Mitson Melton, Marion County GA

Marion County

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Marion County GAGenWeb

Trish Elliott-Kashima, County Coordinator

MITSON MELTON

Parents unknown, but he seems closely connected to the children of McKinney Melton

Compiled by Trish Elliott-Kashima

Mitson Melton

Born ca 1822, SC or GA (all children in census records say he was born GA)

Married Julia Story, 30 Nov 1848, Marion Co GA, dau of Josiah and Martha (Julia was born Feb 1830 GA; died March 1902, Marion County, GA)

Died: April 24, 1881, Marion County, GA (exact date may not be correct) shot in doorway by Oliver P. Jones

Children:

1. Rious M., born ca 1850, GA (probably Marion Co); married Elizabeth Green, 12 Nov 1868, Marion Co GA.

2. Josiah Quith, born June 12, 1854,Marion Co. GA , married Sarah E/Sallie Chambless, ca 1875, GA, died Nov 12, 1924, Marion Co GA. (death cert says his father and mother born in Marion Co GA) Children per 1900/1910 census: Tazewell, Marion Co GA: Julia/Joathas Ann, Loula A., Sarah E., Henry H., Edgar, Warren Tom., Trissney?/Irving? K, Ada, Eva (deceased by 1910?. Apparent members of Mt. Pisgah Primitive Baptist Church as two ch buried there.

3. William T., born ca 1856, GA (prob Marion Co); married Ella Green, 8 Nov 1879, Marion Co GA; died November 1901, probably Marion Co GA

4. Elijah Ezra, born March1858, GA (prob Marion Co); (probably the Eli who married Ada Carson, 16 Dec 1886) widow by 1900. Children per 1900 census: Coleman, Chattahoochee Co GA: Noler, Leffier?, Ada, Havannah. Miller grist mill.

5. Roe Tom, born Jan 1859, GA (prob Marion Co); married Nora S., ca 1890, prob Marion Co GA. Children per 1900 census Brantley, Marion Co GA (living next door to mother): Tom R.

6. Troy, born Oct 1 1863,Marion Co., GA; died a widower Oct 5, 1924, Marion Co., GA (death cert says his father was born in Crawford Co GA and his mother in SC) married Minnie Scroggins, 30 Sept 1886, Marion Co GA. Children per 1900/1910 census Brantley, Marion Co GA: Ernest (born Dec 1891, Marion Co GA), Lillie Eva (born 3 Sept 1892, Marion Co GA) and Van A/Willie (born Apr 1898, Marion Co GA), Ada (born ca 1902, Marion Co GA).

7. Elender/Evender Y. , born March 1864, GA (prob Marion Co); married Harriet/Hattie Epps, 23 Dec 1886, Marion County, GA. Children: Elderada, Maude M., Alberta, Ada Belle, Eddie B., per 1900 census Brantley, Marion Co GA.. Living 1910 census Sumter Co., GA w family, a carpenter for the R.R.

8. Ada, born ca 1866, GA (prob Marion Co)

9. Rough A, born March 1877, Marion Co., GA , unmarried and living with mother in 1900 census.

1850: 30 March: Marion County GA; Between Madison Carter of the first part and Ruben Kemp and Mitson Melton of the second part and Elizabeth Carter, James, Simpson, Mary Ellen, Sarah Jones, Jesse Wellborn, Littleberry Neal, Ann Elizabeth (Children of the said Elizabeth Carter) of the third part. For the consideration of $5.00 paid by Reuben Kemp and Mitson Melton of the second part and also for the love and affection which he has for the said partied of the third part (they being his wife and children), has given, granted, bargained, sold and conveyed unto the said Ruben Kemp and Mitson Melton land in the 4th Dist, lot #22, it being the east half of the lot. I herewith deliver said land.....to Ruben Kemp and Mitson Melton to have and to hold....as trustees and in trust for the use purpose and trust following that is to hold the said in trust for the separate use and benefit and behoof of the said Elizabeth Carter the wife of the said Madison Carter ...and after her decease to and for the use and benefit of the said James Simpson, Mary Ellen, Sarah Jones, Jesse Willborn, Littleberry Neal, Ann Elizabeth..... Signed Maddison Carter, Ruben (his mark) Kemp and Mitson Melton. Witnessed by G. O. Davis and Geo. W. McDuffie. (connection here is the Story family. Reuben Kemp married Elizabeth Story.)

