must move, care being taken to avoid impeding the progress of our troops. Special instructions respecting the direction of the fire will be issued through the Chief of Artillery." At the appointed time Ledlie's division was in position in two lines, Marshall's brigade in front and Bartlett's in the rear, ready to charge into the breach the moment the mine was sprung. Four o'clock came and still no explosion. Officers and men who had been in a state of feverish expectancy since shortly after midnight, began to grow restless. An officer was sent to Burnside to inquire the cause of the delay, and it was learned that the fuse had died out Lieut. Jacob Douty and Sergt. Henry Rees volunteered to enter the gallery and reignite the fuse. Their efforts were crowned with success though they had barely emerged from the mouth of the mine at 4:45 when the explosion took place. A solid mass of earth, mingled with timbers, dismantled cannon and human beings, rose 200 feet in the air, and where Elliott's salient had stood was a ragged crater 170 feet long, 60 wide and 30 feet deep, filled with dust and debris. Immediately the Federal artillery-about 160 guns and mortars-opened fire and as soon as the dust had cleared away Marshall's line advanced closely followed by Bartlett's, but the men could not resist the temptation to crowd forward to look into the hole, and the two brigades became hopelessly mixed. When the explosion occurred the Confederates hurried away from the intrenchments for 200 or 300 yards on either side of the mine, but the confusion of Ledlie's men and the delay in restoring something like order gave the enemy time to recover from his bewilderment, so that when the Union troops attempted to cross the crater they were met by a fire of musketry, straggling at first but increasing in effectiveness until at the end of half an hour the two brigades were huddled in a confused mass in the hole, unable to advance or withdraw. Gen. Humphreys says: "Gen. Ledlie did not accompany, much less lead, his division. He remained, according to the testimony before the Court of Inquiry that followed, in a bomb-proof about 50 yards inside our intrenchments, from which he could see nothing that was going on. He could not have given the instructions he received to his brigade commanders. Had the division advanced in column of attack, led by a resolute, intelligent commander, it would have gained the crest in fifteen minutes after the explosion, and before any serious opposition could have been made to it." Willcox sent in part of a brigade on the left of the mine, halting the remainder of his command until Ledlie's men should advance. He was criticized by the court of inquiry for not making efforts "commensurate with the occasion to carry out Gen. Burnside's order to advance to Cemetery Hill." Ferrero moved in the rear of Willcox and upon reaching the most advanced line of the Federal works was compelled to halt on account of other troops occupying the position assigned to him. After some delay he was ordered to advance and carry the crest beyond the crater and was moving forward for that purpose when he was directed to halt. All seemed to be confusion, for in a little while the order to advance was renewed. By this time the enemy had strengthened his position on the hill and when Ferrero tried to carry it he failed. His colored troops established their valor, however, as in his report Ferrero says : "They were repulsed, but veterans could hardly have stood the fire to which they were exposed." At 6:30 orders were again sent to the division commanders not to halt at the works, but to advance at once to the crest without waiting for mutual support. Potter had moved his division forward by the flank soon after Ledlie began his advance. Upon reaching the vicinity of the mine Griffin's brigade turned to the right, took possession of the intrenchments which the Confederates had abandoned and began an attack upon Elliott's troops which were forced back after a long and severe contest. The other brigade attacked on the right of Griffin but was repulsed. The support of Ord and Warren did not come up to the expectations and at 9:15, after four hours of desultory fighting, Burnside received a peremptory order to withdraw his troops from the enemy's lines and cease offensive operations. This order was sent into the crater with instructions to the brigade commanders to consult and determine as to the time and manner of retiring. They sent back a request that a heavy fire of artillery and infantry should be opened to cover the withdrawal, but before the messenger reached Burnside the enemy made another attack and the men fell back in some disorder,.leaving the wounded to fall into the hands of the Confederates. The Union loss on the 30th was 419 killed, 1,679 wounded and 1,910 missing. Marshall and Bartlett were both captured and 23 regimental commanders were reported either killed, wounded or missing. On the Confederate side the loss in Elliott's brigade was 677, and as Weisinger's brigade lost about as heavily the total casualties among the enemy numbered probably not far from 1,000, most of whom were killed or wounded, as but few prisoners were taken by the Federals. On July 5, Gen. Early, commanding the Confederate forces in the Shenandoah valley, crossed the Potomac near Shepherdstown and moved toward Washington, hoping thereby to compel Grant to withdraw troops from in front of Richmond and Petersburg for the defense of the national capital and thus giving Lee an opportunity to once more assume the offensive. Grant did send Wright with the 6th corps to Washington and this corps was not with the Army of the Potomac again until the early part of December. Soon after the mine explosion Lee felt that he could reduce his force at Petersburg and sent Kershaw's division to reinforce Early in the valley. Grant met this movement by sending Sheridan with two divisions of cavalry early in August to operate against Early. After the failure of Burnside's mine no more assaults were made on the Confederate fortifications, the Union army conducting the siege by regular approaches, raids against the railroads and various movements by detachments. A few days after the battle of Hatcher's run (Oct. 27,) the army went into winter quarters and from that time until the next spring the operations were confined to occasional picket firing and artillery duels. Late in the summer Butler conceived the idea of cutting a canal across the narrow neck of the peninsula known as Dutch gap, by means of which the Union gunboats could ascend the James river without running the fire of the Confederate batteries. The isthmus was less than half a mile in width and by the close of the year the canal was completed, except a bulkhead at the upper end. This was blown up on New Year's day, but the earth fell back in the canal and the enemy immediately planted a battery opposite the entrance to the canal, thus preventing its being opened, and the whole scheme came to naught. By the latter part of March, 1865, numerous changes occurred in the Union army. Hancock had been sent north to organize a new corps and the 2nd was now commanded by Maj.-Gen. A. A. Humphreys' the divisions being commanded by Miles, Barlow and Mott. Cutler's division of the 5th corps was no longer in existence as a separate organization. The divisions of the 6th corps were commanded by Wheaton, Getty and Seymour. After the mine explosion Burnside was, at his own request, granted leave of absence, the command of the 9th corps being turned over to Maj.-Gen. John G. Parke. Willcox took command of the 1st division, Potter of the 2nd and Brig.-Gen. John F. Hartranft of the 3rd. Sheridan still commanded the cavalry of the army, the 1st and 3rd divisions, commanded by Devin and Custer, being known as the Army of the Shenandoah under command of Gen. Merritt, and the 2nd division was commanded by Gen. George Crook. Wilson had been sent to Gen. Thomas at Nashville, Tenn. The Army of the James, Maj.-Gen. E. O. C. Ord commanding, was composed of the 24th and 25th corps and some detached troops guarding the defenses of Bermuda Hundred and the landings along the James. The 24th corps, under Maj.-Gen. John Gibbon, included the divisions of Foster, Devens and Turner, and the 25th, Maj.-Gen. Godfrey Weitzel commanding, consisted of the divisions of Maj.-Gen. August V. Kautz, Brig.-Gen. William Birney, and the cavalry division under Brig.-Gen. Ranald S. Mackenzie. On the last day of March the total strength of the army that was destined to close the war in Virginia was 114,335 men. On Feb. 27, 1865, Sheridan, with the two divisions of cavalry left Winchester and moved up the Shenandoah valley via Staunton and Charlottesville to within a short distance of Lynchburg, destroying the James river canal for some distance, and on March 27, effected a Junction with Grant's army in front of Petersburg and Richmond. A few days before his arrival Lee and Jefferson Davis, president of the Confederacy, held a conference in Richmond, at which it was decided to abandon the Richmond and Petersburg lines as soon as the railroads would admit of it, the purpose being to unite Lee's forces with those of Johnston in North Carolina and attack Sherman there. Lee knew that Grant was preparing for a movement against the Danville and South Side railroads and to counteract this he proposed a sortie against the works on the east side of Petersburg, which he believed would oblige Grant to concentrate there, thus thwarting the design on the railroads and postponing the evacuation until the weather was more favorable. The point selected for the attack was a redoubt known as Fort Stedman, about a mile from the Appomattox and not more than 15O yards from the Confederate works. This part of the line was held by the 9th corps, Willcox on the right Potter on the left and Hartranft in reserve, Fort Stedman being garrisoned by a detachment of the 18th N. Y. heavy artillery under Maj. G. M. Randall. Gordon's corps was chosen to lead the assault in which he was to be supported by portions of Hill's and Longstreet's commands. At this time Lee's army was in desperate straits for food. The capture of Fort Fisher in January had closed the port of Wilmington to the Confederacy, thus making it impossible to obtain supplies from abroad. It had become a common occurrence for squads of Confederate soldiers, impelled by the hope of securing better rations, to desert with their arms in their hands and come over to the Union lines. About 4 a.m. on March 25 several such squads, claiming to be deserters, left the enemy's works and when near enough made a dash and overpowered the Federal pickets. Immediately three strong columns emerged from the Confederate