1855: 11 Dec: Marion Co GA: Marion Co GA: land sold by Andrew Helms to Mitson Melton for $200 part of the west half of lot 157 in 5th Dist in the amount of 81 acres. Witness W. M. McCall and C. H. McCall.

1858: 20 Feb; Marion Co GA: land sold by Z. Booth to Mitson Melton for $250.00 land in NW corner of lot 10, 4th Dist, about 56 acres more or less.

1859: Marion Co tax digest. 948th Dist, worth $1,106.00

1859: 15 March: Marion Co GA: land sold by Josiah Story to Mitson Melton, for $400.00 for the east 90 acres of land in the lot 10, 4th Dist. Witness Jas. A, Booth and W. B. Spinks J.P.

1860 census: Marion Co GA, Redbone Dist:

#524: Mitson Melton, 38, farmer, $800, $365, SC,

Julia A., m, 29, domestic, GA

Rious M., 10, GA

Josiah Q., 6, GA

William T., 4, GA

Eli J., 2, GA

Ro Tom 7/12, GA

1864: 13 Jan: Marion Co GA: land sold by Zachariah L. Chambless to Mitson Melton for $15.00 for 1 acre of land, north west corner of lot 23, in 5th Dist, originally Muscogee Co now Marion Co. Witness Francis Crye

1869: 1 Dec: witness to will of Calvin Johnson, Marion Co GA

1870 census: Red Bone, Marion Co GA:

page 170, #1235:

Mitson Melton, 51, farmer, $1200, $215, GA

Julia A., 41, GA

Josiah Q., 16, works on farm, GA

William T,. 14, works on farm, GA

Elija----, 12, GA

Rolton, 10, GA

Tray, 8, GA

Elender, 6, GA

Ada, 4, GA

1872: 25 March: Marion Co, GA land sold by Marlin T. Edge to Mitson Melton; 74-1/2 acres of south side of north 100 acres of lot 147, 5th Dist for $500.00.

Not in 1880 census that I can see.

1881: April 21: Dodge Co GA newspaper:

"A Brutal Deed, An Old Man Murdered in Marion County"

Columbus, Ga, April 18 - A Special to the Enquirer-Sun gives the particulars of the assassination on Sunday night of Mitson Melton, aged seventy five years, at his home in Marion County, Ga. A young man named G. P. Jones has been arrested on suspicion. The cause of the murder is unknown.

1881: July Term: Marion Co GA: Mitson Melton's will probated, wife Juliann Melton Executrix, other heirs mentioned, but not named. Witnesses: Charles H. McCall, William B. Spinks and John T. or J Crye.

1898: October 14, 1989: The Atlanta Constitution, page 4:

"Did He Commit Blody Crime?" A Prisoner in Atlanta charged with the Old Time Murder. It is a strange case. L. P. Dawson who is said to be Oliver P. Jones, the man arrested. The murder of Mitson Melton. A dastardly deed eighteen years ago in Union County-The arrest of the Supposed murderer in Arkansas after 16 years. Sheriff says he is sure that the man he has under arrest is the real murderer. Last night at 8 o'clock there was taken into police barracks a middle aged white man with handcuffs about his wrists, and by his side was a sheriff, who asked that the man with the handcuffs be locked up for the night. It is not a scene that is new to the attaches of the police barracks, but it was a chapter in one of the most remarkable murder stories that has ever been recorded in the annals of crime in Georgia. The man under arrest said to be Oliver P. Jones, and he claimed he was L. P. Dawson. The guard was Sheriff N. W. Parker of Marion County. The charge against the prisoner was the murder of Mitson Melton. It was a foul murder, that was committed 18 years ago in Marion County, Georgia. It was as black a crime as has ever blackened the pages of Georgia's history, and it seemed destined to take its place among the murder mysteries never to be cleared up. The man supposed to have committed the crime disappeared, and was not heard of until 16 years passed by. Added to the horrible crime came another chapter of the mystery as soon as it was supposed the right man had been captured after after the lapse of so many years, for he claimed it was a case of mistake identity, and a bitter fight in the courts for his freedom. This occurred in the far away western state where he was arrested. Last night, handcuffed and closely guarded, he was brought to Atlanta on his way to Marion County, the scene of the crime long ago.

The foul crime from long ago. In 1881, on a dark night, while Mitson Melton, a prosperous farmer, and a man who had the esteem of all who knew him, sat quietly by his fireside resting, after a day of hard and honest toil, there was a rap at the door, and Melton arose with a light in his hand to open the door. Believing it was some friendly neighbor come for a social call, he drew the latch and flung the wide opened he door. There was a flash and a report of a pistol in the hands of an assassin who hid in the shadows. With a groan Farmer Melton fell back with a pistol ball in his heart. The light in his hand went out no more suddenly than the light of his life. The crime was published in all of the papers of Georgia, and was talked about as one of the more dastardly deeds that had ever occurred in the state. The officers of the law went to work to ferret out the perpetrator, and they soon discovered that Melton had had a quarrel with one of his neighbors named Oliver P. Jones, and when a search was made for Jones, he could not be found. From that day to this there has never been any doubt about Jones having committed the murder, but Jones could not be located so the crime was placed among those classes as unavenged murders.

An Arrest made. 16 years ago a man was arrested in Mena, a small town in Arkansas, who was believed to be Oliver P. Jones, the murder of Mitson Melton, but the prisoner contended he was L. P. Dawson and had never lived in Georgia in his life, but had passed the state but once. He fought his removal from Arkansas and for 2 years the case was in the courts. Last week the prisoner finally lost the case and he was turned over to Sheriff Parker, who was notified by wire to go after him. Sheriff Parker said he knew last night Oliver P. Jones well, and that he was certain the man in custody was the right party.The prisoner at first refused to talk. He said he had been grossly misrepresented and imposed upon, and he decided to have nothing more to say. He finally decided to talk, upon an assurance that he would be fairly treated. He said:

The story of the Prisoner. I am not Oliver P. Jones, My name is L. P. Dawson and I was born in Bucks Co Pennsylvania near the capitol seat of Doylestown. I went to Arkansas several years ago and merchandised in the town of Jonesboro, then moved to Mena, in Sebastian County. I had a store there, and one day 23 months ago there turned up a young man named Tharpe who claimed he was from Marion County, Georgia and he pointed me out as a murder who had committed a crime many years ago in his state. I was arrested and thrown in jail, and I asked that I be brought face to face with my accuser, but this was not done. A young man named Rushing came from Georgia saying he had been sent by the Governor of that state to take me into custody. I took out a writ of habeas corpus, and the court decided against me, as Rushing swore positively that I was Oliver P. Jones. I appealed and the case was in the Supreme Court for two years, and a decision was made only a few days ago. I was only in Georgia once in my life when I went to Savannah. They say the man who killed the farmer was about 35 when the crime was committed. That would make him 50 now. Look at my moustache and hair. Am I that old? My age is 35. If I committed the crime I must have been 17 when it was done. I have spent all of the money I have; have been broken up in business, and here I am in a strange land without friends and money, but there is a just God who will not let the innocent suffer. The sheriff will leave with his prisoner with his prisoner for Buena Vista, Marion County, and the case will doubtless be one of the most interesting that has been tried in Georgia in a long while.

1900 census: Brantley, Marion Co GA:

Julian Melton, born Feby 1830, 70 widowed, GA, GA, GA

Rough A., born March 1877, 23, single, laborer, GA, GA, GA

1902: 5 Dec Marion Co Patriot: "Old Mitson Melton place sold at administrators sale Tuesday, purchased by Messrs Mack and John Benson, price paid $1,255 for 250 acres."

Jan 27, 1905, Supreme Court of Georgia: (source, "The Southeastern Reporter", Vol 49, page 690)