abatis, one moving straight on Fort Stedman, one on Battery No 10, a short distance north of the fort, and the third against Battery No. 11, about the same distance on the south of it. The second column broke the main line between Batteries 9 and 10 and then turned toward the fort, taking it on the flank. The garrison was soon overpowered and the guns of the fort, as well as those of Battery 10, were turned on Willcox's troops Batteries 11 and 12 were quickly captured by the column that had turned to the right, and for a little while it looked as though Gordon's attack was to be a complete success. When the assault was commenced it was so dark that friends and foes could not be distinguished and the artillery of the other batteries could not be used. As soon as it was light enough Gen. McLaughlin, whose brigade occupied the line near Battery 11 opened a mortar fire on the enemy there and soon afterward carried the battery at the point of the bayonet. He then entered Fort Stedman, not knowing it was in the hands of the enemy, and was taken prisoner. Gordon was under the mistaken impression that there were some forts in the rear of the main line and the column which captured Battery 10 was moving to capture these forts when it came in contact with Hartranft's division, which was coming up to Willcox's support, and was driven back to the battery and Fort Stedman. Battery 12 was retaken soon after No. 11, and by 7:30 Parke had driven the Confederates there into the fort, upon which was concentrated the fire of several of the Union batteries on the high ground in the rear. A heavy cross-fire of artillery and infantry was also brought to bear on the open space between the lines, rendering it almost impossible for the enemy to return to his own works or to receive reinforcements. Hartranft then moved against the enemy in the fort and recaptured the position with comparatively small loss, capturing 1,949 prisoners, most of whom had sought shelter in the bomb-proofs, and 9 stands of colors. Many of the Confederates were killed or wounded by the murderous cross-fire, while endeavoring to get back to their own lines. The Union loss was 494 in killed and wounded and 523 missing. The 2nd and 6th corps were then directed to make a reconnaissance of the enemy's works in front of Fort Fisher on the right of Fort Stedman, and to attack if it was found the force there had been sufficiently weakened to support Gordon. The intrenched picket line was carried and the Union troops advanced close to the main works, when it was found that Hill occupied them with a force too strong to be assaulted. The enemy tried to recapture the picket line at several points, but every attack was repulsed. In this affair the Union loss was about 900 in killed and wounded and 177 missing. The Confederate loss in killed and wounded was about the same and nearly 1,000 were captured. Grant was now in shape to operate against the railroads on Lee's right. On April 1 the Confederate forces under Gen. Pickett were defeated in the battle of Five Forks, and on the morning of the 2nd the 6th corps broke through the Confederate lines near Hatcher's run, about 4 miles southwest of Petersburg. In an attempt to recover the captured line Gen. A.P. Hill, one of Lee's ablest lieutenants, was killed. The defeat of Pickett and the breaking of his line determined Lee to evacuate the Petersburg fortifications before it was too late, and early on Sunday morning, April 2, he sent the following despatch to Gen. J. C. Breckenridge, Confederate secretary of war: "I see no prospect of doing more than holding our position here till tonight. I am not certain that I can do that. If I can I shall withdraw tonight north of the Appomattox, and, if possible, it will be better to withdraw the whole line tonight from the James river. The brigades on Hatcher's run are cut off from us; the enemy has broken through our lines and intercepted between us and them, and there is no bridge over which they can cross the Appomattox this side of Goode's or Beaver's, which are not very far from the Danville railroad. Our only chance, then, of concentrating our forces is to do so near the Danville railway, which I shall endeavor to do at once. I advise that all preparation be made for leaving Richmond tonight. I will advise you later, according to circumstances." This despatch-reached Richmond at 10:40 a. m. and was handed to President Davis while in attendance upon the service at St. Paul's church. He at once left the church and late in the day, in company with the officials of the Confederate States, took a train for Danville. That night the Confederate army withdrew from Richmond and Petersburg and commenced its last march, the line of which was up the Appomattox river toward Amelia Court House. During the winter the people of Richmond had been kept in ignorance of the real state of affairs and gave themselves up to pleasures, confidently expecting to hear any moment of a great Confederate victory. Lee's despatch, therefore, created consternation among them and there was a mad rush for the railroad stations in the desire to leave the doomed city. But transportation was out of the question, as every available coach and car were loaded with the officials, attaches and effects of the government, and to make matters worse orders had been issued that none should be permitted to board the trains without a pass from the secretary of war who could nowhere be found. Ewell's command was the last to leave the city, and scarcely had his rearguard departed when a fire broke out near the center of the town and the mob took possession. Stores were broken open and plundered private residences were robbed and new fires kindled, until the city was a perfect pandemonium. At 3 a.m. on the 3rd Parke and Wright discovered that the enemy had been withdrawn from the trenches in their front, and upon advancing ascertained that Petersburg was evacuated. Willcox was ordered to occupy the town with his division, while the remainder of the 9th, with all of the 6th and 2nd corps, pushed on after Lee. Weitzel, who commanded the Union forces on the north side of the James, was informed by Gen. Devens about 5 o'clock that the Federal pickets had possession of the enemy's line. Two staff officers, with 40 of the headquarters, cavalry, were sent forward to receive the surrender of the city, in case the Confederates had evacuated it, and soon afterward Weitzel followed with the divisions of Kautz and Devens. Entering the city by the Osborn pike, Weitzel rode direct to the city hall, where he received the formal surrender of the city at 8:15 a.m. For several days Lieut. J. L. de Peyster, a son of Maj.Gen. J. W. de Peyster, had carried a United States flag upon the pommel of his saddle, ready to raise it over the Confederate capitol when the city should fall into the hands of the Union forces. The same flag had waved over Butler's headquarters at New Orleans. Scarcely had the surrender been made before de Peyster, in company with Capt. Langdon, chief of artillery on Weitzel's staff, raised this flag over the state house, bringing Virginia once more under the realm of the Stars and Stripes. PETERSBURG, VA FEB. 27TH - MARCH 28TH, 1865 Petersburg Va., Feb. 27-March 28, 1865. Sheridan's Expedition. On the 27th Maj.-Gen. P. H. Sheridan left Winchester for an expedition to the front of Petersburg, the object being the destruction of the Virginia Central railroad, the James river canal, and the capture of Lynchburg, after which Sheridan was to join Gen. Sherman's army in North Carolina or return to Winchester. His forces consisted of the 1st and 3rd cavalry divisions of the Army of the Shenandoah, respectively commanded by Brig.-Gen. T. C. Devin and Bvt. Maj.Gen. G. A. Custer; one section of the 2nd and one of the 4th U. S. artillery, and a pontoon train; the total strength being about 10,000 men. Mount Crawford was reached on March 1, and here about 200 of Rosser's Confederate cavalry were discovered trying to burn the bridge over the middle fork of the Shenandoah. Two regiments of Capehart's brigade swam the river above the bridge charged and routed Rosser, pursuing him nearly to Staunton, killing a few of his men and capturing 30 prisoners, with 20 wagons and ambulances, Capehart's loss being 5 men wounded. This caused Gen. Early to retreat from Staunton to Waynesboro, where he intrenched a position. At Staunton Sheridan detached a part of his command for the destruction of some stores at Swoope's station, and pushed on with the main column, Custer's division in advance, for Waynesboro. At Fisherville, 6 miles from Staunton, Custer's advance encountered the enemy's pickets and drove them rapidly to Waynesboro. Without waiting for the 1st division to come up, Custer sent the 2nd brigade against Early's position, to display the force in the works, and directed Lieut.-Col. Whitaker to take three regiments of Bulloch's brigade to the extreme right. The 1st Conn., 2nd Ohio and 3rd N. J., all armed with Spencer carbines, were moved to the right and dismounted under cover of the woods. When they were in position to attack, Woodruff's section of horse artillery opened fire with such vigor that the Confederates were compelled to lie down behind their embankment. Wells and Capehart moved their brigades to the attack in front, at the charge, and at the same time the three regiments on the right caught the enemy on the flank, the whole movement being so sudden that Early's men were completely routed and fled in all directions, leaving 11 pieces of artillery, with their horses and caissons, 200 wagons loaded with subsistence, with their teams and harness; a large quantity of ammunition; all the camp equipage and officers, baggage; the headquarters, papers; 16 battle flags and 1,600 prisoners in the hands of the Federals. On the 3rd the expedition moved toward Charlottesville, which place was reached on the 4th, the bridges, depots, etc., between Staunton and Charlottesville having been destroyed during the march. At Charlottesville the command divided, the 1st division moving to Scottsville on the James river, and the 3rd, with the wagon trains, along the Lynchburg railroad, destroying the bridges and culverts as far as Buffalo river. The two divisions came together near New Market, where the dam and locks on the canal were thoroughly destroyed. At Duguidsville, on the 8th, the Confederates fired on Devin's division from across the river, but the 5th U. S. cavalry was dismounted and covered the retirement of the rest of the division. All the locks on the canal between Goochland and Duguidsville were destroyed, as well as large stores of cotton, tobacco and subsistence. Columbia was reached on the 1Oth. where the expedition