121 Ga. MELTON vs. CAMP. (Supreme Court of Georgia. Jan. 27, 1905.) WILL — CONSTRUCTION — NATURE OF ESTATE — LIENS— LIEN OF JUDGMENTS.
1. Testator died, leaving his property to his wife for life or widowhood, and giving her power to dispose of it during such time, with remainder over, of all that might be undisposed of upon her death, to his lawful heirs, or, if she remarried, then to his lawful heirs ; including
her as one of such heirs. Held, (1) that the widow took an estate for life or widowhood, and also a power of disposal ; (2) that the testator's lawful heirs at the time of his death, other than his wife, took a vested remainder in the property, subject to be defeated by the widow's exercising her power of disposal, and subject, in the event she remarried, to having her included among the remaindermen ; (3) that, where one of such heirs died after the testator died, and the widow subsequently died without having remarried or disposed of the property, children of such deceased heir could take only through him, and his interest was subject to the lien of judgments against hia estate. (Syllabus by the Court.) Error from Superior Court, Marlon County; W. B. Butt, Judge. Garnishment proceedings between E. E. Melton and Effle Camp. Judgment for Camp, and Melton brings error. Reversed. Cameron & Pinkston and W. D. Crawford, for plaintiff in error. John C. Butt and J. J. Dunham, for defendant in error. SIMMONS, C. J. Judgment was obtained and fl. fa. issued for about $475 against the administrator of the estate of W. T. Melton, deceased. The estate being insolvent, the plaintiff In fl. fa. sued out summons of garnishment, and had the same served upon the administrator de bonis non cum testamento annexo of Mitson Melton, deceased. The garnishee answered that, as administrator, he had in his hands $140.29, arising from the proceeds of the estate of the testator, which was the amount W. T. Melton would have taken under the provisions of the will of the testator. The garnishee further stated In his answer that the heirs of W. T. Melton claimed title to this fund, not subject to the lien of the judgment, and be prayed that these heirs be made parties. Mrs. Ella Melton, the widow of W. T. Melton, and Mrs. Eftie Camp, his daughter, claiming to be his only heirs at law, asked to be made parties, and filed a claim to the fund in the hands of the garnishee. They were made parties, but subsequently the name of Mrs. Melton was stricken, and the claim allowed to proceed In the name of Mrs. Camp alone. The case was submitted to the Judge, without the Intervention of a Jury, upon the will of Mitson Melton and an agreed statement of facts. The Judge decided In favor of the claimant, and the plaintiff In fl. fa. excepted. The will of Mitson Melton disposed of his property as follows: "I do hereby give and bequeath all my estate both real and personal and all things to me belonging to beloved wife Julian Melton, to be by her controlled, managed and disposed of with fifll power, liberty and privilege of selling and buying, trading and trafficking as seems right and proper to her, trusting all to her discretion as long as she remains a widow, or in case she should never marry any more, then during her natural life, and at any time while the property Is under her control she may help any of the children that may marry and be in need, but this shall be at her discretion, but if she should marry again then the entire remainder or balance of the property shall be equally divided among my lawful heirs and she shall be entitled to receive an equal part with the other heirs, and at her death the entire balance or remainder shall be equally divided among my lawful heirs." From the agreed statement of facts It appeared that the testator, Mitson Melton, had died April 24, 1881, leaving his widow and eight children, one of whom was W. T. Melton; that the widow did not remarry, but died in March, 1902; that W. T. Melton died in November, 1901, leaving as his only heirs at law his widow and Mrs. Camp, the latter being his only child; that each of the distributive shares of the estate of Mitson Melton in the hands of the administrator at the time of the service of the summons of garnishment was $140.29. We think that the court below erred in holding that Mrs. Camp was entitled to a share of the estate of her grandfather, free of the lien of her father's debts. The will Is inartificially drawn, but Its intention seems clear. The testator's widow took an estate for life or widowhood, and also a power of disposal. Indeed, neither party to this case could travel, except on the theory that the widow took such an estate, and not a fee. The will expressly limits her estate to one for life or widowhood, and therefore the addition of the power of disposal does not enlarge this estate into a fee. Wooster v. Cooper, 53 N. J. Eq. G82, 33 Atl. 1050; Payne v. Johnson, 95 Ky. 175, 24 S. W. 238, 609; Shaw v. Hussey, 41 Me. 495. It Is true, the words "as long as she remains a widow" and "during her natural life" follow the words giving the power of disposal, but this does not make them apply any the less to the estate given. They affected both the quantum of interest In the estate and the power of disposal. Stuart v. Walker, 72 Me. 146, 39 Am. Rep. 311. . A power is not property, but a mere authority, and an absolute power of disposal is not inconsistent with an estate for life only. The gift of such power will not enlarge the life estate previously given, but confers an authority In addition thereto. The widow therefore took an estate for life or widowhood. The limitation over to the lawful heirs of the testator was neither an executory devise nor a contingent remainder. It was to a class, and the objects thereof must be determined in this case as of the time when such will took effect; that Is, at the death of the place of intent Is calculated to mislead the jury, and a new trial should have been granted because of such Instruction. The motion for a new trial contains numerous other assignments of error, some of them relating to matters which will probably not occur upon another bearing. No error seems
to have been committed In the admission of the evidence which was objected to, and the other portions of the charge excepted to do not seem to be subject to the objections made thereto. Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur. (121 Oa. 679) "