rested for a day, and on the 12th the march was resumed toward the Virginia Central railroad, which was struck at Tolersville on the 13th, and several miles of track torn up. The next day Custer directed his march toward Ground Squirrel bridge, while Devin moved along the railroad to the South Anna. Both bridges were destroyed after a slight skirmish with the guards, in which the 5th U. S. cavalry captured a number of prisoners and 3 pieces of artillery. The 1st division was here ordered to move toward Hanover Court House and the 3rd to push south as far as Ashland, but upon learning that a considerable force of the enemy under Longstreet was moving to intercept the expedition, the two divisions were united, the whole command recrossed the South Anna and moved along the north bank of the Pamunkey to White House landing, which was reached on the 18th. Here the expedition rested until the 25th, when it again took up the march and two days later rejoined the Army of the Potomac. During the movement Sheridan's forces captured 1,603 prisoners, 2,154 horses and mules, 16 battle flags, 17 pieces of artillery and over 2,000 stands of small arms. The line of march was marked by wholesale destruction. Sixteen large mills and factories 26 warehouses and 8 railroad depots, together with their contents of valuable stores, were laid in ashes 47 miles of railroad track, 30 miles of telegraph, 49 canal locks, 44 railroad and several wagon bridges, 10 watertanks, and about 40 canal and flatboats all loaded with provisions, etc., were completely destroyed. Battle at Mayre's Heights, Virginia on 01 August 1864 Battle at Petersburg, Virginia on 01 August 1864; Source: The Union Army, vol. 6 (Same as above) Battle at Deep Bottom Run, Virginia on 14 August 1864 ; Source: The Union Army, vol. 5 Battle at Deep Bottom Run, Virginia on 15 August 1864; Source: The Union Army, vol. 5 Deep Bottom, Va., Aug. 13-20, 1864. 2nd and 1Oth Army Corps and Gregg's Cavalry Division. Early in August Gen. Grant received information from various sources that led him to believe Lee had sent three divisions of infantry and one of cavalry to reinforce Gen. Early in the Shenandoth valley, leaving, according to Gen. Butler's estimate, only 8,500 men to hold the entrenchment's north of the James. At noon on the 12th Grant ordered Maj.-Gen. W. S. Hancock to move with his own corps, the 2nd, the 10th corps, Maj.-Gen. D. B. Birney commanding, and Gregg's cavalry to the north side of the James at Deep Bottom and threaten Richmond. The movement was almost identical with that of the latter part of July (see preceding article), except Hancock was to embark his corps on steamers at City Point and move up the river to the lower pontoon bridge during the night of the 13th, Birney's corps crossed at the upper bridge and the cavalry at the lower. It was intended to have all the troops on the north side of the James and ready for an advance by daylight on the 14th, but owing to delay in disembarking it was well toward noon when the advance was commenced. The plan was for Birney to attack the enemy on the west side of Four-mile creek at daybreak, and if successful he was to move over the roads leading to Chaffin's bluff and Richmond. Mott's division, as soon as it was disembarked, was to move up the New Market road, drive the enemy into his entrenchment's on the west side of Bailey's creek, and farther if practicable. Barlow was to move to the right of Mott and attack the enemy's works near Fussell's mill, and Gregg's cavalry was to cover the right flank. If Barlow succeeded in carrying the lines in his front he was to move to the left and uncover Mott's front, af- ter which the two divisions were to advance on the New Market road and form a junction with Birney. The object of these combined movements was to turn the Confederate position and gain possession of Chaffin's bluff, which would be an important step toward opening the James river to the Federal gunboats. Barlow carried one line, held by dismounted cavalry, and about 4 P.M. assaulted the works near Fussell's mill, but the attack was made with only one brigade and was not a success. His advance was so threatening however, that the enemy weakened his right to strengthen the line near the mill, and Birney, taking advan- tage of this, carried a part of the line west of Four-mile creek, capturing 4 guns and a few prisoners. Gregg advanced up the Charles City road and carried a line of rifle-pits, and at night a strong picket line was established along the entire front. During the night the troops were disposed for an attack on the next morning. Birney's command was massed in the rear of Barlow, with instructions to find and turn the Confederate left. The dense woods made a reconnaissance difficult, and the operations of the 15th were begun without knowing just how the enemy was located. Slight skirmishing occurred at several points during the day, but Birney did not come upon the Confederate line until nearly 7 P.M., and as the ground was not favorable for a night attack further operations were postponed until the next day. Early on the morning of the 16th Gregg moved out on the Charles City road and drove the enemy before him across Deep creek, nearly to White's tavern. In a skirmish near Deep creek Confederate Gen. Chambliss was killed. About 10 A.M. Terry's division of Birney's corps carried the works above Fussell's mill, capturing about 300 prisoners. Craig's brigade and the colored troops under Brig.-Gen. William Birney made an assault on the right and captured the entrenchment's, but were unable to hold them. In this action Col. Craig was killed. About 5 P.M. Gregg was driven from his position on the Charles City road and forced back across Deep creek. When night closed the Federals held only the advanced rifle-pits of the enemy. During the night of the 16th a fleet of steamers came up from City Point to Deep Bottom to convey the impression that the Union forces were withdrawing, in the hope that the enemy would come out of his works and attack, but the ruse was not successful. Nothing was done on the 17th, but about 5 P.M. on the 18th the Confederates sallied out. of their works above Fussell's mill and attacked Birney. While the fight was going on Miles, now in command of Barlow's division. struck the enemy on the left flank, driving him in confusion and with considerable loss. The 19th was spent in looking for a weak point in the Confederate line, but none could be found. Grant's information, regarding the number of troops sent to Early, was erroneous, only Kershaw's division having left Richmond, and as soon as Hancock crossed the James, Mahone's division and Hampton's cavalry were sent over from Petersburg to reinforce the lines on the north side of the river. Finding the position there too strong to be carried, Grant ordered Hancock and Birney back to their original positions on the Petersburg lines, and immediately after dark on the 2Oth the troops were withdrawn, Birney covering the movement. The Union loss in the operations about Deep Bottom was 328 killed, 1,802 wounded and 721 missing. The Confederate loss was not ascertained, but it was probably somewhat less, as they fought most of the time behind breastworks. Among their killed were Gens. Chambliss and Girardy, both of whom fell on the 16th . Battle at Fussell's Mill, Virginia on 15 August 1864 Battle at Deep Bottom Run, Virginia on 16 August 1864 ; Source: The Union Army, vol. 5 (Same as above.) Battle at Deep Bottom Run, Virginia on 15 August 1864; Source: The Union Army, vol. 5 (Same as above) Battle at Reams' Station, Virginia on 25 August 1864 Battle at Petersburg, Virginia on 28 August 1864; Source: The Union Army, vol. 6 (Same as above) Battle at Fort Harrison, Virginia on 29 September 1864 Battle at Deep Bottom Run, Virginia on 30 September 1864; Source: The Union Army, vol. 5 Battle at Fort Harrison, Virginia on 30 September 1864 ; The Unions Army, Vol 5, p. 425 10th and 18th Army and Kautz's Cavalry Division. Fort Harrison was a redoubt on the Confederate line of defenses north of the James river, and about a mile directly east of Chaffin's bluff. A short distance north was another redoubt known as Fort Gilmer, both forts being connected with the works at Chaffin's bluff by lines of intrenchments, while an advanced line, held by the enemy's pickets, extended northeast from Fort Harrison. On Sept. 28 Maj.-Gen. David B. Birney, commanding the 10th corps, was directed to cross the James river at the upper pontoon bridge at Deep Bottom (q. v.) and advance upon Richmond by the Newmarket and Darbytown roads. Kautz, with his cavalry division, was to move on the latter road in support of Birney's movement, and as a diversion Maj.-Gen. E. O. C. Ord, with the 18th corps, was directed to cross the river by a pontoon 2 miles below Dutch gap and move up the Varina road against the Confederate works about Chaffin's bluff. The movement was made secretly, and by daylight on the 29th both corps were north of the James. The Confederate pickets and skirmishers were driven in and about 7:30 the head of Ord's column reached the open fields of the Chaffin farm in front of Fort Harrison, when the enemy immediately opened fire with artillery from the fort and the adjacent trenches. Ord reconnoitered the ground and made dispositions to attack. Stannard's division was directed to push forward on the left of the road, advance at quick time across the open ground, and at the double-quick upon arriving at the foot of the hill in front of the fort, while Heckman's division was to move to the right of the road and attack in front. Heckman went too far into the woods and when the time came for him to assault his brigades were scattered and could not be brought up in time to be of service. Stannard's men, Burnham's brigade in the lead, advanced across the open ground in the face of a severe fire, swept over the parapet, and after a sharp encounter carried the fort, capturing 16 guns and a number of prisoners. The guns were turned on the works to the right and left of the fort and two lunettes, about 600 yards apart, with 6 more pieces of artillery, fell into the hands of the Federals. Ord then tried to form his men to swing round inside the trenches toward Fort Gilmer, but in the excitement and confusion, and owing to the heavy loss in brigade and regimental commanders, the attempt did not succeed. Burnham had been killed early in the assault and two other officers that succeeded him in command of the brigade were wounded in quick succession. While trying to rally his men Ord was severely wounded and the command of the corps devolved on Gen. Heckman, who was just about to attack Fort Gilmer. Ord had been instructed to occupy such works as he took, after which he was to push on with any spare force he had, and attack the works toward Richmond. These instructions were imparted to Heckman when he assumed command, and he afterward made an attack on Fort Gilmer, but as that work had been strongly reinforced the assault was repulsed with considerable loss. The 10th corps, Foster's division in advance, moved forward on the Kingsland road from Deep Bottom about 6 a. m. and shortly after 9 o'clock met the enemy's pickets along the line of works at the junction of the Mill and New Market roads. Part of the 142nd N. Y. under Lieut.-Col. Barney, was deployed as skirmishers, and closely followed by the remainder of the 1st brigade, charged the works driving the enemy in some confusion back to Laurel Hill Church, where the Confederates had a battery of 12-pounders in position. This battery was quickly dislodged and Foster formed his command along the New Market road, his right resting at the church, where he remained until about the middle of the afternoon when the corps was ordered to make an assault on Fort Gilmer and the main line of works as far as New Market road. In this assault the only Union troops that reached the fort were those belonging to the colored brigade. They jumped into the ditch and endeavored to scale the parapet by climbing upon each other's shoulders, but their determined efforts were finally defeated and the brigade driven back with severe loss. The corps then fell back to Laurel hill, where it intrenched. During the night of the 29th and the forenoon of the 30th large parties of Stannard's division worked arduously to made Fort Harrison an enclosed work in anticipation of an attempt to recapture it. Gen. Ewell, who was in command of the Confederate forces on the north side of the James, was joined by Gen. Lee soon after Stannard's successful assault on the fort, and steps were at once taken to recover the lost position. Troops were hurried over from the south side of the river and by daylight on the 30th ten brigades were concentrated near Fort Gilmer ready for an attack on Stannard. About 2 p. m. the enemy opened fire with 12 pieces of artillery on Stannard's center and left and Anderson, now in command of Longstreet's corps, advanced on the right with the brigades of Law, Anderson, Bratton, Colquitt and Clingman. Stannard ordered his men to reserve their fire until the Confederates came out of the chaparral, when the whole line opened a most effective fire which drove the enemy back to the cover of the underbrush. At this unfortunate juncture it was discovered that the Federal supply of artillery ammunition was exhausted and Stannard ordered the guns to be removed by hand. Two subsequent attacks were repulsed in like manner and the day closed with the Union troops still in possession of the fort. The Federal loss during the several engagements about Fort Harrison, Fort Gilmer, New Market Heights, Laurel Hill Church, etc., was 383 killed, 2,299 wounded and 645 missing. The "Medical and Surgical History of the War" gives the total number of Confederates killed and wounded at 2,000. In addition to this list of casualties about 300 were captured, together with 22 pieces of artillery and a large quantity of ammunition, camp equipage, etc. Although the expedition was not entirely a success its principal object-that of preventing Lee from sending reinforcements to Early in the Shenandoah valley-was accomplished. Had it not been for Heckman's unfortunate error in taking position and the destructive fire of the Confederate gunboats in the river just at the time Ord was trying to rally his men for an attack on Fort Gilmer, that work would have undoubtedly fallen into the hands of the Union forces, thus opening the way for an entry into Richmond. Battle at Richmond, Virginia on 30 September 1864 Battle at Darbytown Road, Virginia on 07 October 1864 ; Source: The Union Army vol. 5 Darbytown Road, Va, Oct. 7, 1864. 1Oth Army Corps and Kautz's Cavalry Division. After the capture of Fort Harrison on Sept. 29, the 1Oth corps, Maj.-Gen. David B. Birney commanding, intrenched at Laurel Hill church on the New Market road, while Brig.-Gen. A. V. Kautz, with 1,700 cavalry and two batteries, held the Darbytown road at the old line of the enemy's works on the Johnson farm. Kautz's position was such that he could at any time threaten Richmond, and the Confederate general accordingly took steps to dislodge him. During the night of Oct. 6, the greater part of Field's and Hoke's divisions was massed on the Darbytown road, and at daylight on the 7th the brigades of Anderson and Bratton attacked Kautz in front, while Gary's cavalry, supported by Lane's brigade, moved down the Charles City road to attack him on the right. Gary's rear attack was a partial success, though Kautz managed to extricate his command with the loss of 8 guns and crossed over to the New Market road, where he rallied his men under the protection of the 1Oth corps, which was just moving out to his assistance. About 8 o'clock Bratton's brigade emerged from the woods and attacked Terry's division, which was on Birney's right, the object evidently being to turn the flank. Battery D, 1st U. S. artillery, opened a terrific fire on the assailants and drove them back to the cover of the timber. Anticipating another assault from the same direction, Lieut.Col. Jackson, chief of artillery of the corps, placed two other batteries in position to meet it. After an hour or so the Union pickets were driven in and the Confederates again appeared, opening fire with a battery of 12-pounders and soon afterwards with 6 rifled guns. The Union batteries replied with such deadly effect that Hoke's division was kept from moving forward to participate in the assault, and by quickly changing the position of some of his guns Jackson succeeded in silencing the Confederate artillery. By this time Terry had his division in position to act on the offensive and easily repulsed the attack, inflicting a heavy loss on the enemy. Kautz reported his loss 18 killed, 54 wounded and 202 missing. Birney's loss was comparatively slight. On the Confederate side Gen. Gregg, commanding the celebrated Texas brigade, was killed and Gen. Bratton was severely wounded. No detailed report of the Confederate loss can be found. Battle at Cedar Run, Virginia on 17 October 1864 Battle on 24 October 1864 Battle at Darbytown Road, Virginia on 27 October 1864 Battle at Petersburg, Virginia on 27 October 1864 Battle on 08 November 1864 Battle at Macon, Georgia on 22 November 1864 Battle at Bermuda Hundred, Virginia on 13 December 1864 Battle at Bristol, Tennessee on 14 December 1864 ; Source: The Union Army Vol. 5, p. 168 Cavalry commanded by Gen. Burbridge. After the engagement at Kingsport on the 13th, Burbridge's cavalry pursued Duke's brigade to Bristol, where the 11th Ky. made a dashing charge into the town at 3 o'clock in the morning, routed the enemy and drove him from the place in confusion. About 200 were captured, together with 2 trains of cars, 5 locomotives and a large quantity of stores and munitions of war. Col. Boyle of the 11th was warmly commended by his superiors for his gallant action. The engagement was an incident of Stoneman's raid. Battle on 01 January 1865 Battle at Lee's Mills, Virginia on 14 February 1865 Battle on 28 February 1865 Battle on 03 March 1865 Battle at Hatcher's Run, Virginia on 29 March 1865 Battle at Burkeville, Virginia on 01 April 1865 Battle at Petersburg, Virginia on 02 April 1865 ; Source: The Union Army vol. 6 Petersburg, Va., June 15, 1864, to April 2, 1865. Army of the Potomac and Army of the James. When the Army of the Potomac began the campaign from the Rapidan to the James on May 4, 1864, Gen. Butler, with the Army of the James, was directed to move against Richmond by the south bank of the James river, and Gen. Hunter was to move up the Shenandoah Valley, "destroying, as far as practicable, railroads that could be used as lines of supplies to the enemy, and also the James river and the Kanawha canal." After the battle of Cold Harbor on June 3, Grant resolved to transfer the field of operations to the south side of the James, and on the 5th he sent a despatch to Gen. Halleck, chief of staff, in which he stated: "My idea from the start has been to beat Lee's army if possible north of Richmond; then after destroying his lines of communication on the north side of the James river to transfer the army to the south side and besiege Lee in Richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat. * * * Once on the south side of the James river, I can cut off all sources of supply to the enemy except what is furnished by the canal. If Hunter succeeds in reaching Lynchburg, that will be lost to him also. Should Hunter not succeed, I will still make the effort to destroy the canal by sending cavalry up the south side of the river with a pontoon train to cross wherever they can." Grant had now adopted practically the same plan that had been proposed by McClellan two years before. In June, 1862, McClellan said: "The superiority of the James river route as a line of attack and supply is too obvious to need exposition," and again in August, when the authorities in Washington were needlessly alarmed for the safety of the national capital, he telegraphed Gen. Halleck: "Here is the true defense of Washington. It is here on the banks of the James, that the fate of the Union should be decided." In view of the final success of the army under Grant these words are prophetic. The siege of Petersburg was also the siege of Richmond, for with the fall of the former the latter was doomed. From Richmond the James river flows south in almost a straight line for 10 miles, when it turns toward the southeast and after a sinuous course receives the Appomattox at City Point. Petersburg is located on the Appomattox, 10 miles above its mouth and 22 miles south of Richmond. The two cities were connected by the Richmond & Petersburg railway. From Petersburg the South Side railroad ran west along the bank of the Appomattox to Lynchburg; the Weldon railroad ran south and the Norfolk southeast. A short line also connected Petersburg with City Point. Directly across the James from Richmond was the village of Manchester, from which the Richmond & Danville railroad ran west along the south bank of the James river, while along the north bank of that stream was the Kanawha canal, mentioned by Grant in his despatch to Halleck. To cut these lines of communication was the first object of the Federal commander. About half way between Petersburg and City Point are the Point of Rocks and Broadway landing on the Appomattox. From this point to the Dutch Gap bend on the James the distance in a straight line is about 3 miles. The peninsula enclosed by the two rivers below this line is known as Bermuda Hundred, which had been occupied by Butler early in May and a line of works constructed across the neck of the peninsula. This position was a strong one for defense, but Gen. Beauregard, commanding the defenses of Petersburg, threw up a line of works immediately in Butler's front, thus preventing his further advance and bottling him up on the peninsula, where he remained until the Army of the Potomac moved to the south side of the James. On June 9, Kautz charged and carried a portion of the Petersburg works, but not being supported by the infantry was unable to hold them, though he brought out 40 prisoners and 1 piece of artillery when he withdrew. The withdrawal of troops from Cold Harbor began on the 1Oth. Shortly after dark on the 12th the 18th corps, the last to leave the trenches, took up the march to White House landing on the Pamunkey river, where the men were embarked on transports, and by sunset on the 14th the corps joined Butler at Bermuda Hundred, near the junction of the James and Appomattox rivers. The other corps crossed the Chickahominy and marched across the country, striking the James river in the vicinity of Malvern hill. By the 20th of June Grant had about 110,000 men in front of the Petersburg and Richmond intrenchments. His forces were organized as follows: The Army of the Potomac, Maj.