GA State Supreme Court Cases from The American State Reports by Abraham Clark Freeman:

(page 184-188
WARTHEN v. MELTON. [132 Qa. 113, 63 S. E. 832.] JUDGMENT IN GARNISHMENT, Attacking by Showing the Payment of the Original Judgment. — Where a transferee of an execution
sues out a garnishment proceeding against one who has funds in his hands belonging to the principal debtor, one of the defendants in the execution, said garnishment proceeding being based on the judgment on which the execution was founded, a judgment rendered in favor of such transferee, while conclusive against the garnishee, may be attacked by the principal debtor, the defendant in fi. fa., on the ground that subsequently to its rendition the judgment, upon which the transferred execution was founded, had been paid off and discharged prior to the institution of the garnishment
proceedings, (p. 186.) EXECUTION, Attacking by Showing that One of the Defendants was a Surety. — The parol evidence offered at the trial, to show that one of the defendants in the execution was merely a surety, was properly excluded, (p. 187.)

JUDGMENT AND EXECUTION, Payment and Transfer of. — The court did not err in charging the jury as follows: "If you believe from the evidence that Mathew Melton, one of the defendants, paid off this fi. fa., and had the same transferred to him, I charge you that that would be a settlement of the fi. fa., an-3 it would fee your duty to find the issue in favor of the plaintiff, Eli E. Melton," it not appearing from the recital in the transfer that the transferee
had complied with the provision in section 5376 of the Civil Code, by having the amount of the payment made entered on the fi. fa. (p. 187.)