-Gen. George G. Meade, commanding, consisted of the 2nd 5th, 6th and 9th corps of infantry and the cavalry corps. The 2nd corps was commanded by Maj.-Gen. Winfield S. Hancock and was composed of three divisions, the first under command of Brig.-Gen. Francis C. Barlow, the 2nd under Maj.-Gen. John Gibbon, and the 3rd under Maj.-Gen. David B. Birney. The 5th corps, commanded by Maj.-Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren, embraced four divisions, respectively commanded by Brig.-Gens. Charles Griffin, Romeyn B. Ayres, Samuel W. Crawford and Lysander Cutler. The 6th corps, Maj.-Gen. Horatio G. Wright commanding, included three divisions, the 1st commanded by Brig.-Gen. David A. Russell, the 2nd by Brig.-Gen. George W. Getty, and the 3rd by Brig.-Gen. James B. Ricketts. Maj.-Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside was in command of the 9th corps. which was composed of four divisions respectively commanded by Brig.-Gens. James H. Ledlie, Robert H. Potter, Orlando B. Willcox and Edward Ferrero, the last named being composed of colored troops. The cavalry corps was under command of Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan, and was made up of three divisions, the 1st commanded by Brig.-Gen. Alfred T. A. Torbert, the 2nd by Brig.-Gen. David McM. Gregg, and the 3rd by Brig.-Gen. James H. Wilson. With the 2nd corps was the artillery brigade of Col. John C. Tidball, Col. Charles S. Wainwright commanded the artillery brigade of the 5th corps, and Col. Charles H. Tompkins of the 6th, while the artillery of the 9th was distributed among the several divisions. Capt. James M. Robertson's brigade of horse artillery was attached to Sheridan's command. The Army of the James, Maj.-Gen. Benjamin F. Butler commanding, was made up of the 1Oth. and 18th infantry corps, the cavalry division under Brig. Gen. August V. Kautz, the siege artillery under Col. Henry L Abbot, and the naval brigade under Brig.-Gen. Charles K. Graham. The 1Oth. corps, commanded by Brig.-Gen. William H. T. Brooks, included the three divisions commanded by Brig.-Gens. Alfred H. Terry, John W. Turner and Orris K. Ferry. The 18th corps, commanded by Maj.-Gen. William F. Smith, embraced the three divisions under Brig.-Gens. George J. Stannard, John H. Martindale and Edward W. Hinks. In addition to the regular organizations named there were some unattached troops. Early on the morning of June 13, Lee discovered that the Federal troops in his front had been withdrawn, and immediately put his own army in motion for the Richmond and Petersburg intrenchmeets. The Confederate works about the two cities are thus described by Hotchkiss in the Virginia volume of the Confederate Military History: "At this time, Beauregard's left rested on the navigable Appomattox, about one mile north of east from Petersburg. * * * On his right, Anderson, with the First corps, extended the Confederate line for some 3 miles to the southward, in front of Petersburg, crossing the Norfolk & Petersburg railroad in the vicinity of the Jerusalem plank road, thence westward for some 2 miles; the Third corps, under A. P. Hill, extended the Confederate right, on the south of Petersburg, to the Weldon & Petersburg railroad. Pickett's division took up the line on the west side of the Appomattox and extended it north to the James, at the big bend opposite Dutch gap. The fortifications on the north of the James from Chaffin's bluff northward, along the front of Richmond, were held by batteries and by local troops in command of Lieut.-Gen. R. S. Ewell. Subsequently the Confederate works were extended to the southwest of Petersburg for more than 10 miles to beyond Hatcher's run, until Lee's line of defensive works, consisting of forts and redoubts connected by breastworks and strengthened by all means known to the art of war, extended for nearly 40 miles." According to the same authority, "Lee had, in his 40-mile line, for the defense of Richmond and Petersburg, some 54,000 men, the remaining veterans of the Army of Northern Virginia, and of the department of North Carolina and Southern Virginia, Beauregard's army." From official sources it is learned that on June 30, Lee's forces numbered 54,751 men, which was gradually increased until on December 20, he had 66,533. During the same period the Union army had lost in killed, wounded and missing 47,554 men, but recruits had been brought in until on Dec. 20, Grant had 110,364 men of all arms in front of the Confederate works. About 4 a.m. on June 15, Smith's corps and Kautz's cavalry left Broadway landing for an assault on Beauregard's works. Kautz soon met the Confederate skirmishers and at Baylor's farm about 4 miles from Petersburg, a force of infantry and artillery was found occupying a line of rifle-pits. Hinks' division of colored troops made a vigorous attack, dislodged the enemy and captured 1 piece of artillery. Smith then advanced about a mile and a half to the Jordan farm, where his entire front was subjected to an artillery fire that drove the Union batteries from their position. Some delay was incurred in reconnoitering, but at 7 p. m. the divisions of Brooks and Hinks pushed forward and carried the works, capturing over 200 prisoners, 4 guns, with horses, caissons and ammunition, several stands of colors and the intrenching tools. About the same time Martindale's division carried the works between Jordan's house and the Appomattox, capturing 2 pieces of artillery and equipments complete. Hancock was directed on the evening of the 18th to hold his corps in readiness to move, but he was delayed in waiting or rations from City Point until 10:30 a.m. on the 15th when the command moved without the rations. Owing to an incorrect map he was unable to join Smith until after the action at Jordan's was over. At 8 o'clock that evening Burnside started the 9th corps to reinforce Smith and Hancock, and at 10 o'clock the next morning his command went into position on Hancock's left. Hancock was placed in command of all the troops and ordered to make a general assault at 6 p.m. Before that hour Egan's brigade of Birney's division assaulted and carried a redoubt, known as redan No. 12, on Birney's left. In the attack at 6 o'clock redans Nos. 4, 13 and 14, with their connecting lines of breastworks, were carried, but with considerable loss to the assailants. At dawn on the 17th Potter's division surprised the enemy in the works on the ridge near the Shand house, captured 4 guns, 5 stands of colors, 600 prisoners and 1,50O stands of small arms. This was accomplished without a shot being fired, the bayonet alone being used. The Confederates were asleep with their arms in their hands, but Potter's men moved so quietly, and at the same time so swiftly, that they were over the works before the alarm could be given. Those captured surrendered without resistance and the others fled precipitately to an intrenched position along the west side of Harrison's creek. Later in the day this line was attacked by Willcox, but owing to a heavy enfilading fire of artillery from the left, and the lack of proper support, the assault was repulsed. Hartranft's brigade went into this action with 1,890 men, of whom but 1,050 came back. In the meantime Warren's corps had come up and taken position on the left of Burnside. From prisoners Meade learned the character of Beauregard's intrenchments and the strength of his force, and ordered an assault by the whole line to be made at daylight on the morning of the 18th, hoping to carry the works before Lee could send reinforcements. When the line advanced on the morning of the 18th it was found that the enemy had evacuated the trenches held the day before and now occupied a new line some distance farther back toward the city of Petersburg. It was also discovered that Field's and Kershaw's divisions had arrived during the night and were already in position to meet the assault. On account of the change in the enemy's position and the nature of the ground over which the Federal troops had to advance, the attack was postponed until 12 o'clock. The 2nd corps then made two attacks on the right of the Prince George Court House road, but both were repulsed. Burnside encountered some difficulty in driving the Confederates from the railroad cut, but finally succeeded and established his corps within a hundred yards of the enemy's main line. Warren's assault was also unsuccessful, though some of Griffin's men fell within 20 feet of the enemy's works. Martindale's division carried a line of rifle-pits, but made no attack on the main line. The positions gained by the several commands were then intrenched "and the siege of Petersburg was begun in earnest. From that time until the fall of the city on April 2, 1865, there was almost daily skirmishing at some point along the lines in front of Petersburg, with more serious engagements on the Jerusalem plank road, at Deep Bottom, long the Weldon, South Side and Danville railroads, Reams' Station, Yellow Tavern, Globe Tavern, Dinwiddie Court. House, Fort Harrison, Chaffin's farm, Fair Oaks, Hatcher's run, Five Forks, Sailor's creek, and a number of minor skirmishes, each of which is herein treated under the proper head. In Potter's division of the 9th corps was the 48th Pa., a Regiment made up chiefly of miners from Schuylkill county and commanded by Lieut.-Col. Henry Pleasants, who was a practical mining engineer. After the assault of the 18th the men of this regiment began discussing the feasibility of running a mine under the enemy's works, and the plan was finally proposed by Pleasants to Burnside, who gave the project his unqualified approval and gained Meade's consent to it. The portion of the works to be mined was known as Elliott's salient, being occupied by Elliott's brigade of Bushrod Johnson's division and was near the center of the line on the east side of the city. With no tools but the pick and shovel the Pennsylvanians excavated a main gallery 522 feet in length with lateral galleries 37 and 38 feet long running under and nearly parallel to the enemy's works, the earth taken from the tunnel being carried out in cracker boxes. The work was commenced on June 25, and on July 27 the mine was charged with 8,000 pounds of powder which was placed in eight magazines of 1,000 pounds each. On the 26th Burnside reported his plan for an assault to follow immediately upon the explosion of the mine. This plan contemplated the placing of Ferrero's division in the advance, because his other divisions had been under a heavy fire, day and night, for more than a month, while the colored troops had been held as a reserve. This selection was not approved by Meade and Grant, partly for the reason that it might be charged they were willing to sacrifice the negro soldiers by pushing them forward and partly because Ferrero's division had never been in close contact with the enemy and it was not known how they would conduct themselves in such an emergency, though the men had been drilling for several weeks for the work, and were not only willing but anxious for the undertaking. A division was then selected by lot, and it fell to Gen. Ledlie to lead the assault. This was Burnside's weakest division and was commanded by a man whom Gen. Humphreys, Meade's chief of staff, characterizes as "an officer whose total unfitness for such a duty ought to have been known to Gen. Burnside, though it is not possible that it could have been. It was not known to Gen. Meade." On the 29th an order was issued from headquarters providing that "At half past three in the morning of the 30th, Maj.-Gen. Burnside will spring his mine, and his assaulting columns will immediately move rapidly upon the breach, seize the crest in the rear and effect a lodgment there. He will be followed by Maj.-Gen. Ord (now in command of the 18th corps), who will support him on the right, directing his movement to the crest indicated, and by Maj.-Gen. Warren who will support him on the left. Upon the explosion of the mine the artillery of all kinds in battery will open upon those points of the enemy's works whose fire covers the ground over which our columns must move, care being taken to avoid impeding the progress of our troops. Special instructions respecting the direction of the fire will be issued through the Chief of Artillery." At the appointed time Ledlie's division was in position in two lines, Marshall's brigade in front and Bartlett's in the rear, ready to charge into the breach the moment the mine was sprung. Four o'clock came and still no explosion. Officers and men who had been in a state of feverish expectancy since shortly after midnight, began to grow restless. An officer was sent to Burnside to inquire the cause of the delay, and it was learned that the fuse had died out Lieut. Jacob Douty and Sergt. Henry Rees volunteered to enter the gallery and reignite the fuse. Their efforts were crowned with success though they had barely emerged from the mouth of the mine at 4:45 when the explosion took place. A solid mass of earth, mingled with timbers, dismantled cannon and human beings, rose 200 feet in the air, and where Elliott's salient had stood was a ragged crater 170 feet long, 60 wide and 30 feet deep, filled with dust and debris. Immediately the Federal artillery-about 160 guns and mortars opened fire and as soon as the dust had cleared away Marshall's line advanced closely followed by Bartlett's, but the men could not resist the temptation to crowd forward to look into the hole, and the two brigades became hopelessly mixed. When the explosion occurred the Confederates hurried away from the intrenchments for 200 or 300 yards on either side of the mine, but the confusion of Ledlie's men and the delay in restoring something like order gave the enemy time to recover from his bewilderment, so that when the Union troops attempted to cross the crater they were met by a fire of musketry, straggling at first but increasing in effectiveness until at the end of half an hour the two brigades were huddled in a confused mass in the hole, unable to advance or withdraw. Gen. Humphreys says: "Gen. Ledlie did not accompany, much less lead, his division. He remained, according to the testimony before the Court of Inquiry that followed, in a bomb-proof about 50 yards inside our intrenchments, from which he could see nothing that was going on. He could not have given the instructions he received to his brigade commanders. Had the division advanced in column of attack, led by a resolute, intelligent commander, it would have gained the crest in fifteen minutes after the explosion, and before any serious opposition could have been made to it." Willcox sent in part of a brigade on the left of the mine, halting the remainder of his command until Ledlie's men should advance. He was criticized by the court of inquiry for not making efforts "commensurate with the occasion to carry out Gen. Burnside's order to advance to Cemetery Hill." Ferrero moved in the rear of Willcox and upon reaching the most advanced line of the Federal works was compelled to halt on account of other troops occupying the position assigned to him. After some delay he was ordered to advance and carry the crest beyond the crater and was moving forward for that purpose when he was directed to halt. All seemed to be confusion, for in a little while the order to advance was renewed. By this time the enemy had strengthened his position on the hill and when Ferrero tried to carry it he failed. His colored troops established their valor, however, as in his report Ferrero says : "They were repulsed, but veterans could hardly have stood the fire to which they were exposed." At 6:30 orders were again sent to the division commanders not to halt at the works, but to advance at once to the crest without waiting for mutual support. Potter had moved his division forward by the flank soon after Ledlie began his advance. Upon reaching the vicinity of the mine Griffin's brigade turned to the right, took possession of the intrenchments which the Confederates had abandoned and began an attack upon Elliott's troops which were forced back after a long and severe contest. The other brigade attacked on the right of Griffin but was repulsed. The support of Ord and Warren did not come up to the expectations and at 9:15, after four hours of desultory fighting, Burnside received a peremptory order to withdraw his troops from the enemy's lines and cease offensive operations. This order was sent into the crater with instructions to the brigade commanders to consult and determine as to the time and manner of retiring. They sent back a request that a heavy fire of artillery and infantry should be opened to cover the withdrawal, but before the messenger reached Burnside the enemy made another attack and the men fell back in some disorder,.leaving the wounded to fall into the hands of the Confederates. The Union loss on the 30th was 419 killed, 1,679 wounded and 1,910 missing. Marshall and Bartlett were both captured and 23 regimental commanders were reported either killed, wounded or missing. On the Confederate side the loss in Elliott's brigade was 677, and as Weisinger's brigade lost about as heavily the total casualties among the enemy numbered probably not far from 1,000, most of whom were killed or wounded, as but few prisoners were taken by the Federals. On July 5, Gen. Early, commanding the Confederate forces in the Shenandoah valley, crossed the Potomac near Shepherdstown and moved toward Washington, hoping thereby to compel Grant to withdraw troops from in front of Richmond and Petersburg for the defense of the national capital and thus giving Lee an opportunity to once more assume the offensive. Grant did send Wright with the 6th corps to Washington and this corps was not with the Army of the Potomac again until the early part of December. Soon after the mine explosion Lee felt that he could reduce his force at Petersburg and sent Kershaw's division to reinforce Early in the valley. Grant met this movement by sending Sheridan with two divisions of cavalry early in August to operate against Early. After the failure of Burnside's mine no more assaults were made on the Confederate fortifications, the Union army conducting the siege by regular approaches, raids against the railroads and various movements by detachments. A few days after the battle of Hatcher's run (Oct. 27,) the army went into winter quarters and from that time until the next spring the operations were confined to occasional picket firing and artillery duels. Late in the summer Butler conceived the idea of cutting a canal across the narrow neck of the peninsula known as Dutch gap, by means of which the Union gunboats could ascend the James river without running the fire of the Confederate batteries. The isthmus was less than half a mile in width and by the close of the year the canal was completed, except a bulkhead at the upper end. This was blown up on New Year's day, but the earth fell back in the canal and the enemy immediately planted a battery opposite the entrance to the canal, thus preventing its being opened, and the whole scheme came to naught. By the latter part of March, 1865, numerous changes occurred in the Union army. Hancock had been sent north to organize a new corps and the 2nd was now commanded by Maj.-Gen. A. A. Humphreys' the divisions being commanded by Miles, longer in existence as a separate organization. The divisions of the 6th corps were commanded by Wheaton, Getty and Seymour. After the mine explosion Burnside was, at his own request, granted leave of absence, the command of the 9th corps being turned over to Maj.-Gen. John G. Parke. Willcox took command of the 1st division, Potter of the 2nd and Brig.-Gen. John F. Hartranft of the 3rd. Sheridan still commanded the cavalry of the army, the 1st and 3rd divisions, commanded by Devin and Custer, being known as the Army of the Shenandoah under command of Gen. Merritt, and the 2nd division was commanded by Gen. George Crook. Wilson had been sent to Gen. Thomas at Nashville, Tenn. The Army of the James, Maj.