JUDGMENT, Release of One of Several Judgment Debtors. — Where a plaintiff in fi. fa., or a transferee of the execution accepts a sum of money from one of the joint defendants in such fi. fa., and "agrees to relieve him, and does release him," from further liability under said fi. fa., the other defendants are also released and the fi. fa. is discharged, (p. 188.)
JUDGMENT, Motion to Set Aside — Newly Discovered Evidence. — There was no abuse of discretion in overruling the ground of the motion based on the alleged newly discovered evidence, (p. 188.) (Syllabi by the court.) (184)beneficial interest in the estate of the bankrupt, and where there is no allegation that partition is necessary to fully protect the rights of those interested in the estate of the bankrupt. The decree is reversed and the cause remanded. Shackleford, C. J., and Cockrell, J., concur. Taylor, Hocker and Parkhill, JJ., concur in the opinion. Every Cotenant is Entitled to a Partition as a matter of right: O'Brien v. Hahoney, 179 Mass. 200, 88 Am. St. Eep. 371. A trustee of an express trust holding the legal title to land may maintain a partition suit in his own name: Snell v. Harrison, 131 Mo. 495, 52 Am. St. Bep. DETAILS: 118 BECK, J. The Buena Vista Loan and Savings Bank obtained, in the county court of Marion county, a judgment against Eli E. Melton, Mathew Melton, and R. T. Melton, upon which judgment a fi. fa. issued on the twenty-sixth day of August, 1895. On December 19, 1895, said fi. fa. was transferred to Mrs. Mathew Melton (now Mrs. Caroline Warthen, the plaintiff in error). Eli E. Melton is a son and heir at law of Mitson Melton, deceased, and Troy Melton is the administrator on the estate of the deceased. On December 2, 1902, Mrs. Melton sued out a summons of garnishment against said administrator, and a verdict was rendered in her favor for the sum of one hundred and thirty dollars and twenty-nine cents. At the April term, 1903, of the superior court of said county, Eli II. Melton, one of the defendants, filed his motion to set aside the judgment against the garnishee, on various grounds; but at the hearing, all the grounds except the second and fifth, as amended, were abandoned ; and these are as follows: "Because since the rendition of the original judgment in said case, and before the suing out of said garnishment proceedings and the rendition of the judgment in said garnishment against said garnishee, to wit, on the nineteenth day of December, 1895, said execution and the judgment upon which the same was funded were paid off and discharged by Mathew Melton, one of the defendants in said original fi. fa. and judgment; said payment made to Joe J. Dunham, the attorney of record for said original plaintiff, Buena Vista Loan and Savings Bank, who was then the owner and holder of said fi. fa. and judgment." And further, "Because since the rendition of the original judgment in said case, and before the rendition of the judgment in said garnishment, or the suing out of said process, to wit, on the fourth day of April, 1896, Mrs. Math. (Caroline) Melton, the alleged transferee, received from R. T. Melton, one of the defendants in said original fi. fa. and judgment, the sum of twenty-five dollars, agreeing to release the said defendant upon the payment by him of fifty dollars, which sum of fifty dollars was paid by said R. T. Melton, one of the defendants, to Mrs. Math. (Caroline) Melton, to wit, twenty-five dollars on the said fourth day of April. 1896; sixteen and one-half dollars on April 17, 1896; and eight and one-half dollars on May 4, 1896; which interest may be had without partition, and this may be sufficient for debt paying purposes. Under the bankrupt law the trustee has "rights of action arising upon contracts or from the unlawful taking or detention of, or injury to, his [bankrupt's] property." The bankrupt's right to partition does not arise out of contract.
Partition does not involve unlawful taking or detention of or injury to property. The bankruptcy law vests the title to the property of the bankrupt in the trustee in bankruptcy, and requires the trustee, under the supervision of the bankruptcy court. 800 to reduce the property to money for debt-paying purposes. The possession of one cotenant is the possession of all cotenants, when the rights of none are denied. If in this case Porter is in possession and denied the right of the trustee, the latter, having the legal title, could bring ejectment to establish his right to possession. But as the title of the trustee is not denied by Porter, the possession follows the title, and partition is not shown by any allegation in the bill to be necessary to a reduction of the property to money for purposes of paying debts, or that it will be advantageous to the interest of creditors to have partition thereof. There is no showing that partition is necessary or expedient to protect the rights of the trustee in bankruptcy or those whom he represents. The allegation is that the trustee in bankruptcy "is desirous of obtaining a partition and division of the said premises." The statutes of the state do not contemplate that partition may be enforced except when required by the demands or the interests of a beneficial owner, or when shown to be necessary to protect the rights of those beneficially interested. It is not shown that the interests of the beneficial owners here require partition. The defendants in the partition proceedings did not consent to the partition, but by demurrer questioned the trustee's right under the showing made by the bill to partition.
The bankruptcy law does not expressly authorize partition proceedings by the trustee of the bankrupt ; and as such a proceeding is not shown here to be essential to the statutory duties of such a trustee, and no such duty appears to have been imposed by the bankruptcy court, the statute of this state relating to partition should not be unreasonably extended to cover trustees in bankruptcy who
have the bare legal title but only special statutory duties to perform in connection with such title, 8O1 who have no said payments and release were a full discharge and payment of said original fi. fa. and the judgment upon which the same was founded." Mrs. Melton filed an answer to the original motion to set aside the judgment, and also a plea of res judicata. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Eli E. Melton. Mrs. Melton filed a motion for a new trial, the grounds of which appear in the decision. The motion was overruled, and she excepted.