-Gen. E. O. C. Ord commanding, was composed of the 24th and 25th corps and some detached troops guarding the defenses of Bermuda Hundred and the landings along the James. The 24th corps, under Maj.Gen. John Gibbon, included the divisions of Foster, Devens and Turner, and the 25th, Maj.-Gen. Godfrey Weitzel commanding, consisted of the divisions of Maj.-Gen. August V. Kautz, Brig.-Gen. William Birney, and the cavalry division under Brig.-Gen. Ranald S. Mackenzie. On the last day of March the total strength of the army that was destined to close the war in Virginia was 114,335 men. On Feb. 27, 1865, Sheridan, with the two divisions of cavalry left Winchester and moved up the Shenandoah valley via Staunton and Charlottesville to within a short distance of Lynchburg, destroying the James river canal for some distance, and on March 27, effected a Junction with Grant's army in front of Petersburg and Richmond. A few days before his arrival Lee and Jefferson Davis, president of the Confederacy, held a conference in Richmond, at which it was decided to abandon the Richmond and Petersburg lines as soon as the railroads would admit of it, the purpose being to unite Lee's forces with those of Johnston in North Carolina and attack Sherman there. Lee knew that Grant was preparing for a movement against the Danville and South Side railroads and to counteract this he proposed a sortie against the works on the east side of Petersburg, which he believed would oblige Grant to concentrate there, thus thwarting the design on the railroads and postponing the evacuation until the weather was more favorable. The point selected for the attack was a redoubt known as Fort Stedman, about a mile from the Appomattox and not more than 15O yards from the Confederate works. This part of the line was held by the 9th corps, Willcox on the right Potter on the left and Hartranft in reserve, Fort Stedman being garrisoned by a detachment of the 18th N. Y. heavy artillery under Maj. G. M. Randall. Gordon's corps was chosen to lead the assault in which he was to be supported by portions of Hill's and Longstreet's commands. At this time Lee's army was in desperate straits for food. The capture of Fort Fisher in January had closed the port of Wilmington to the Confederacy, thus making it impossible to occurrence for squads of Confederate soldiers, impelled by the hope of securing better rations, to desert with their arms in their hands and come over to the Union lines. About 4 a.m. on March 25 several such squads, claiming to be deserters, left the enemy's works and when near enough made a dash and overpowered the Federal pickets. Immediately three strong columns emerged from the Confederate abatis, one moving straight on Fort Stedman, one on Battery No 10, a short distance north of the fort, and the third against Battery No. 11, about the same distance on the south of it. The second column broke the main line between Batteries 9 and 10 and then turned toward the fort, taking it on the flank. The garrison was soon overpowered and the guns of the fort, as well as those of Battery 10, were turned on Willcox's troops. Batteries 11 and 12 were quickly captured by the column that had turned to the right, and for a little while it looked as though Gordon's attack was to be a complete success. When the assault was commenced it was so dark that friends and foes could not be distinguished and the artillery of the other batteries could not be used. As soon as it was light enough Gen. McLaughlin, whose brigade occupied the line near Battery 11 opened a mortar fire on the enemy there and soon afterward carried the battery at the point of the bayonet. He then entered Fort Stedman, not knowing it was in the hands of the enemy, and was taken prisoner. Gordon was under the mistaken impression that there were some forts in the rear of the main line and the column which captured Battery 10 was moving to capture these forts when it came in contact with Hartranft's division, which was coming up to Willcox's support, and was driven back to the battery and Fort Stedman. Battery 12 was retaken soon after No. 11, and by 7:30 Parke had driven the Confederates there into the fort, upon which was concentrated the fire of several of the Union batteries on the high ground in the rear. A heavy cross-fire of artillery and infantry was also brought to bear on the open space between the lines, rendering it almost impossible for the enemy to return to his own works or to receive reinforcements. Hartranft then moved against the enemy in the fort and recaptured the position with comparatively small loss, capturing 1,949 prisoners, most of whom had sought shelter in the bomb-proofs, and 9 stands of colors. Many of the Confederates were killed or wounded by the murderous cross-fire, while endeavoring to get back to their own lines. The Union loss was 494 in killed and wounded and 523 missing. The 2nd and 6th corps were then directed to make a reconnaissance of the enemy's works in front of Fort Fisher on the right of Fort Stedman, and to attack if it was found the force there had been sufficiently weakened to support Gordon. The intrenched picket line was carried and the Union troops advanced close to the main works, when it was found that Hill occupied them with a force too strong to be assaulted. The enemy tried to recapture the picket line at several points, but every attack was repulsed. In this affair the Union loss was about 900 in killed and wounded and 177 missing. The Confederate loss in killed and wounded was about the same and nearly 1,000 were captured. Grant was now in shape to operate against the railroads on Lee's right. On April 1 the Confederate forces under Gen. Pickett were defeated in the battle of Five Forks, and on the morning of the 2nd the 6th corps broke through the Confederate lines near Hatcher's run, about 4 miles southwest of Petersburg. In an attempt to recover the captured line Gen. A.P. Hill, one of Lee's ablest lieutenants, was killed. The defeat of Pickett and the breaking of his line determined Lee to evacuate the Petersburg fortifications before it was too late, and early on Sunday morning, April 2, he sent the following despatch to Gen. J. C. Breckenridge, Confederate secretary of war: "I see no prospect of doing more than holding our position here till tonight. I am not certain that I can do that. If I can I shall withdraw tonight north of the Appomattox, and, if possible, it will be better to withdraw the whole line tonight from the James river. The brigades on Hatcher's run are cut off from us; the enemy has broken through our lines and intercepted between us and them, and there is no bridge over which they can cross the Appomattox this side of Goode's or Beaver's, which are not very far from the Danville railroad. Our only chance, then, of concentrating our forces is to do so near the Danville railway, which I shall endeavor to do at once. I advise that all preparation be made for leaving Richmond tonight. I will advise you later, according to circumstances." This despatch-reached Richmond at 10:40 a. m. and was handed to President Davis while in attendance upon the service at St. Paul's church. He at once left the church and late in the day, in company with the officials of the Confederate States, took a train for Danville. That night the Confederate army withdrew from Richmond and Petersburg and commenced its last march, the line of which was up the Appomattox river toward Amelia Court House. During the winter the people of Richmond had been kept in ignorance of the real state of affairs and gave themselves up to pleasures, confidently expecting to hear any moment of a great Confederate victory. Lee's despatch, therefore, created consternation among them and there was a mad rush for the railroad stations in the desire to leave the doomed city. But transportation was out of the question, as every available coach and car were loaded with the officials, attaches and effects of the government, and to make matters worse orders had been issued that none should be permitted to board the trains without a pass from the secretary of war who could nowhere be found. Ewell's command was the last to leave the city, and scarcely had his rearguard departed when a fire broke out near the center of the town and the mob took possession. Stores were broken open and plundered private residences were robbed and new fires kindled, until the city was a perfect pandemonium. At 3 a.m. on the 3rd Parke and Wright discovered that the enemy had been withdrawn from the trenches in their front, and upon advancing ascertained that Petersburg was evacuated. Willcox was ordered to occupy the town with his division, while the remainder of the 9th, with all of the 6th and 2nd corps, pushed on after Lee. Weitzel, who commanded the Union forces on the north side of the James, was informed by Gen. Devens about 5 o'clock that the Federal pickets had possession of the enemy's line. Two staff officers, with 40 of the headquarters, cavalry, were sent forward to receive the surrender of the city, in case the Confederates had evacuated it, and soon afterward Weitzel followed with the divisions of Kautz and Devens. Entering the city by the Osborn pike, Weitzel rode direct to the city hall, where he received the formal surrender of the city at 8:15 a.m. For several days Lieut. J. L. de Peyster, a son of Maj.Gen. J. W. de Peyster, had carried a United States flag upon the pommel of his saddle, ready to raise it over the Confederate capitol when the city should fall into the hands of the Union forces. The same flag had waved over Butler's headquarters at New Orleans. Scarcely had the surrender been made before de Peyster, in company with Capt. Langdon, chief of artillery on Weitzel's staff, raised this flag over the state house, bringing Virginia once more under the realm of the Stars and Stripes. PETERSBURG, VA FEB. 27TH - MARCH 28TH, 1865 Petersburg Va., Feb. 27-March 28, 1865. Sheridan's Expedition. On the 27th Maj.-Gen. P. H. Sheridan left Winchester for an expedition to the front of Petersburg, the object being the destruction of the Virginia Central railroad, the James river canal, and the capture of Lynchburg, after which Sheridan was to join Gen. Sherman's army in North Carolina or return to Winchester. His forces consisted of the 1st and 3rd cavalry divisions of the Army of the Shenandoah, respectively commanded by Brig.