115 1. Where one who is a transferee of a judgment sues out a process of garnishment against another, and the latter, in answer to the summons of garnishment, admits that he is indebted to the defendant in execution, and thereupon the plaintiff enters a judgment against the garnishee for the sum admitted by him to be due the principal debtor. such a judgment, while conclusive against the garnishee, does not conclude the defendant in execution, upon proper pleadings, from attacking the judgment against the garnishee and showing that the judgment and execution, upon which the garnishment proceedings were based, had in fact been paid off and discharged prior to the institution of the garnishment proceedings. If the execution held by the transferee in this case had actually been paid off or discharged by the defendants in fi. fa., or the transferee had done any act which in law operated as a release of the defendants in fi. fa., and, notwithstanding, proceeded to enforce the same as a valid subsisting lien upon the property of the defendants therein, and obtained a judgment as stated above, such a judgment was obtained by fraud as against the principal debtor, and should be set aside upon proper pleadings instituted for that purpose. The question in this case as to whether the petition filed by the defendant in execution, which was termed "a motion," was sufficient in form or not has not been raised by demurrer or otherwise, although the defendant in the petition to have the judgment against the garnishee set aside, in addition to making denial of certain allegations in the petition and setting up certain other matters responsive to the charges, did plead: "That said judgment should not be opened and set aside for the reasons alleged in plaintiff's motion, for the reasons that the defenses therein set out were matters that by proper diligence the plaintiff in said motion could and should have ascertained and pleaded at the trial of said garnishment case, which was had in Marion superior court on the twenty-seventh day of October, 1903, said court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the defendant in said garnishment, and that the same is res adjudicata and should not be set aside." In regard to which plea, it is sufficient to observe that no issue between the principal debtor and the plaintiff in garnishment was determined by the judgment taken in that case, because the 116 principal debtor was not a party to the garnishment proceedings: Rood on Garnishment, sec. 375; Foster v. Haynes, 88 Ga. 240, 14 S. E. 570. 2. On the trial of the case the plaintiff in error offered parol evidence to show that Eli E. Melton "was principal in said judgment and fi. fa. [the basis of the garnishment proceedings], and that R. T. Melton and Mathew Melton were only securities." The court refused to admit this evidence, upon which ruling error is assigned. The judgment and execution on the face of each appears to be against all of the defendants as principals. The fact of suretyship does not appear on the face of the execution, nor, so far as we know, upon the face of the contract; and that being the case, the party seeking to enforce the execution was not entitled in this contest to show by parol evidence that certain parties defendant, who appear to have been joint principals, were in fact only sureties: Patterson v. Clark, 101 Ga. 214, 28 S. E. 623. 3. Error is assigned upon the following charge of the court: "If you believe from the evidence that Mathew Melton, one of the defendants, paid off this fi. fa. and had the same transferred to him, I charge you that that would be a settlement of the fi. fa., and it would be your duty to find the issue in favor of the plaintiff, Eli E. Melton." The exception to this part of the charge is not well taken. The execution in question in this case is against Mathew Melton and two other defendants. It would have been competent for either of the defendants to pay the execution against himself and the others, and take a written transfer from the plaintiff in fi. fa., and the fi. fa. would have been enforceable in favor of the transferee against the other joint defendants for their proportion of the amount so paid as the consideration of the transfer of the fi. fa., if the defendant making the payment had complied with the provisions of the Civil Code, section 5376, and had entered on the fi. fa. the payment made. That it was made for a "valuable consideration" does not authorize the inference that the plaintiff in fi. fa. had received from the transferees the full amount due thereon, and there was no entry appearing on the fi. fa. to show what amount was actually paid by the transferee. In the case of Miller v. Perkerson, 128 Ga. 465, 57 S. E. 787, it appears that several of the payments made by the defendants, to 'whom the fi. fa. was transferred, were credited 11T thereon as having been made, and in the transfer appears a recital to the effect that the transfer was made for "value received." It was held in that case that the expression "for value received" would authorize the inference, in the absence of anything to the contrary, that the plaintiff in fi. fa. had received from the transferee the full amount due thereon. Without questioning that ruling, we are unwilling to amplify it to the extent of holding that the recital which appears on the fi. fa. appearing in this record would authorize the same inference. And, without the support of such an inference, the contention of the plaintiff in error, in respect to the charge in question, must fail. 4. Under the evidence in this case the court did not err in instructing the jury that if they should find from the evidence that the transferee of the fi. fa. had "accepted a certain sum of money from R. T. Melton, one of the defendants to said fi. fa., and agreed to relieve him and did release him," the other defendants would also be released and the fi. fa. discharged : Powell v. Davis, 60 Ga. 70. 5. There was no abuse of discretion in overruling the ground of the motion based on the alleged newly discovered evidence. Judgment affirmed. All the justices concur. A Valid Judgment Against the Principal Defendant is essential to authorize a judgment against the garnishee: Frisk v. Reigelman, 57 Wis. 499, 17 Am. St. Rep. 198. That the latter may avail himself of the invalidity of the judgment against the principal, see the note to Hanna'u Syndics v. Lauring, 13 Am. Dec. 341. Compare, however,Schncitman v. Noble, 75 Iowa, 120, 9 Am. St. Rep. 467. Proceedings to Dissolve Attachments are discussed in the note to Collins v. Stanley, 123 Am. St. Eep. 1028.

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