-Gen. T. C. Devin and Bvt. Maj.Gen. G. A. Custer; one section of the 2nd and one of the 4th U. S. artillery, and a pontoon train; the total strength being about 10,000 men. Mount Crawford was reached on March 1, and here about 200 of Rosser's Confederate cavalry were discovered trying to burn the bridge over the middle fork of the Shenandoah. Two regiments of Capehart's brigade swam the river above the bridge charged and routed Rosser, pursuing him nearly to Staunton, killing a few of his men and capturing 30 prisoners, with 20 wagons and ambulances, Capehart's loss being 5 men wounded. This caused Gen. Early to retreat from Staunton to Waynesboro, where he intrenched a position. At Staunton Sheridan detached a part of his command for the destruction of some stores at Swoope's station, and pushed on with the main column, Custer's division in advance, for Waynesboro. At Fisherville, 6 miles from Staunton, Custer's advance encountered the enemy's pickets and drove them rapidly to Waynesboro. Without waiting for the 1st division to come up, Custer sent the 2nd brigade against Early's position, to display the force in the works, and directed Lieut.-Col. Whitaker to take three regiments of Bulloch's brigade to the extreme right. The 1st Conn., 2nd Ohio and 3rd N. J., all armed with Spencer carbines, were moved to the right and dismounted under cover of the woods. When they were in position to attack, Woodruff's section of horse artillery opened fire with such vigor that the Confederates were compelled to lie down behind their embankment. Wells and Capehart moved their brigades to the attack in front, at the charge, and at the same time the three regiments on the right caught the enemy on the flank, the whole movement being so sudden that Early's men were completely routed and fled in all directions, leaving 11 pieces of artillery, with their horses and caissons, 200 wagons loaded with subsistence, with their teams and harness; a large quantity of ammunition; all the camp equipage and officers, baggage; the headquarters, papers; 16 battle flags and 1,600 prisoners in the hands of the Federals. On the 3rd the expedition moved toward Charlottesville, which place was reached on the 4th, the bridges, depots, etc., between Staunton and Charlottesville having been destroyed during the march. At Charlottesville the command divided, the 1st division moving to Scottsville on the James river, and the 3rd, with the wagon trains, along the Lynchburg railroad, destroying the bridges and culverts as far as Buffalo river. The two divisions came together near New Market, where the dam and locks on the canal were thoroughly destroyed. At Duguidsville, on the 8th, the Confederates fired on Devin's division from across the river, but the 5th U. S. cavalry was dismounted and covered the retirement of the rest of the division. All the locks on the canal between Goochland and Duguidsville were destroyed, as well as large stores of cotton, tobacco and subsistence. Columbia was reached on the 1Oth. where the expedition rested for a day, and on the 12th the march was resumed toward the Virginia Central railroad, which was struck at Tolersville on the 13th, and several miles of track torn up. The next day Custer directed his march toward Ground Squirrel bridge, while Devin moved along the railroad to the South Anna. Both bridges were destroyed after a slight skirmish with the guards, in which the 5th U. S. cavalry captured a number of prisoners and 3 pieces of artillery. The 1st division was here ordered to move toward Hanover Court House and the 3rd to push south as far as Ashland, but upon learning that a considerable force of the enemy under Longstreet was moving to intercept the expedition, the two divisions were united, the whole command recrossed the South Anna and moved along the north bank of the Pamunkey to White House landing, which was reached on the 18th. Here the expedition rested until the 25th, when it again took up the march and two days later rejoined the Army of the Potomac. During the movement Sheridan's forces captured 1,603 prisoners, 2,154 horses and mules, 16 battle flags, 17 pieces of artillery and over 2,000 stands of small arms. The line of march was marked by wholesale destruction. Sixteen large mills and factories 26 warehouses and 8 railroad depots, together with their contents of valuable stores, were laid in ashes 47 miles of railroad track, 30 miles of telegraph, 49 canal locks, 44 railroad and several wagon bridges, 10 watertanks, and about 40 canal and flatboats all loaded with provisions, etc., were completely destroyed. Battle at Jackson Hospl, Richmond, Virginia on 03 April 1865 Battle at Petersburg, Virginia on 03 April 1865 Battle at Richmond, Virginia on 03 April 1865 Battle at Richmond, Virginia Hospital on 03 April 1865 Battle at Amelia Court House, Virginia on 05 April 1865 Battle at Farmville, Virginia on 06 April 1865 Battle at High Bridge, Virginia on 06 April 1865 ; Source: The Union Army vol. 6 High Bridge, Va., April 6, 1865. 4th Massachusetts Cavalry, 54th Pennsylvania and 123rd Ohio Infantry. At 4 a.m. of this date this detachment, under command of Gen. Theodore Read, left Burkeville to destroy High bridge over the Appomattox river about 5 miles from Farmville. The cavalry advance met the enemy when within about 2 miles of the bridge and immedately engaged and drove him almost to Farmville. Here the Confederate artillery opened on the advance, compelling it to fall back to near Rice's Station, where the infantry was hotly engaged. Read ordered the cavalry to charge into the woods on the left, which it did with great success, but on its return it was surrounded and after a severe fight captured by a superior force of the enemy. Some 15 members of the cavalry were killed or wounded. The enemy's loss was not reported. Battle at Farmville, Virginia on 07 April 1865 ; Source: The Union Army, vol. 5 Farmville, Va, April 7, 1865. 2nd Army Corps and Crook's Cavalry. During the night of the 6th the Confederate army under Gen. Lee crossed to the north bank of the Appomattox river, Gen. Longstreet's corps crossing at Farmville, the cavalry at a ford a short distance above that place, and Gordon and Mahone at High bridge, about 5 miles below. At Farmville the army halted long enough to distribute rations, of which the men stood sorely in need, and then pushed on toward Lynchburg; via Appomattox Court House. Gen. Ord, with the 24th corps, commanded by Gen. Gibbon, came up with Longstreet strongly intrenched at Rice's station late on the 6th, and disposed his forces for an attack at daylight the following morning, but finding that the enemy had withdrawn during the night, pressed on to Farmville, where he was joined by Gen. Wright with the 6th corps, and directed to continue the direct pursuit as long as there was any probability of overtaking the enemy. Gen. Humphreys, who, with the 2nd corps, had followed Gordon from Sailor's creek, came up to High bridge just as the enemy had fired the railroad bridge and was trying to set fire to the wagon bridge. Gen. Barlow, whose division was in advance, promptly drove back the enemy from the bridge and extinguished the flames. Mahone's division was formed on the high ground north of the river, a strong skirmish line was thrown back to drive Barlow's men away from the bridge, but upon seeing the 2nd corps already coming up in force he quickly withdrew abandoning 18 pieces of artillery and 500 Enfield rifles, and followed Gordon toward Farmville. Humphreys now sent the divisions of Miles and De Trobriand on a road running northwest to intercept Lee on the Lynchburg stage road about 4 miles from Farmville, and ordered Barlow to follow Gordon and Mahone up the railroad. When Barlow reached Farmville he found the bridges there destroyed and a strong force guarding a wagon train moving toward Lynchburg. He immediately attacked, but the enemy was evidently not in fighting humor, as he set fire to 130 of his wagons and hurriedly evacuated the town. In this affair Brig.-Gen. T. A. Smyth, commanding Barlow's 3rd brigade, was mortally wounded. About 1 p.m. Miles and De Trobriand reached the stage road and found the enemy in position behind breastworks. Both divisions were formed in line of battle and Miles ordered Scott's brigade to charge the left of the Confederate works. The charge was gallantly made but failed of success, chiefly on account of the difficult nature of the ground over which it had to be made. As Scott fell back the enemy made a countercharge, which in turn was repulsed. It was soon developed that the main body of Lee's army was concentrated near the junction of the roads, and Barlow's division was brought up, taking position on the right. It was now almost dark and further operations were postponed until the next morning, the corps going into bivouac after throwing out a strong picket line close up to the enemy's intrenchments. The destruction of the bridges at Farmville kept the Federal infantry on the south side of the river and prevented Wright and Gibbon from joining Humphreys, but Gen. Crook forded the river with his cavalry division and pushed forward on the plank road in pursuit. Gregg's brigade, which was in advance, soon came up with the Confederate rear-guard and, was attacked by Munford's and Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry in front and Rosser's on the flank, the enemy's cavalry being supported by Heth's division of infantry. Seeing himself greatly outnumbered, Gregg gave the order to withdraw, when the enemy made a dash, capturing him and a number of his command. Crook was then recalled to Farmville and ordered to move to Prospect Station on the Lynchburg railroad, where he arrived about midnight. The loss of the 2nd corps for the day was 671 in killed, wounded and missing. Crook's loss, as well as that of the enemy, was not stated. Battle at Petersburg, Virginia on 07 April 1865 Battle at Macon, Georgia on 20 April 1865 ; Source: The Union Army, vol.6, p. 580 2nd Cavalry Division, Military Division of Mississippi. This affair was the last engagement of Wilson's raid through Alabama and Georgia. When within 20 miles of Macon the advance division encountered a Confederate cavalry command of 400 men. By a series of brilliant charges by the 17th Ind. the enemy was driven from behind every barricade where he took refuge and was completely routed, throwing away arms and ammunition in the haste of his flight. When nine miles out of the city a Confederate flag of truce was met announcing an armistice between Sherman and Johnston, but Col. Robt. H. G. Minty, commanding the advance, refused to honor it and gave it five minutes to get out of the way. The Federals then continued the charge and dashed over the works into the city, which was surrendered by Gen. Howell Cobb. The results of the capture were 350 commissioned officers, 1,995 enlisted men, 60 pieces of artillery, a large amount of small arms, and all public works. The casualties were not reported. Battle at Macon, Georgia on 21 April 1865 |
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